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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
change of venue order is successful the inconvenienced party will not be able
to recoup the expenses resulting from the erroneous change of venue order. s
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Purina demonstrates that without a more
sensible approach to mandamus review an erroneous change of venue order
may be practically unassailable on appeal.
ROBERT WALKER HUIpHIES
III. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. Abatement of Restitution Orders Under the Victim and
Witness Protection Act
The Victim and Witness Protection Act (the "Act") added sections 3579
and 3580 to title 18 of the United States Code.' The sections allow the judge
in a criminal suit under title 18 or under the Federal Aviation Act2 to order
restitution3 to the victim 4 of the crime as part of the criminal sentence.'
88. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (erroneous change of venue order may not
be capable of correction on appeal of final judgment).
1. Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5(a), 96 Stat. 1253 & 1255
(1982) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579 & 3580 (1982)).
2. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472(h), (i), (j), & (n) (1982) (crimes under Federal Aviation Act
for which judge may order restitution include aircraft piracy, interference with flight crew
members or attendants, and transportation of hazardous materials on board aircraft); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1-6005 (1982) (title 18 contains statutes enumerating crimes and criminal procedure).
3. Restitution refers to the allocation of the victim's loss to the offender. See S. SCHAFFER,
COMNSAAON AND RESTrrrroN TO VIcmrss OF CRUME, x (2d ed. 1970). Restitution differs from
compensation, in which society assumes responsibility for restoring the victim's loss rather than
assigning that responsibility to the offender. Id. Restitution is part of the offender's sentence,
whereas compensation takes the form of payments through a civil agency. Id.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982). The Victim and Witness Protection Act (the "Act")
does not define the term "victim." One authority has interpreted the Act to apply only to
human victims, and not to institutional victims. See Memo of F. X. Altimari, U.S. District
Judge, to Judges of Eastern District of New York, Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982
at 14 (June 28, 1983) (available in files of VAsH. & LEE L. REv.); see also infra note 27
(discussion of Fourth Circuit's treatment of issue of institutional victims in United States v.
Dudley).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982). In addition to providing for restitution orders, the
Victim and Witness Protection Act proscribes certain acts against witnesses occurring prior and
subsequent to witness testimony or communication with law enforcement officers. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1512-1513 (1982); see also S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2515, 2520, 2528 [hereinafter cited as 1982 Senate Report]. Other
provisions in the Act set forth criminal penalties for offenses against witnesses while the offender
is on release awaiting trial. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514-1515 (1982); 1982 Senate Report, supra, at
2528-33. The Act also permits a civil suit by the Attorney General to enjoin intimidation of
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Section 3579 authorizes restitution, and section 3580 details the procedure
for ordering restitution. 6 The legislative history of the Act reveals that
restitution orders have rehabilitative, penal, and recompensatory objectives.'
These mixed objectives render classification of restitution orders as criminal
or civil in nature a difficult task.8
Under federal law, criminal penalties abate upon the death of the
defendant pending appeal. 9 In contrast, a person holding a judgment for
victims or witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3523 (1982); 1982 Senate Report, supra, at 2533-35. Under
the Act, probation departments must develop Victim Impact Statements to aid judges in
sentencing. See 1982 Senate Report, supra, at 2517-20. Furthermore, the Act creates a civil
cause of action for persons injured by the negligent acts of federal government employees which
lead to the escape or release of the offender. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (Federal Tort
Claims Act); 1982 Senate Report, supra, at 2539-43. Title V of the Victim and Witness Protection
Act required the Attorney General to set forth and implement guidelines for the fair treatment
of victims and witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982); 1982 Senate Report, supra, at 2543-48.
Finally, the Act required a report from the Attorney General on laws necessary to prevent a
criminal from profiting from the sale of his story before the victim has obtained compensation
for his criminal acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982); 1982 Senate Report, supra, at 2548-50.
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579-3580 (1982) (restitution provisions of Victim and Witness
Protection Act).
7. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2536-39 (legislative history of Victim and
Witness Protection Act). The 1982 Senate Report concerning the Victim and Witness Protection
Act states that the various restitution options that the Act permits allow the court to determine
the type of restitution which will "both satisfy the victim and provide maximum rehabilitative
incentives to the offender." Id. at 2538. The 1982 Senate Report also refers to the penal
objective of restitution orders, stating that society should require offenders to compensate their
victims in addition to imposing other criminal sanctions on the offender. Id. at 2536. According
to the Senate Report's summary of the restitution provisions, Congress' premise was that
restitution is a part of the "just sanctions" which compose an offender's sentence. Id. A prior
senate report termed the restitution order a "penal sanction." See S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 993, 1001 (1981). Representative Rodino, the primary sponsor of the House version
of the Act, termed the restitution provision a criminal sanction. See 128 CoNo. REc. H8205
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982). In general remarks during floor debates over the Act, senators and
representatives referred to restitution as part of the defendant's sentence. See, e.g., 128 CoNG.
REc. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep. McCollum); 128 CONG. REc. S11,436
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen. Mathias); 128 CONG. REc. S 3860 (daily ed. April
22, 1982) (statement of Sen. Chiles). The orientation of §§ 3579 and 3580 towards recompensing
the victim is apparent in other parts of the legislative history. See 1982 Senate Report, supra
note 5, at 2537 (terming restitution "victim oriented"). The Senate Report accompanying the
Act states that restitution should be "as fair as possible to the victim without unduly complicating
... the sentencing procedure." Id.
8. See also infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text (provisions of Act are similar to
civil penalties in some respects and similar to criminal sentences in other respects).
9. See United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1980). In Pauline, the Fifth
Circuit reviewed the effect of Dove v. United States on the doctrine of abatement ab initio
when a criminal defendant dies pending appeal. Id. at 683; Dove, 423 U.S. 325 (1971). Under
the rule of abatement ab initio, upon the death of the defendant the Court would dismiss the
appeal as moot, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case with directions to dismiss the
indictment against the decedent. See Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971). Until
the Dove decision, the Supreme Court applied the rule of abatement ab initio pending petitions
for certiorari. See United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 127 (7th Cir. 1977). In Dove,
the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari without vacating the decedent's conviction. Dove,
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civil damages against someone who dies prior to enforcement of the judgment
can enforce the judgment against the decedent's estate. 10 Thus, when a
criminal defendant's sentence includes a restitution order and the defendant
dies pending appeal, the characterization of the restitution order as a civil
award or a criminal penalty controls whether that order abates." In United
States v. Dudley,'2 the Fourth Circuit considered whether a restitution order
under the Victim and Witness Protection Act abates upon the death of the
defendant."'
In Dudley, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
convicted the defendant of conspiracy to use and unlawful use of food
stamps. 14 The trial court imposed a sentence that required the defendant to
reimburse the United States Department of Agriculture in the amount of the
value of the food stamps that the defendant had stolen.'5 The defendant died
423 U.S. at 325. The Court stated that insofar as Durham was inconsistent with the Court's
action in Dove, Dove overruled Durham. Id.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Dove, the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have decided that Dove changed the rule of abatement ab initio only with regard to
petitions for certiorari and not appeals as of right. See, e.g., Pauline, 625 F.2d at 685 (Fifth
Circuit remanded case to lower court following defendant's death pending appeal with directions
to vacate judgment and dismiss appeal); United States v. Littlefield, 594 F.2d 682, 683 (8th Cir.
1979) (Eighth Circuit vacated judgment and remanded case for dismissal of indictment after
defendant died pending appeal); United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 127 (7th Cir.
1977) (Seventh Circuit vacated conviction and remanded cause to lower court for dismissal of
indictment after defendant died prior to resolution of appeal); United States v. Bechtel, 547
F.2d 1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ninth Circuit held that all proceedings from inception of
prosecution abated subsequent to defendant's death pending appeal).
While courts have interpreted the Dove decision as changing the rule of abatement ab
initio regarding petitions for certiorari, the rule of abatement ab initio remains valid in its
application to direct criminal appeals. See Pauline, 625 F.2d at 685. Under the rule of abatement
ab initio as applied in federal court, the death of the defendant pending appeal abates not only
the appeal, but all proceedings from the inception of the prosecution. See Crooker v. United
States, 325 F.2d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1963) (reviewing federal courts' treatment of abatement
upon death of defendant pending appeal). The rationale for the rule is that allowing the
conviction to stand when death has prevented a defendant from exercising the defendant's right
of appeal would be unjust. See Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d at 128.
10. See Howard v. Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884, 885 (6th Cir. 1948) (in contrast to rule in
criminal cases, in civil action death of losing party pending appeal does not abate appeal).
11. See Epstein, Crime & Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL":
REsTITTON, RETRBUTION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, 231, 255 (R. Barnett & J. Hagel, eds.
1977). Epstein examined the theoretical basis of the distinction between tort and criminal law,
and concluded that valid reasons exist for maintaining tort law as a separate entity from
criminal law. Id. at 231-54. Epstein then discussed problems that arise in creating a system of
restitution based on combined tort and criminal theories as part of the criminal process. Id. at
255-57. Among the problems that restitution creates, Epstein anticipated the question of whether
restitution in a criminal context should abate following the defendant's death. Id. at 255.
12. 739 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1984).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 175-76. In addition to charges of conspiracy to use and unlawful use of food
stamps, the defendant in United States v. Dudley also faced a charge of illegal distribution of
Demerol. Id. at 175. The court convicted Dudley of all charges. Id. at 175-76.
15. Id. at 176. The trial court in Dudley imposed the restitution order requiring reim-
bursement for the stolen food stamps pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3579. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3579
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while awaiting appeal. 6 The defendant's counsel sought to have the entire
sentence vacated. 7 Although the government conceded that Dudley's death
voided the assessment of the fine and the prison and parole terms, the
government argued that the restitution order differed from the other, purely
penal, sanctions."' The government contended that the purposes of the
required reimbursement were primarily restitutionary, and that the defend-
ant's estate therefore was responsible for the repayment. 9 Dudley's counsel
argued that because the context of the restitution order was criminal, the
reimbursement was a penal sanction which should have abated upon the
death of the defendant.
20
Whether the section 3579 restitution order abated upon Dudley's death
pending appeal presented the Fourth Circuit with an issue of first impres-
sion. 2' The Fourth Circuit therefore considered the analogous case of United
States v. Oberlin22 for guidance in deciding the abatement issue.23 In Oberlin,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's death
caused the abatement of a forfeiture decreed under the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.2 The Fourth Circuit reasoned,
(1982) (authorizing restitution orders). The amount of the restitution order was $4,807.50. See
739 F.2d at 176. In addition to the restitution requirement in Dudley, the defendant's complete
sentence included concurrent sentences of four years on each of the six counts Dudley faced, a
parole term of four years on the count of distribution of Demerol, and a fine of $10,000 for
conspiracy to use food stamps. Id.
16. 739 F.2d at 176.
17. Id. In Dudley, defendant's counsel moved to have the Fourth Circuit dismiss the
appeal as moot pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id.;
Appellant's Brief at 3-4, United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Appellant's Brief]; see FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (procedure for voluntary dismissal of
appeal).
18. See 739 F.2d at 176.
19. Id. at 177.
20. Id. at 176.
21. See id. at 179. Since the Victim and Witness Protection Act applies only to crimes
occurring after January 1, 1983, only two courts other than Dudley have published opinions
dealing with the Act. See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983); United
States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1984) (decided after Dudley); infra notes 67-72 and
accompanying text (discussion of Welden); infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussion
of Florence).
22. 718 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1983).
23. See 739 F.2d at 177.
24. 718 F.2d at 896; see 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982) (forfeiture clause of Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970). Forfeiture is the divestiture of specific
property without compensation, as a result of some default or illegal act. See State v. DeGress,
72 Tex. 242, 11 S.W. 1029 (1888) (defining forfeiture).
In United States v. Oberlin, the defendant committed suicide following his conviction on
charges of drug trafficking and operating a continuing criminal enterprise. See 718 F.2d at 895.
Oberlin's sentence included an order to forfeit the proceeds from Oberlin's criminal activities.
Id. at 896. Following entry of judgment and the filing of a notice of appeal on Oberlin's behalf,
Oberlin's attorney moved to abate the prosecution. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule of
abatement ab initio applied, resulting in the abatement of all proceedings in the prosecution
from its inception. Id. at 895. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument that a
criminal forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 848 does not abate. Id. at 896. The Oberlin
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however, that the decision in favor of abatement in Oberlin was not directly
analogous to the issue that Dudley presented because forfeiture to the
government had much more of a penal quality than restitution to the victim
of a crime. 25 The Fourth Circuit maintained that while forfeiture has exclu-
sively punitive aims, the objective of a restitution order is to recompense the
victim. 26 Based on the Fourth Circuit's view of restitution orders as essentially
compensatory, the court held that the restitution provided by section 3579
constituted a recovery of property as in civil litigation, despite the criminal
context in which the lower court imposed the restitution order.
27
After determining that a restitution order under section 3579 essentially
is civil in nature, the Fourth Circuit considered the defendant's contention
that if the restitution order was a civil penalty, the statute was unconstitu-
tional. 2 Since the Act entrusts the determination of the amount of restitution
court reasoned that although some aspects of the forfeiture may have been remedial, the criminal
context and the essentially penal nature of the forfeiture indicated that the forfeiture should
abate in the same manner as other criminal penalties. Id. The criminal context in which the
district court ordered restitution showed that the forfeiture was a penal sanction. Id. The Ninth
Circuit contrasted the forfeiture proceeding's criminal nature with civil tax cases involving
forfeiture, in which the forfeiture does not abate upon the death of the defendant. Id.
25 See 739 F.2d at 177.
26. See id. But see United States v. Elliot Hall Farm, 42 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D.N.J. 1941)
(forfeiture not requiring criminal conviction is civil in nature). In addition to noting distinctions
between forfeiture and restitution, the Fourth Circuit in Dudley contrasted 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2),
the statute under which the Oberlin trial court sentenced Oberlin to forfeiture, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3579, the restitution statute before the Dudley court. See 739 F.2d at 177; 21 U.S.C. §
848(a)(2) (1982) (courts may order restitution as a condition of probation); 18 U.S.C. § 3579
(1982) (authorizing restitution orders independent of probation). The Fourth Circuit noted that
21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) appears under the title of "Offenses and Penalties," whereas the restitution
statute's title is "Criminal Procedure, Sentence, Judgment and Execution." 739 F.2d at 177.
Moreover, the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) reveals only penal and deterrent
motives in Congress' enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2). See 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 4566, 4575-76; cf. supra note 7 and accompanying text (legislative history of Victim and
Witness Protection Act reveals rehabilitative, penal, and restitutionary objectives).
27. 739 F.2d at 177. The Dudley court commented that unlike criminal penalties such as
forfeitures, fines, and incarceration, whose punitive purpose ceases with the death of the
defendant, restitution after the wrongdoer's death still serves the purpose of compensating the
victim. Id. Since the defendant's counsel had not argued that the government was not a victim
under the statute, the court saw no reason to distinguish between the government and other
victims of food stamp theft. Id. at 178. The Fourth Circuit in Dudley found that the language
of 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h), providing for enforcement of the restitution order by the United States,
indicated that the government was a proper victim under the Act. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h)
(1982). The court noted, however, that the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) merely could
indicate that the United States could serve in a fiduciary capacity to recover the judgment on
behalf of the victim. 739 F.2d at 178; see supra note 4 (discussion of whether Victim and
Witness Protection Act applies to institutional victims). Although defendant's counsel in Dudley
did not expressly argue that the government was not a victim under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act, defendant's counsel did contend that the victim's identity as an arm of the
government made the restitution order in Dudley a penal sanction for a crime against the state.
See Appellant's Brief at 15.
28. See 739 F.2d at 178. In addition to arguing that restitution is a criminal penalty, or
alternatively, that 18 U.S.C. § 3580 is unconstitutional, defense counsel in Dudley contended
that the sentence of restitution order applies only to crimes under title 18 and certain other
1985]
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to the judge, the defendant's counsel claimed that the Act violated the
defendant's right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment of the United
States Constitution by not providing for a jury determination of the amount
of restitution.29 In evaluating the defendant's constitutional argument, the
Dudley court discussed whether a restitution proceeding was a suit at common
law.30 Unlike a suit at common law, the restitution statute requires that the
court consider the financial status of the defendant and the defendant's
dependents. 31 Differences between restitution proceedings and traditional
common-law actions are not necessarily disppsitive, however, because courts
have held that the seventh amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in
actions which did not exist when the United States enacted the seventh
amendment.
32
The Fourth Circuit in Dudley recognized that the similarities between a
restitution order proceeding and an ordinary civil suit for damages might
require that a defendant have the option of a jury trial.33 The Fourth Circuit
Federal Aviation Act crimes. See supra note 2 (enumerating crimes for which courts may issue
restitution orders). Although the court convicted Dudley of stealing food stamps, that crime is
not a crime for which courts may order restitution, because theft of food stamps is a crime
under title 7, which has no restitution provision. See 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1982) (defining crime
of food stamp theft). The only crime for which Dudley was subject to a restitution order was
conspiracy to use, transfer, acquire, alter and possess food stamps. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982)
(conspiracy to defraud United States government); 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982) (authorizing
restitution for title 18 crimes). Dudley's counsel maintained that conspiracy is an inchoate crime
which does not in itself cause harm. Appellant's Brief at 22 (citing lannelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975)). Dudley's counsel, therefore, argued that the trial court had no
authority to order restitution for the conspiracy, since no one had sustained actual damages
solely as a result of the conspiracy. Id. The government responded to appellant's argument by
citing United States v. Tiler, in which the Second Circuit affirmed an order of restitution under
18 U.S.C. § 3651 although the only crime of which Tiler was convicted was conspiracy.
Appellee's Brief at 8, United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1984); see United States
v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1979); 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) (courts may order restitution
as a condition of probation). The Fourth Circuit in Dudley did not address the question of
whether a restitution order was a proper sanction for conspiracy.
29. See 739 F.2d at 178; 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982) (procedure for ordering restitution);
U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII (citizens have right to trial by jury in suits at common law when
amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars). Although Dudley received a trial by jury, he
did not receive a jury determination of his liability for restitution or of the amount of restitution.
See 739 F.2d at 178; see also United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983). The
court in United States v. Welden addressed whether the lack of provision for a jury determination
of restitution under § 3579 violated the seventh amendment. See 568 F. Supp. at 534; infra
notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussion of Welden).
30. See 739 F.2d 175, 178-79.
31. Id. at 178; 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982); cf. Washington Annapolis Hotel Co. v. Riddle,
171 F.2d 732, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (common-law suit in which counsel's remarks concerning
plaintiff's financial status provided grounds for declaring mistrial).
32. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1973) (right to jury trial encompasses actions
which did not exist at common law at time of seventh amendment's enactment), citing Parsons
v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 446-47 (1830) (courts may apply seventh amendment to any suits which
determine legal rights as opposed to equitable or admiralty rights).
33. See 739 F.2d at 179.
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did not decide the seventh amendment issue, however, because the court
found that no issues of fact remained for a jury to decide.3 4 The defendant's
counsel had raised no issue of fact concerning the correctness of the sum
ordered restored to the government, nor had the defendant's counsel pre-
served other factual defenses.35 The defendant thus had no standing on
appeal to raise the constitutional issue.3 6 The Dudley court, therefore,
concluded that it need not decide whether the seventh amendment requires
provision of a jury trial under section 3579 when questions of fact are
present." Since the Fourth Circuit found that the restitution order was civil
in nature and that the defendant had no standing on appeal to raise the
constitutional issue, the court held that the restitution order did not abate
upon the defendant's death.38 Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss the appeal as moot insofar as the motion concerned the
restitution order.
39
The legislative history of the Victim and Witness Protection Act is
inconclusive with respect to the civil or criminal character of restitution
orders under section 3579. 40 Although the legislative history of section 3579
reveals restitutionary motives on the part of Congress, the legislative history
shows that Congress also had penal and rehabilitative goals in enacting
section 3579.41 The Senate Report accompanying the Act makes clear that
Congress intended that restitution be part of a victim-oriented sentencing
procedure which would bring the effect of the crime on the victim to the
attention of prosecutorial, judicial and probationary authorities.4 2 The res-
titution order has civil overtones since the order compensates the victim.
4 3
Yet considerable evidence from the legislative history of section 3579 suggests
that Congress intended section 3579 as a criminal sanction. 44 During floor






39. Id.; see FED. R. App. P. 42(b) (procedure for voluntary dismissal of appeal).
40. See supra note 7 (legislative history of Act reveals restitutionary, penal and rehabili-
tative goals of restitution orders).
41. Id.
42. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2537. The Senate Report accompanying the
Act recites the story of a victim of a purse snatching who received restitution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 in the amount of $350 as a condition of the defendant's probation. See id. at 2536; 18
U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The victim knew nothing of the defendant's trial until the victim received
a notice of the award of restitution. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2536. Unknown
to any of the authorities involved in the plea bargaining, sentencing, and probation processes,
the victim had incurred medical bills of over $10,000. Id. at 2537. The Senate Report lamented
such neglect of the victim in the criminal justice system. Id.
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982) (restitution order recompenses victim).
44. See supra note 7 (legislative history of Act reveals restitutionary, penal and rehabili-
tative goals of restitution orders).
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order as part of the offender's sentence.4 5 The restitution order was an
attempt to provide not only compensation to the victim, but also rehabili-
tation of the offender.4 6 Representative Rodino, the primary sponsor of the
House version of the Act, termed the restitution order a criminal sanction.
4
1
A Senate report similarly termed the restitution order a penal sanction
against the offender. 48 Although the Senate Report accompanying the Act
stated that restitution should be as fair as possible to the victim, the report
also cautioned against allowing the sentencing hearing to become a lengthy,
involved trial on the issue of damages.
49
Since the legislative history of section 3579 does not resolve the question
of the civil or criminal nature of the restitution order, resolution of the
problem requires an inference of legislative intent from the provisions of the
Act itself.50 An analysis of the restitution order provisions suggests that
Congress intended the restitution order to differ markedly from the damage
remedy obtainable in a civil suit.5' For example, the restitution order proce-
dure requires a judge to consider the financial position and needs of the
defendant and any dependents the defendant may have.5 2 Consideration of
the defendant's financial status would constitute reversible error in a civil
damage suit.5 3 Moreover, several types of damages traditionally available in
a civil suit are unavailable as part of a restitution order. 4 The Act excludes
damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages and loss of use damages
45. Id. The term "sentence" refers to the formal declaration by a criminal tribunal to a
criminal defendant of the legal consequences of the defendant's guilt. See Barnes v. United
States, 223 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1955).
46. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2538. The Act permits restitution in the
form of services, and includes an option for the victim to substitute another person or
organization to receive the restitution payment. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(1)(A) and § 3579(b)(4).
Congress included the various restitution options to provide courts with the flexibility to
recompense the victim while maximizing the offender's incentive for rehabilitation. See 1982
Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2538.
47. See 128 CONG. REc. H8205 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (in section-by-section analysis
of Act's provisions, Rep. Rodino stated that § 3579 provided explicit recognition of importance
of restitution as criminal sanction).
48. See S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 993, 1001 (1981) (in discussion of effect
of restitution on sentencing process, report accompanying Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981
stated that restitution is penal sanction against offender).
49. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2537.
50. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971)
(court must infer congressional intent from statutory provisions when legislative history does
not clearly indicate congressional intent).
51. See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text (restitution order and restitution pro-
ceeding differ from civil damage award and civil trial).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982) (enumerating considerations in determining amount of
restitution order).
53. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (in contrast to restitution proceeding,
statements made in civil damage suit concerning party's financial position constitute reversible
error).
54. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (types of damages includible in restitution
order are more limited than civil damages).
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from restitution orders. 5- In addition, the trial court may decide not to award
restitution despite the guilt of the defendant and the existence of damages
to the plaintiff. 56 Finally, unlike a civil damage suit, which provides a final
adjudication of remedies,5 7 Congress drafted section 3579 with the expecta-
tion that a suit for civil damages could follow the procurement of a restitution
order.5 8 Additionally, Congress included in the Act the provision that the
court in a subsequent proceeding must consider facts adjudicated in the
criminal proceeding as established. 9 Furthermore, the statute permits the
defendant to set off sums paid pursuant to a restitution order against any
subsequent civil damage award. 60 The estoppel and set off provisions showing
that Congress anticipated civil damage suits following orders of restitution
suggest that a restitution order under section 3579 is not a civil damage
award.
6'
Alternatively, the set off provision in section 3579(h) arguably implies
that the restitution order amounts to a civil damage award since the restitu-
tion payment substitutes for a damage payment. 62 The provision for enforce-
ment of the restitution order in the same manner as a civil judgment
represents another similarity between restitution orders and civil damage
awards. 63 Although restitution orders therefore resemble civil damage awards
55. See Implementation of Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1982 at 9 (August 29, 1983) (memorandum of D. Lowell Jensen, Assoc. Att'y. Gen.)
(expressing opinion on allowable types of damages in restitution orders under 18 U.S.C. §
3579); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(1) (computation of damages for restitution order for offense
which has caused damage, loss or destruction of property).
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982) (court must state reasons for decision not to order
restitution).
57. See J. MooRE, J. LucAs & T. CuRIER, 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIC 0.40511]
(2d ed. 1984) (res judicata renders final determination of all matters actually decided in prior
proceeding conclusively binding on parties).
58. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2538 (amount paid under § 3579 shall be set
off against amount later recovered in civil damage suit); United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d
1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984) (18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) provides for civil suits subsequent to
determination of restitution); Note, Victim Impact Statements and Restitution: Making the
Punishment Fit the Victim, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv., 301, 314 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Victim
Impact] (Victim and Witness Protection Act specifies effect of restitution order on subsequent
civil suit); infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (restitution order provisions anticipate
subsequent civil suit).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3580 (1982) (criminal conviction has estoppel effect in subsequent civil
suits).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2) (1982) (defendant may set off amount of restitution order
against subsequent civil damage award).
61. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (courts have viewed setoff and estoppel
provisions of restitution statutes as indication that restitution is criminal in nature).
62. But see Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755, 272 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1980) (restitution
proceeding following criminal conviction is not civil action despite provision in restitution statute
for setoff of amount of restitution against subsequent civil judgment).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982) (United States or victim may enforce restitution order
in same way as civil judgment). But see infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (§ 3579(h)
simply enhances enforcement of restitution orders).
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in some respects, the differences between restitution under section 3579 and
civil damages appear to be greater than the similarities.r
4
Judicial interpretations of the statute offer some guidance concerning
the civil or criminal character of section 3579 restitution orders. Only two
federal courts in addition to the Fourth Circuit have addressed the issue of
whether restitution orders are civil or criminal in nature.6 5 In United States
v. Welden, 66 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama determined that section 3579(h), which provides for the enforcement
of a restitution order in the same manner as a civil judgment, renders the
restitution order a civil judgment.67 The defendants in Welden received a
sentencing hearing following their conviction for kidnapping that resulted in
the death of one victim, psychological damage and sexual abuse of a second
victim, and damage to a third victim's automobile.68 At the sentencing
hearing, the defendants argued that sections 3579 and 3580 unconstitutionally
deprived defendants of their seventh amendment right to a jury trial in suits
at common law. 69 In holding that the restitution order under section 3579(h)
was a civil judgment, the Welden court reasoned that the seventh amendment
applies to the proceeding for ordering restitution under section 3579 because
a proceeding that leads inevitably to a civil judgment is a suit at common
64. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussing similarities and differences
between restitution and civil damage suit).
65. See United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984) (restitution
order is criminal sanction); United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Ala. 1983)
(enforcement provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) renders restitution order an award of civil
damages); infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text (discussing Welden and Florence).
66. 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
67. Id. at 534.
68. Id. at 517; 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982) (United States or victim may enforce restitution
order in same way as civil judgment). But see infra note 73 and accompanying text and text
accompanying note 84 (§ 3579(h) simply allows greater enforceability of restitution order); 1982
Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2539 (enforcement section of § 3579 enhances likelihood of
collecting restitution).
69. Id. at 534. The defendants in Welden raised fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendment arguments in addition to the defendants' seventh amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3579 and 3580. Id. at 532-35. After consideration of the eighth amendment issue, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama found that the restitution statute
did not constitute an excessive fine or cruel and unusual punishment, since the Act permitted
sentencing courts to consider the defendant's financial status in setting the amount of restitution.
Id. at 532-33. The defendant's eighth amendment challenge therefore failed. Id. The district
court further held that §§ 3579 and 3580 did not violate the sixth amendment because the sixth
amendment requirement of a jury trial applies only to the determination of a criminal defendant's
guilt. Id. at 534. The Welden court determined, however, that the restitution provisions did
violate defendants' rights to due process and equal protection under the. fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 534-35. Since the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing,
courts may decide the amount of restitution based on hearsay. Id. In addition, the Welden
court found that the lack of procedural rules in §§ 3579 and 3580 for calculating the amount
of restitution permits disparate results, thereby contravening defendants' rights to equal protec-
tion. Id. at 535; see also infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (Welden court's response to
defendants' seventh amendment challenge to §§ 3579 and 3580).
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law.70 Consequently, a defendant in a restitution proceeding must have the
option of a jury determination of the amount of restitution, if any.7' The
Welden court held that since the Victim and Witness Protection Act prohibits
such jury determinations, imposition of the restitution order pursuant to the
Act violated the defendant's seventh amendment rights.
72
Although the Welden court held that the restitution order is a civil
judgment, the majority of authorities have found fault with the rationale of
the Welden decision.7 3 Basic to the Welden decision was the Welden court's
interpretation that section 3579(h) transforms the restitution order into a
civil judgment.74 Most authorities, however, view section 3579(h) as merely
improving the enforcement of restitution orders, rather than an indication
that the restitution order is a civil judgment. 75
Shortly after the Fourth Circuit decided Dudley, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the civil or criminal nature of
restitution orders in United States v. Florence.7 6 The Florence court held that
the imposition of a restitution order did not violate the defendant's seventh
amendment right to a jury determination of damages since restitution under
section 3579 did not constitute civil damages. 7 In Florence, the defendant
pleaded guilty to a charge of armed robbery.78 The district court imposed a
restitution order as part of the defendant's sentence.7 9 The defendant ap-
70. 568 F. Supp. at 534. The Welden court's characterization of a restitution determination
as necessarily resulting in a civil judgment is difficult to understand, even if one accepts the
Welden court's finding that the restitution order is a civil judgment because the sentencing
judge can decide not to impose a restitution order. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982) (judge
must state reasons for failure to order restitution); see also supra note 29 and accompanying
text (explaining argument that §§ 3579 and 3580 violate seventh amendment).
71. 568 F. Supp. at 534.
72. See id. (holding that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579 and 3580 violate defendant's right to jury
trial); 18 U.S.C. § 3480(a) (1982) (court determines whether to order restitution and amount of
restitution order).
73. See, e.g., Victim Impact, supra note 58, at 312 (§ 3579(h) does not render restitution
order civil judgment); Special Project, Congress Opens A Pandora's Box-the Restitution
Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FoPDiwsi L. Rav. 507, 538-
39 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Pandora's Box] (§ 3579(h) is simply means of enforcement and
does not render restitution order civil judgment); Note, Where Offenders Pay for their Crimes:
Victim Restitution and Its Constitutionality, 59 NomnE DAm L. REv. 685, 707 (1984) (Welden
court was incorrect concerning meaning of § 3579); see also infra text accompanying note 84
(Eighth Circuit in United States v. Florence held that § 3579(h) merely provides for enhanced
enforcement of restitution orders).
74. United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984); see Welden, 568
F. Supp. at 534 (provision for enforcement of restitution order in same manner as civil judgment
renders restitution order civil penalty).
75. See supra note 73 (discussing criticism of Welden by commentators).
76. 741 F.2d 1055, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984).
77. Id. at 1068.
78. Id. at 1067. The defendant in United States v. Florence was charged with armed bank
robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (1982).
79. 741 F.2d at 1067. In Florence, the United States District COurt for the Eastern
District of Missouri imposed an order requiring the defendant to make restitution in the amount
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pealed, challenging the district court's imposition of the restitution order on
the ground that the restitution proceeding violated the defendant's seventh
amendment right to a jury determination of damages. 0 The Eighth Circuit
rejected the defendant's seventh amendment argument.,' The Florence court
found that the defendant's seventh amendment argument was invalid because
the basis of that argument was that a restitution order is a civil penalty. 82
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that terming restitution a civil penalty conflicts
with the provisions of section 3580(e) which anticipate a subsequent civil
trial.83 The Eighth Circuit interpreted section 3579(h), which allows for the
enforcement of restitution orders in the same manner as civil judgments, as
merely a means for facilitating execution of the criminal judgment.
8 4
In addition to federal court interpretations of sections 3579 and 3580,
several state courts have addressed the question of the civil or criminal
nature of state restitution provisions.8 5 State courts in ten states have held
of $2694. Id. That sum was equal to the amount that the defendant had stolen, minus the
amount that authorities had recovered. Id.
80. Id. In addition to arguing that the imposition of a restitution order violated the
defendant's seventh amendment right to a jury determination of damages, the defendant in
Florence contended that the imposition of the restitution order violated the due process and
equal protection provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 1068-69. The Eighth
Circuit rejected the defendant's due process and equal protection claims, holding that the
traditional procedural protections afforded defendants in ordinary sentencing proceedings,
combined with the express proceedural provisions of § 3580, sufficiently protected the defend-
ant's fifth and fourteenth amendment rights. Id.
81. Id. at 1067-68.
82. Id. at 1067.
83. Id. at 1067-68; see 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982) (conviction upon which court orders
restitution estops religitation of underlying facts of conviction in subsequent civil suit).
84. 741 F.2d at 1068.
85. See, e.g., State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 581, 566 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1977) (restitution
order which exceeded defendant's ability to pay would contravene rehabilitative and penal
objectives of restitution); Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755, 272 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1982)'
(restitution determination following criminal conviction is not civil action); People v. Tidwell,
33 Ill. App. 3d 232, 237, 338 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1975) (state need not supply corroborated
evidence of damage to victim since restitution is not suit to recover civil damages); People v.
Good, 287 Mich. 110, 115, 282 N.W. 920, 923 (1938) (order of restitution does not require
hearing because restitution is not award of damages); State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 597-98, 362
A.2d 32, 38 (1976) (rehabilitative purpose of restitution predominates over objective of victim
compensation); State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 508, 650 P.2d 22, 30 (1982) (defendant in restitution
proceeding has no right to jury determination of amount of restitution since restitution is part
of sentencing process, not trial); State v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, ... 637 P.2d 602, 607 (1981)
(although restitution statute with setoff and estoppel provisions includes mixture of criminal
and civil concepts, restitution is penal in nature and not form of civil judgment); Commonwealth
v. Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super. 504, 507-08, 407 A.2d 24, 26 (1979) (restitution is not damage award);
State v. Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 425, 101 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1960) (theory of restitution as civil
action to determine civil liability is erroneous).
In In re Gartner's Estate, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the question of
abatement of restitution upon a defendant's death, and held that the restitution requirement
abated. See In re Gartner's Estate, 94 Pa. Super. 45, 48 (1928). In re Gartner's Estate concerned
a decedent who had received a sentence for obtaining money under false pretenses. Id. The
sentence required the defendant to make restitution. Id. The appellate court held that the victim
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that state statutory provisions for restitution within criminal proceedings are
criminal sanctions, rather than a form of civil liability. 6 For example, in
Cannon v. State87 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the Georgia restitu-
tion statute did not violate the defendant's right to a jury trial in civil actions
because the procedure by which the court imposed restitution was not a civil
trial." In Cannon, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of hit and run,
driving under the influence of alcohol, and driving after revocation of the
defendant's license.8 9 The trial court imposed restitution as a condition of
probation.90 At the guilty plea hearing, the defendant challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Georgia statute that permitted courts to impose restitution
as a condition for probation. 9' The defendant charged that the statute violated
the defendant's right to a jury trial in civil actions. 92 The Georgia Supreme
Court held that a determination of restitution following a criminal conviction
is not a civil action. 93 The court noted that the restitution statute provided
for setoff in the amount of restitution against an award of damages in a
subsequent civil action.9 4 The court apparently reasoned that since the
restitution statute contemplated a subsequent civil action, the restitution
proceeding was not a civil proceeding. 95
Although some provisions of sections 3579 and 3580 suggest similarities
between restitution orders and civil judgments, the Florence and Cannon
courts reasoned that the provisions are consistent with the characterization
of restitution as a criminal sanction.9 6 The Florence court explained the
provision for the enforcement of a restitution order in the same manner as
a civil judgment as merely providing for enhanced enforcement of the
criminal penalty.Y The setoff provisions of sections 3579 and 3580 suggest
that restitution orders can replace civil damages. 98 The Cannon court,
of the fraud could not enforce the claim for restitution against the decedent's estate because
the wrongdoer's death discharged all obligations resulting from the criminal sentence. Id.
86. See supra note 85 (state courts have found that state restitution statutes are criminal
rather than civil in nature).
87. 246 Ga. 754, 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980).
88. See 246 Ga. 754, 755, 272 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1980).
89. 246 Ga. at 754, 272 S.E.2d at 709.
90. 246 Ga. at 754, 272 S.E.2d at 710.
91. Id.
92. 246 Ga. at 755, 272 S.E.2d at 710.
93. Id.
94. 246 Ga. at 755 n.4, 272 S.E.2d at 710 n.4; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2) (1982) (provision
for setoff of restitution against subsequent civil judgment).
95. See 246 Ga. at 755, 272 S.E.2d at 710; supra note 83 and accompanying text (Eighth
Circuit in Florence found that provisions in restitution statute for subsequent civil action
contradicted notion that restitution is civil matter).
96. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussion of Florence); supra notes
88-95 and accompanying text (discussion of Cannon); supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text
(discussion of similarities between restitution orders and civil damage awards).
97. See supra note 73 and text accompanying notes 73-75 (§ 3579(h) merely allows for
improved enforcement of restitution orders).
98. But see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (Act excludes some kinds of civil
damages from restitution orders).
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however, viewed the setoff provisions in the Georgia restitution statute as
an indication that a civil suit was to follow the criminal restitution proceed-
ing.91 The Florence court concluded that viewing the restitution proceeding
as civil in nature would contradict the estoppel provision of the federal
restitution statute. 100Thus, the setoff and estoppel provisions which anticipate
a civil suit following the restitution proceeding are evidence of the criminal
nature of the restitution proceeding.' 0'
A fundamental difficulty with the Fourth Circuit's holding in Dudley
that the restitution order did not abate lies in the rule of abatement ab
initio.102 Under the rule of abatement ab initio, the death of a criminal
defendant pending appeal abates all proceedings from the inception of the
prosecution. 0 Therefore, in applying the rule of abatement ab initio, a court
typically dismisses the defendant's appeal as moot and vacates the judgment
below.'04 The Fourth Circuit conceded that the rule of abatement ab initio
applied to all of Dudley's sentence apart from the restitution order.103 Under
the rule of abatement ab initio, however, since all proceedings against the
defendant are void from their inception, no conviction remains upon which
to base a restitution order.'06 For the court to allow a portion of the sentence
to stand is illogical when the criminal conviction forming the basis for the
restitution order is void. 0 7
Instead, the Fourth Circuit should have held that the restitution require-
ment abated upon Dudley's death pending appeal. 08 Even following the
Fourth Circuit's approach under which the abatement determination rests on
the civil or criminal nature of the restitution order, however, sections 3579
and 3580 markedly differentiate the restitution procedure from a civil damage
action.' °9 The inclusion of the restitution proceedings within the criminal
99. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (Cannon court apparently viewed set-
off provision in Georgia statute as evidence that restitution is not substitute for civil damages).
100. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (Eighth Circuit in Florence found charac-
terization of restitution as civil contradicted estoppel provision of restitution statute).
101. See supra notes 83 & 94-95 and accompanying text (restitution order is not civil
damage award since restitution provision shows expectation of subsequent civil suit).
102. Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971), (rule of abatement ab initio which
- applies when criminal defendant dies pending appeal renders all proceedings against decedent
void from inception of prosecution), overruled, 423 U.S. 325 (1976); see United States v.
Mohlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 127 (7th Cir. 1977) (abatement rule of Durham remains valid when
applied to appeals as of right); supra note 9 (Court overruled Durham rule of abatement ab
initio only with respect to petitions for certiorari).
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See 739 F.2d at 176.
106. See supra note 102 (under rule of abatement ab initio, all proceedings against decedent
are void from inception of prosecution).
107. Id.
108. See supra note 102 and text accompanying notes 102-07 (applicable rule of abatement
ab initio renders all proceedings against deceased criminal defendant void from inception of
prosecution).
109. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text (restitution and restitution procedure
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579 and 3580 differ from civil judgment in many respects).
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sentencing process further indicates the criminal character of the restitution
order."10
The Fourth Circuit based the Dudley decision on the restitutionary intent
of Congress in enacting the Victim and Witness Protection Act.," The
legislative history, however, reveals that Congress had both penal and
rehabilitative intentions in enacting section 3579.112 Since an examination of
legislative intent does not resolve the question of the civil or criminal nature
of section 3579, the Dudley court should have engaged in a close analysis of
the section's express provisions." 3 Such an analysis shows that the similarities
between restitution under section 3579 and a criminal proceeding overshadow
the civil aspects of restitution under the Act."4 Thus, both courts and
commentators have indicated that a restitution proceeding under section 3579
is a criminal proceeding resulting in an essentially criminal penalty, despite
the compensatory benefits that the restitution order confers on the victim." 5
If courts rely on Dudley for the prosposition that a restitution order
under section 3579 is a civil damage award, those courts may well conclude
that the restitution provisions of the Act amount to an unconstitutional
deprivation of defendants' seventh amendment rights, since the Act precludes
a jury determination of restitution." 6 If courts use Dudley to declare the
restitution provisions unconstitutional, victims of federal crimes will be
unable to obtain the relief that Congress intended under section 3579.' 7 The
triumph for the institutional victim in Dudley, which enabled the government
to collect restitution from the defendant's estate, ironically could result in
defeat for many individual victims in the future.
BARBARA J. TAYLOR
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (court orders restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3579 when
sentencing convicted criminal defendant).
111. See 739 F.2d at 177 (Fourth Circuit determined that restitution order in Dudley did
not abate because legislative intent behind Act was restitutionary); supra note 7 (legislative
history indicates that compensation of victims was one of Congress' goals in enacting 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3579 and 3580).
112. See supra notes 7 & 40-49 and accompanying text (legislative history of Act discloses
penal, restitutionary, and rehabilitative motives behind § 3579).
113. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971)
(court must infer congressional intent from statutory provisions when legislative history does
not clearly indicate congressional intent).
114. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text (analysis of statutory provisions in §§
3579 and 3580 demonstrates that restitution and procedure for ordering restitution more closely
resemble criminal sentence than civil judgment).
115. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text (Eighth Circuit in Florence held that
restitution orders under 18 U.S.C. § 3579 are criminal in nature); see also Victim Impact, supra
note 58, at 312-15 (restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3579 is criminal sanction); Pandora's Box,
supra note 73, at 540 (restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3579 is criminal sanction).
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982) (court determines whether to order restitution and
amount of restitution order).
117. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2536 (premise of § 3579 is that court should
require offender to compensate victim).
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B. Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellate Review
of Jury Instructions Containing Erroneous
Reasonable Doubt Definitions
The United States Constitution protects a person accused of a crime
from conviction unless every element of the crime is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.' Reasonable doubt has been an elusive concept to define
or explain.2 Many courts have stated that reasonable doubt should not be
defined because a definition would create more confusion than assistance.3
In Holland v. United States,4 however, the United States Supreme Court
sanctioned a definition of reasonable doubt that defined the concept as doubt
that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in his more serious and
1. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process clause requires prosecution
to prove every element of offense beyond reasonable doubt to sustain criminal conviction).
Society has made a policy choice that conviction of an innocent man is significantly less desirable
than to allow one who is guilty to go free. See Champagne and Nagel, The Psychology of
Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, 279, 279 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) (survey
showed that judges frequently state that it is ten times less desirable to convict innocent man than
to acquit guilty one); C. McCoRaMcK, LAw OF EVIDENCE § 341, at 798 (2d ed. 1972) (society
has decided it is considerably worse to find innocent man guilty of crime than to acquit guilty
man). The common law therefore required that a prosecutor satisfy an exacting standard, that
is, convince the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to obtain a conviction.
See id. at 798-99.
In Winship, the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause, and not
merely common law tradition, requires that the trier of fact be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt before returning a conviction. See 397 U.S. at 364; see also
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975) (Maine criminal statute which shifted burden
of proof to defendant to show that he acted in heat of passion did not satisfy due process
requirement that prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute
crime charged); State v. Dobbs, 163 W. Va. 630, 633, 259 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1979) (fourteenth
amendment due process requires state to prove defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt to
obtain criminal conviction).
2. See Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) (explanations of reasonable
doubt usually do not clarify concept in minds of jurors); United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684
F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 1982) (defining reasonable doubt often creates more confusion than
term itself); State v. Sauer, 38 Minn. 438, -, 38 N.W. 355, 355-56 (1888) (attempting to
define reasonable doubt is more likely to confuse jurors than to enlighten them).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1982) (court
should not explain reasonable doubt because definition often confuses jury); United States v.
Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1240-42 (5th Cir. 1978) (little explanation of reasonable doubt can
or should be added after judicial use of term for 200 years), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980),
modified on other grounds sub nom., Albernaz v. United States, 612 F.2d 906 (1980) (en banc),
aff'd 450 U.S. 333 (1981); Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.) (appellate courts repeatedly
have warned trial courts that definitions of reasonable doubt are seldom effective and may
impermissibly reduce prosecution's burden), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). But see Holland
v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (trial courts should define reasonable doubt as kind
of doubt that would cause one to hesitate to act in important affairs); McBaine, Burden of
Proof. Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. Rav. 242, 258 (1944) (courts should use plain words to
define reasonable doubt).
4. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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important affairsA Despite the Supreme Court's recommended definition in
Holland, trial courts continue to define reasonable doubt in many different
ways. 6 Trial courts have defined reasonable doubt as the kind of doubt that
would make one hesitate to act,7 the kind of doubt that one would be willing
to act upon,8 a substantial doubt,9 a real doubt,10 a doubt based on reason,"
a doubt that is substantial and not shadowy,' 2 a doubt for which one can
give a good and sufficient reason, 3 a strong and abiding conviction as to
the defendant's innocence,' 4 and a doubt which is substantial and not the
mere possibility of innocence.' 5 Appellate courts, however, have disapproved
of nearly all trial court definitions of reasonable doubt.' 6 In Smith v.
5. Id. at 140. The trial court in Holland defined reasonable doubt as "the kind of doubt
• . . which you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be
willing to act upon." Id. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's definition was
erroneous. See id. The Holland court, however, held that the "willing to act" definition was
not prejudicial to the defendant because the jury instructions, taken as a whole, conveyed the
proper understanding of reasonable doubt. Id.
6. See infra notes 7-16 and accompanying text (discussing various trial court definitions
of reasonable doubt).
7. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (recommending that
courts define reasonable doubt as kind of doubt that would make reasonable person hesitate to
act in important affairs of his life); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1982)
(endorsing use of Holland hesitate to act definition); Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297,
303 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (trial court properly defined reasonable doubt as doubt that "would cause
men to hesitate to act in matters of importance").
8. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (trial court incorrectly
defined reasonable doubt as "kind of doubt . . . which you folks in the more serious and
important affairs of your own life might be willing to act upon"); United States v. Gordon,
634 F.2d 639, 644 (Ist Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 313-14 (9th
Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1977).
9. See Payne v. Smith, 667 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 1981) (reasonable doubt is substantial
doubt), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1982).
10. See id. (reasonable doubt is real doubt).
11. See United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1981) (reasonable doubt
is doubt based on reason), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982).
12. See United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 437 (2d Cir. 1976) (reasonable doubt is
"doubt founded on reason and is substantial and not shadowy"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091
(1977).
13. See Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.) (reasonable doubt is "doubt as for the
existence of which a reasonable person can give or suggest a good and sufficient reason"), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
14. See id. at 24 (reasonable doubt is "such a strong and abiding conviction as still
remains after careful consideration of all the facts and arguments").
15. See United States v. Fallen, 498 F.2d 172, 177 (8th Cir. 1974) ("reasonable doubt
means a substantial doubt and not the mere possibility of innocence").
16. See, e.g., United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1982) (criticizing instruction
which defined reasonable doubt as kind of doubt upon which one would be willing to act);
United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1981) (defining reasonable doubt as
"doubt that is based on reason" is neither helpful nor harmful), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133
(1982); Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.) (reasonable doubt should not be defined as
doubt for which "reasonable person can give or suggest a good and sufficient reason for its
existence"), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Id. at 23, 24 (defining reasonable doubt as strong
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Bordenkircher,'7 the Fourth Circuit determined whether a jury charge defin-
ing reasonable doubt amounted to prejudicial error.'
8
In Smith, the defendant, Keith Austin Smith (Smith), was indicted for
the murder of Johnny Richmond.' 9 Smith was tried in the Circuit Court of
Raleigh County, West Virginia. 20 Smith asserted two defenses at trial, that
he was intoxicated, and that he acted in the heat of passion. 2' Smith did not
produce any witnesses or introduce any evidence in support of his defenses.
22
At the close of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury that the state
must prove Smith's guilt beyond a reasonable* doubt in order to sustain a
conviction. 23 In an attempt to clarify the concept of reasonable doubt, the
court equated reasonable doubt with "good and substantial doubt," and
further explained reasonable doubt as "one for which he who entertains
such doubt shall be able to give a good and substantial reason." 24 The jury
found Smith guilty of first degree murder. 25 Thereafter, pursuant to section
58-5-10) of the West Virginia Code26 Smith filed an appeal with the West
and abiding conviction remaining after careful consideration was constitutionally erroneous);
United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1241 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial court should not have
given instruction stating that reasonable doubt must be "substantial rather than speculative");
United States v. Alvero, 470 F.2d 981, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1972) (defining reasonable doubt as
"substantial reasonable doubt" and "very substantial doubt" is grounds for new trial); United
States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1965) (criticizing definition of reasonable doubt as
"doubt for which you can assign a reason" and recommending use of Holland hesitate to act
definition).
17. 718 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2355 (1984).
18. See 718 F.2d at 1274.
19. See id. In Smith, Keith Austin Smith and Ronald Morton, Jr. walked to a local store
on November 3, 1978 to purchase some beer. Id. On their return trip, the boys passed a local
bar, and Keith Smith made an obscene gesture toward a female. Id. The female reported Smith's
action to her brother, Johnny Richmond, who was inside the bar. Id. Richmond and some
friends immediately ran outside to confront Smith and Morton. Id. Richmond kicked Morton
in the groin, then took the boys' beer and laughingly distributed it among the patrons of the
bar. Id. Smith and Morton returned to the Morton home where they told Tom Morton, Ronald's
father, of the incident. Id. Tom Morton armed himself with a pistol, then he and the two boys
returned to the bar. Id. Richmond and a group of friends confronted the Mortons and Smith
outside the bar. Id. An argument ensued, with Richmond asking for a pistol at one point. Id.
As the Mortons began to walk back toward their home, Smith went to the Morton house to
retrieve a shotgun. Id. By the time Smith returned to the scene, Tom Morton has fired several
shots at Richmond, who was lifting up his shirt and yelling, "Shoot me, motherfucker." Id.




23. See id. at 1275.
24. Id. (state's instruction no. 7).
25. Id. at 1274-75. The trial court in Smith instructed the jury that it could return a
verdict of first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary
manslaughter. Id. The jury found Smith guilty of first degree murder, but recommended mercy.
Id. at 1275.
26. See W. VA. CODE § 58-5-1(j) (1981). A defendant who has been convicted of a crime
in any circuit court may appeal a judgment, decree or order of such circuit court to the Supreme
Court of Appeals. Id.
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Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. 27 The Supreme Court of Appeals refused
to hear Smith's appeal. Smith next petitioned the court for a writ of habeas
corpus.29 The court denied Smith's habeas petition. 0 Having exhausted his
state court remedies, Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia." The district court denied Smith's habeas
petition.3 2 Smith then filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. 33 In support of his appeal, Smith claimed that the
trial court's jury instruction lowered the state's constitutionally mandated
burden of proof in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
34
In considering Smith's due process claim, the Fourth Circuit first ad-
dressed the question of whether Smith's failure to object at the time the trial
judge gave the jury instructions defining reasonable doubt precluded the
defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the instruction in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding.35 The Smith court noted that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has stated that the failure to register a contem-
poraneous objection does not preclude a constitutional challenge in West
Virginia state courts.3 6 Applying West Virginia law, 37 the Fourth Circuit held
27. See 718 F.2d at 1275.
28. Id.
29. See id.; W. VA. CONST., art. VIII, § 3 (original jurisdiction of habeas corpus
proceedings is in Supreme Court of Appeals); W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-1 (1981) (right to habeas
corpus for post-conviction review). § 53-4A-1 of the West Virginia Code provides:
... any person convicted of a crime and incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment
therefore who contends that there was such a denial or infringement of his rights as
render the conviction or sentence void under the Constitution of the United States or
the Constitution of this State, or both . . . may ... file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, and prosecute the same...
W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1 (1981).
30. See 718 F.2d at 1275.
31. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1984) (federal courts may grant habeas relief from state
conviction if conviction violates "Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"). The
United States Constitution guarantees a state prisoner access to federal habeas relief to challenge
his custody based on alleged violations of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States, regardless of whether state habeas proceedings are provided. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §
9, cl. 2.




36. Id. West Virginia courts apply the state's procedural default rules liberally. See
Wallace v. McKenzie, 449 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D. W. Va. 1978) (failure to comply with
contemporaneous objection rule does not bar review of jury instruction for constitutionality);
cf. Spaulding v. Warden, West Virginia State Penitentiary, 158 W. Va. 557, 559, 212 S.E.2d
619, 621 (1975) (defendant's failure to object at trial barred review of alleged errors because
errors had no constitutional or jurisdictional basis).
37. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977) (state procedural rule bars federal
habeas relief unless defendant can show cause for failure to object and actual prejudice resulting
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that Smith's failure to object at trial did not bar his due process claim.38
After concluding that the constitutionality of the jury instruction was
reviewable, the Fourth Circuit examined whether the challenged jury instruc-
tions denied Smith his constitutional guarantee that the government be
required to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt to
convict.3 9 The Smith court held that the challenged jury instructions did not
deny the defendant due process and therefore affirmed the district court's
-denial of the habeas petition. 40 In support of its holding, the Fourth Circuit
stated that in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the reviewing court must
examine a challenged state court instruction in light of the overall charge to
the jury.4 The Smith court stated that the standard of review was whether,
in the context of the entire charge, the challenged instructions so affected
the trial as to constitute a denial of due process.4 According to the Smith
court, a federal court may not grant a habeas petition merely because a state
court jury instruction is objectionable, a misstatement, or universally disap-
proved.
43
Applying the due process standard of review to the two challenged jury
instructions, the Smith court first noted that the Fourth Circuit and other
appellate courts disapprove of instructions equating reasonable doubt with
"good and substantial doubt." 44 However, the Smith court held that the
therefrom). Failure to make a contemporaneous objection required by state law bars a defendant
from habeas relief, unless the defendant can show cause for his failure to object and actual
prejudice from the challenged action. Id.; see also C. W~iorr, LAw oF FEDERAL CoURTs § 53,
at 340-43 (4th ed,. 1983) (historical analysis of effect of failure to comply with state rule
requiring contemporaneous objection on availability of federal habeas corpus relief). Under
West Virginia law, however, failure to make a contemporaneous objection does not bar a
constitutional challenge to state courts. See Wallace v. McKenzie, 449 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D.
W. Va. 1978) (failure to comply with contemporaneous objection rule does not bar review of
jury instruction for constitutionality); cf. Spaulding v. Warden, West Virginia State Penitentiary,
158 W. Va. 557, 559, 212 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1975) (defendant's failure to object at trial barred
review of alleged errors because errors had no constitutional or jurisdictional basis). Therefore,
the defendant's petition in Smith was reviewable by the federal courts in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 85-86.
38. 718 F.2d at 1275.
39. See id. at 1277.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1276. The practice of examining a challenged jury instruction in light of the
entire charge to ascertain whether constitutional error has occurred is not limited to federal
habeas corpus review of state court proceedings. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121,
140 (1954) (reviewing challenged jury instruction in light of entire charge on direct appeal from
district court). When reviewing a federal district court decision, a federal appellate court
examines a challenged jury instruction in the context of the whole charge to determine whether
constitutional error has occurred. See id.
42. 718 F.2d at 1276.
43. Id.; cf. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (in federal habeas proceeding,
issue is whether jury instruction violated defendant's due process rights and not whether
instruction was undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned).
44. Id. at 1277; see United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial
court should not have given instruction stating that reasonable doubt must be "substantial
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"good and substantial doubt" instruction did not so prejudice the defendant
as to deny him his constitutional right to due process of law. 45 The Smith
majority reasoned that several proper instructions in the trial court's charge
to the jury mitigated any prejudicial effects attributable to the court's use
of "good and substantial doubt" language. 4 In support of its contention
that the "good and substantial doubt" instruction did not prejudice Smith,
the Fourth Circuit emphasized the ameliorating effect of another instruction
the trial court gave which defined proof beyond a reasonable doubt as
"proof that excludes every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt." ' 47 More-
over, the Smith court stated that two instructions on the defendant's pre-
sumption of innocence also served to mitigate the prejudicial effects of the
"good and substantial doubt" instruction.48 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found
that, in light of the entire charge to the jury, the "good and substantial
doubt" instruction was not constitutionally erroneous.
4 9
In addition to challenging the "good and substantial doubt" instruction
on due process grounds, Smith claimed that the trial court's other definition
of reasonable doubt as "one for which he who entertains such doubt should
be able to give a good and substantial reason" constituted prejudicial error.
50
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a "good and substantial reason"
definition of reasonable doubt might prejudice a defendant.-' The Smith
court stated that if the instruction gave a juror the impression that he might
be required to defend his decision to acquit the defendant with a good and
substantial reason, the instruction may have violated the federal Constitu-
tion. 2 The Fourth Circuit, however, emphasized that the "good and sub-
stantial reason" instruction could not be read in isolation, but had to be
rather than speculative"); United States v. Alvero, 470 F.2d 981, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1972) (defining
reasonable doubt as "substantial reasonable doubt" and "very substantial doubt" is grounds
for new trial). In State v. Davis, Justice Seiler of the Missouri Supreme Court in a concurring
opinion used the following example to demonstrate the problem of equating reasonable doubt
with substantial doubt. Justice Seiler said:
"Reasonable" and "substantial" are not synonomous, as can be seen by referring to
any of the standard dictionaries. The point was well put by counsel in argument
recently where he pointed out that if one had to undergo a serious operation and
were querying the doctor as to the prospects for a successful outcome, how differently
the person would feel if the doctor told him there was only a reasonable chance of
success as opposed to being told there was a substantial chance of success.
State v. Davis, 482 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Mo. 1972) (Seiler, J., concurring).
45. See 718 F.2d at 1277 (in light of entire charge, reasonable doubt standard as explained
to jury was not below that guaranteed by fourteenth amendment due process clause).
46. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 47-48. (Smith court found that proper jury
instructions mitigated prejudice attributable to trial court's erroneous definitions of reasonable
doubt).
47. See 718 F.2d at 1277.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1277-78.
50. Id. at 1277.
51. Id. at 1278.
52. Id.
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read in light of the entire jury charge. 53 In context of the entire charge, the
Fourth Circuit found that the challenged.instruction did not suggest that a
juror might be called upon to give the trial judge a sound reason why the
juror chose to vote not guilty,. 4 The Smith court explained that the "good
and substantial reason" instrdction merely suggested to the jurors that
reasonable doubt was the kind of doubt that they conscientiously could
retain if opposed by fellow jurors.
5
To support its conclusion that the "good and substantial reason"
instruction did not prejudice the defendant, the Smith court emphasized the
importance of a subsequent instruction which explained the juror's duty not
to surrender a conscientious opinion merely because fellow jurors held a
different opinion.5 6 Citing decisions of other circuit courts as support 5 7 the
Fourth Circuit held that the "good and substantial reason" language did not
constitute reversible error in the context of the charge as a whole. 8 Thus,
while the Smith court disapproved of both the "good and substantial doubt"
instruction and the "good and substantial reason" instruction, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief because
the court concluded that, in light of the overall charge, the challenged jury
instructions did not deny Smith his due process rights.
5 9
Although the majority in Smith refused to grant the defendant habeas
corpus relief, the dissent stated that the court should have issued the habeas
writ, subject to West Virginia's right to reprosecute. 6° The dissent asserted
that reversal subject to reprosecution is necessary to deter continued use of
53. Id.
54. Id.; see supra test accompanying notes 51-52 (reasonable doubt instruction violates
due process if instruction gives jurors impression that they may be called upon to articulate
reasons for acquitting defendant).
55. 718 F.2d at 1278.
56. See id.
57. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Smith cited six cases from other circuits to support its
holding that the "good and substantial reason" instruction did not constitute reversible error.
Id. See Robinson v. Callahan, 694 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1982) (defining reasonable doubt as
"doubt for which you can give a reason" was not violation of due process); Bumpus v. Gunter,
635 F.2d 907, 910 (1st Cir. 1980) (not constitutional error to define reasonable doubt as doubt
"that you can stand up in the jury room and argue with principle and integrity to your fellow
jurors"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1003 (1981); Tsoumas v. New Hampshire, 611 F.2d 412, 413-
14 (1st Cir. 1980) (defining reasonable doubt as doubt that can not be easily explained away is
not reversible error); Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.) (not reversible error to define
reasonable doubt as doubt for which one can give or sufficient reason), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
910 (1978); United States v. MacDonald, 455 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (1st Cir.) (defining proof
beyond reasonable doubt as proof for which you can state "an intelligent reason" was not
reversible as matter of law), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962 (1972); United States'v. Davis, 328 F.2d
864, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1964) (unwise but not reversible error to define reasonable doubt as doubt
that appears reasonable after explained to fellow juror).
58. 718 F.2d at 1278.
59. See id. at 1276-78.
60. Id. at 1279 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The dissent in Smith stated that the habeas




inaccurate definitions of reasonable doubt. 61 The dissent in Smith explained
that appellate courts uniformly disapprove of the substantial doubt defini-
tion, yet trial courts continue to include the definition in their jury instruc-
tions.62 The dissent, therefore, concluded that since experience has
demonstrated that words of disapproval are not effective in preventing trial
courts from using the substantial doubt definition, reversal is a necessary
sanction to preclude future use of the definition. 6
The great weight of authority supports the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Smith.64 The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal court
sitting to review a petition for habeas relief must judge the constitutionality
of a challenged jury instruction in light of the entire charge.6s A federal
court must determine whether the instruction is so prejudicial as to deny the
defendant due process of law, and not merely whether the instruction is
undesirable, a misstatement, or universally disapproved. 66 The Smith court,
in examining the entire charge, correctly noted several other instructions that
minimized any prejudicial effects the erroneous instructions otherwise might
have caused.
67
In reviewing reasonable doubt jury instructions for prejudicial error,
several circuits have placed importance on the presence of mitigating instruc-
tions because such instructions counteract the tendency of erroneous defini-
tions to lessen the government's burden of proof.6 For example, in United
61. Id.
62. Id. The dissent in Smith acknowledged that case precedent supports the majority's
decision to deny the defendant habeas relief. Id.
63. Id. at 1279.
64. See infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (analysis of case precedent in support of
Fourth Circuit's holding in Smit
65. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973). In Cupp, the Supreme Court
reviewed a writ of habeas corpus the Ninth Circuit has issued in response to defendant's petition
challenging the constitutionality of a jury instruction. Id. at 143-44. The challenged jury
instruction stated that a witness is "presumed to speak the truth." Id. at 142. Only the
prosecution produced witnesses at trial. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that since the defendant
did not testify or call any witnesses, the instruction impermissibly reduced the government's
burden of proof because the instruction placed the burden on the defendant to prove his
innocence. Id. at 143-44. The Supreme Court stated that it is a well-established rule that a
reviewing court must examine the constitutionality of a challenged jury instruction in the context
of the overall charge. Id. at 146-47. The Court held that, in light of the entire charge, the trial
court's instruction did not rise to the level of constitutional error. Id. at 149-50.
66. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (issue in federal habeas proceeding
is whether jury instruction violated defendant's due process rights and not whether instruction
was undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,
146 (1973) (same); Cooper v. North Carolina, 702 F.2d 481, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1983) (same)
(quoting Cupp v. Naughten).
67. See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text (analysis of mitigating effect of proper
jury instructions in Smith).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1982) (trial court's use of
Holland "hesitate to act" definition of reasonable doubt and repeated references to presumption
of innocence mitigated prejudice of erroneous instruction which also was part of charge); see
infra text accompanying notes 70-75 (discussion of Drake); United States v. Fallen, 498 F.2d
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States v. Drake,69 the First Circuit held that defining proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as proof "you would be willing to rely and act upon...
in the most important of your own affairs" did not constitute reversible
error. 70 In Drake, the defendant was indicted for manufacturing a controlled
substance in violation of section 841(a)(1) of title 21 of the United States
Code.71 The jury found the defendant guilty.72 Drake appealed the conviction,
claiming that the "willing to act" instruction was unconstitutional. 73 The
First Circuit held that, because the trial court used the Holland "hesitate to
act" definition of reasonable doubt 4 in another part of the charge, and
because the court made repeated references to the defendant's presumption
of innocence, the "willing to act" instruction did not constitute reversible
error.
75
Placing similar emphasis on mitigating instructions, the Sixth Circuit in
United States v. Christy6 held that equating reasonable doubt with substantial
doubt did not constitute plain error.77 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee convicted the defendant in Christy of
passing and aiding and abetting the passing of counterfeit currency.78 The
defendant appealed the conviction, claiming that the substantial doubt
definition unconstitutionally lowered the government's burden of proof.79
The Sixth Circuit found that, in light of the whole charge, the challenged
172, 177 (8th Cir. 1974) (single instruction equating reasonable doubt with substantial doubt
was harmless error because trial court also used Holland "hesitate to act" definition in charge);
United States v. Christy, 444 F.2d 448, 450-51 (6th Cir. 1971) (defining reasonable doubt as
substantial doubt was not prejudicial since charge included phrase "reasonable doubt" nine
times without mention of substantial doubt); see infra text accompanying notes 77-80 (discussion
of Christy).
69. 673 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 16; see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982) (prohibiting intentional manufacture of
controlled substance).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 20. The district court in Drake convicted the defendant of manufacturing
methamphetamine. Id. at 16. Authorities obtained the evidence supporting the conviction
pursuant to a federal search warrant. Id. The defendant appealed the conviction, challenging
both the validity of the search warrant and the trial judge's instruction on reasonable doubt.
Id.
74. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussion of reasonable doubt definition
Supreme Court recommended in Holland).
75. 673 F.2d at 20.
76. 444 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1971).
77. Id. at 450-51. The trial court in Christy instructed the jury that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is proof that will "leave no reasonable, substantial doubt in the minds of the
jury." See id. at 450. Although the defendant did not object to the instruction at trial, the
defendant argued on appeal that the definition impermissibly reduced the government's burden
of proof and therefore constituted plain error. Id.
78. Id. at 449; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 472 (1982) (intentionally passing, publishing,
uttering, selling, or aiding the passing, publishing, uttering or selling of counterfeit funds shall
be punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both).
79. Id. at 450.
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instruction did not impermissibly reduce the government's burden of proof
because the district court's jury charge included the phrase "reasonable
doubt" nine times without indicating that reasonable doubt need be substan-
tial. 0
Appellate courts are correct in placing grate importance on the presence
of mitigating instructions when reviewing the constitutionality of a jury
charge that contains an undesirable definition of reasonable doubt. The
United States Supreme Court clearly has stated that the standard of review
applicable to criminal burden of proof instructions is whether the charge as
a whole conveys to the jury the idea that the government has the burden to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' The greater the number of instruc-
tions that convey the correct understanding of reasonable doubt, the less
likely a jury is to rely on an erroneous definition that also is part of the
charge.8 2 In Smith, both the good and substantial doubt instruction and the
good and substantial reason instruction appeared only once in the jury
charge. 3 The charge in Smith also contained several proper instructions on
the reasonable doubt standards. 84 For example, the trial judge twice instructed
the jury on the defendant's presumption of innocence.' 5 The jury charge also
equated proof beyond a reasonable doubt with proof that "excludes every
reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt." '8 6 Furthermore, the trial judge's
charge contained at least three instructions offering no definition or expla-
nation of reasonable doubt and stating that the government's burden was to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8 7 Under the defer-
ential constitutional standard of review, an appellate court may not overturn
a conviction based on the trial court's use of an erroneous definition of
reasonable doubt unless the charge as a whole does not convey to the jury
the idea that the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8
80. See id. at 450-51.
81. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973) (standard in reviewing jury charge
is whether definition was so prejudicial as to deny defendant due process).
82. See supra note 68 (appellate courts emphasize importance of whether proper instruc-
tions on reasonable doubt are included in charge because such instructions lessen prejudicial
effect of erroneous definitions).
83. See 718 F.2d at 1275, 1277-78.
84. See id. at 1277.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see United States v. Alonzo, 681 F.2d 997, 1002 (5th Cir. 1982) (not necessary to
instruct jury that "evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis but [that of] guilt" if
trial court instructs jury that government's burden is to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1983); United States v. Burchinal, 657 F.2d 985, 992 (8th Cir.)
(government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but need not exclude every reasonable
hypothesis but that of guilt for conviction), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
87. See 718 F.2d at 1277 (judge in Smith informed jury several times that government's
burden was to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, making no reference to good and substantial
doubt); set also Appellee's Answer to Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 5, Smith v. Borden-
kircher, 718 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1983).
88. See supra note 66 (in reviewing jury instructions for constitutional error, issue is
whether jury instruction violated defendant's due process rights and not whether instruction
was undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned).
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Therefore, in light of the mitigating instructions contained in the jury charge,
the Smith court correctly held that the "good and substantial doubt"
instruction and the "good and substantial reason" instruction did not deny
the defendant due process of law.
89
The Smith court's finding that the reasonable doubt instructions did not
violate the federal constitution precluded the court from reversing the state
court conviction. When a federal court reviews a habeas corpus petition that
challenges a state court jury instruction, the federal court is limited to
determining whether the challenged instruction was in accordance with the
United States Constitution.9 In Smith, the state jury instruction on reason-
able doubt did not violate the federal Constitution. 9 Therefore, the relief
suggested by the dissent, that the Fourth Circuit should have reversed the
defendant's conviction, was not an option available to the Smith court. 92
However, the dissent's arguments would be pertinent when a federal appellate
court is reviewing a federal district court conviction rather than a state court
conviction. When a defendant challenges a jury instruction given by a federal
trial court, a federal appellate court is not limited to constitutional review
of the instruction. 93 In addition to the power to determine the constitution-
ality of lower court's actions, federal appellate courts have supervisory
powers to establish standards of procedure and evidence for federal trial
courts.94
When reviewing an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction given by a
federal trial court, a federal appellate court may utilize its supervisory powers
to reverse the conviction even though the instruction does not deny the
defendant due process of law.95 Through the court's supervisory power, a
federal appellate court may require a federal trial court to refrain from using
certain reasonable doubt instructions that the appellate court deems undesir-
able from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice. 96 State appellate courts
89. See supra notes 65-88 and accompanying text (analysis of case precedent supporting
Fourth Circuit's holding in Smith).
90. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (federal court may not overturn
state conviction unless challenged instruction violates due process clause of fourteenth amend-
ment).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 64-89 (case precedent supports Smith court's
decision to deny habeas relief on constitutional grounds).
92. 718 F.2d at 1279 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146
(1973) (federal court may not overturn state conviction unless challenged instruction violates
due process clause of fourteenth amendment).
93. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1973) (appellate courts may utilize
supervisory powers to require trial courts to follow sound judicial practice although practice is
not required by statute or Constitution); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943)
(federal appellate courts may set standards of evidence and procedure for lower federal courts
pursuant to power to supervise administration of criminal justice).
94. See supra note 93.
95. See Cupp, 414 U.S. at 145-46 (appellate courts may utilize supervisory powers to
require trial courts to follow sound judicial practice although practice is not required by statute
or Constitution); McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340-41 (court utilized supervisory powers to reverse
federal conviction and therefore found that it was not necessary to reach constitutional issue).
96. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (appellate courts may utilize
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possess similar supervisory powers over state trial courts.9 7 Appellate courts
at both the state and federal levels should use their supervisory power of
reversal to compel trial courts to discontinue the use of erroneous reasonable
doubt definitions. As the dissent correctly pointed out, appellate due process
review and strong criticism by reviewing courts have not succeeded in
removing incorrect definitions of reasonable doubt from jury instructions."
In attempting to define reasonable doubt, trial courts continue to use
language that appellate courts consistently have criticized. 9 The continued
use of incorrect definitions is dangerous because erroneous explanations of
reasonable doubt often confuse the jury and create misunderstanding of the
government's burden of proof.1°0 Empirical studies have demonstrated that
the reasonable doubt standard is a very difficult concept for jurors to
comprehend. 0' Since juries are uncertain about the meaning of reasonable
supervisory powers to require trial courts to follow sound judicial practice although practice is
not required by statute or Constitution).
97. See, e.g., State v. Byrd, 163 W. Va. 248, 251-52, 256 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1979) (utilizing
inherent supervisory powers, Supreme Court of Appeals imposed procedural rule that requires
trial courts to permit defendant to read and comment on presentence investigation report); State
v. Gary, 162 W. Va. 136, 139, 247 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1978) (pursuant to inherent rule-making
and supervisory powers, Supreme Court of Appeals established rule requiring trial courts to
conduct bail hearing if State opposes bail); Stubbs v. Cowden, 179 Va. 190, 199, 18 S.E.2d
275, 280 (1942) (Virginia Supreme Court possesses supervisory power to prevent "miscarriage
of justice").
98. See 718 F.2d at 1279 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). Strong warnings by appellate courts
against the use of certain erroneous definitions of reasonable doubt followed by affirmance of
convictions have not prevented trial courts from using such definitions. Id.; see, e.g., United
States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (Ist Cir. 1982) (trial court in Drake included "willing to act"
definition of reasonable doubt in jury charge even though both Supreme Court and First Circuit
had expressly disapproved of such definition); Payne v. Smith, 667 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir.
1981) (trial court in Payne defined reasonable doubt as "as substantial doubt, a real doubt"
even though Supreme Court had criticized use of such definition), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1983
(1982); Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1978) (trial court in Dunn included "good
and sufficient" reason instruction in jury charge even though appellate courts previously had
criticized defining reasonable doubt as "doubt for which one can give a good and sufficient
reason"); United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1241 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial court in
Rodriguez instructed jury that reasonable doubt must be "substantial rather than speculative"
even though Fifth Circuit expressly disapproved of instructing jury that reasonable doubt "must
be substantial rather than speculative" in two prior cases), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980),
modified on other grounds sub nom., Alberuaz v. United States, 602 F.2d 906 (1980) (en banc),
aff'd 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
99. See supra note 98 (discussing cases in which trial court used reasonable doubt definition
that appellate court previously had criticized).
100. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 (1978) (defining reasonable doubt as "a
substantial doubt, a real doubt" creates confusion); Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23 (Ist Cir.
1978) (trial courts must carefully define reasonable doubt because reasonable doubt definitions
may reduce government's burden of proof).
101. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc. REv. 153, 173, 174-75 (1982) (reasonable doubt
standard was confusing to deliberating juries). In a 1982 study, researchers Severance and
Loftus examined questions that juries submitted to Washington state trial judges during
deliberations. Id. at 164-73. Severance and Loftus found that the meanings of reasonable doubt
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doubt, they are particularly susceptible to the improper influence of erro-
neous definitions of the standard. 0 2
To prevent trial courts from unnecessarily increasing jury confusion,
appellate courts should utilize their supervisory powers'03 to reverse convic-
tions when a trial court includes a universally condemned definition of
reasonable doubt in the jury charge. The reasonable doubt standard plays a
central role in the criminal justice system.? 4 When possible, appellate courts
must prevent jury confusion from reducing the level of proof required to
satisfy the reasonable doubt standard.10 Incorrect definitions of reasonable
doubt can only increase the difficulties jurors have in understanding the
actual meaning of the concept. °6 Through the power of reversal, appellate
courts should compel trial courts to discontinue the use of erroneous defi-
nitions, and thereby alleviate some of the unnecessary confusion which
surrounds the reasonable doubt standard.
0 7
Although appellate courts could reduce some of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the application of the reasonable doubt standard through the power
is unclear and confusing to juries. Id. at 174-75; see also Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt &
Davis, Guilt Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision
Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PEs. & Soc. PsYcH. 282, 292 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Kerr et al.] (considerable uncertainty resulted when mock jurors were not given definition
of reasonable doubt). The Kerr study on jury behavior found that mock jurors participating in
the study were confused about the concept of reasonable doubt. See Kerr et al., supra at 292.
102. See supra note 101 (empirical research has demonstrated that jurors are uncertain
about meaning of reasonable doubt). Although jurors are confused about the concept of
reasonable doubt, proper definitions of reasonable doubt can substantially improve juror
comprehension of the elusive standard. See Severance & Loftus, supra note 101, at 180, 190,
194 (jurors instructed on reasonable doubt had significantly fewer comprehension errors than
jurors who received no instructions on concept); Kerr et al., supra note 101, at 292 (mock
jurors were considerably more uncertain when researchers gave no definition of reasonable
doubt). Consequently, jurors can be substantially influenced by improper reasonable doubt
definitions as well. See id. at 291 (variations in reasonable doubt definitions affected mock
juror verdicts); see also Champagne & Nagel, supra note 1, at 278-80 (juror comprehension of
reasonable doubt standard is affected by content of jury instruction on standard).
103. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing appellate courts' power to
supervise administration of justice in lower courts).
104. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (reasonable doubt standard plays essential
part in administration of criminal justice); see supra note I (discussing importance of exacting
standard of proof in criminal trials).
105. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (appellate courts must carefully
guard against dilution of principle that government must establish defendant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt to obtain conviction).
106. See supra note 101 (empirical research has demonstrated that jurors are uncertain
about meaning of reasonable doubt). Since psychological research has demonstrated that
reasonable doubt definitions affect juror comprehension of the reasonable doubt concept, an
erroneous definition of reasonable doubt is likely to have a detrimental effect on a juror's
ability to understand the actual meaning of reasonable doubt. See Severance & Loftus, supra
note 101, at 180, 190, 194 (jurors instructed on reasonable doubt had significantly fewer
comprehension errors than jurors who received no instructions on concept).
107. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text (appellate courts should use supervisory
power of reversal to prevent future use of erroneous reasonable doubt definitions because such
definitions often confuse jury and create misunderstanding of government's burden of proof).
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of reversal, the threat of reversal is not the most effective means of clarifying
the concept. 08 Legislation is the best method of alleviating the conflict and
confusion surrounding the reasonable doubt standard.' 9 Appellate courts
are limited to deciding whether the particular definition of reasonable doubt
before them is erroneous and therefore should not be used in jury instruc-
tions.1 ° Consequently, the process of controlling the use of improper rea-
sonable doubt instructions would require a series of appellate decisions in
each jurisdiction. Case law development of an acceptable reasonable doubt
definition would not be as efficient a means of clarifying the proper definition
of reasonable doubt as would be the passage of a statute adopting a particular
definition of the standard."' A legislature, unlike an appellate court, could
promulgate a specific definition of reasonable doubt and thereby eliminate
the use of all other formulations in a single act."
2
In formulating a statutory definition of reasonable doubt, the "hesitate
to act" instruction the Supreme Court approved in Holland should provide
guidance for legislators." 3 Since the "hesitate to act" definition is the only
definition of reasonable doubt that the judiciary generally has accepted," 4 a
108. See McBaine, supra note 3, at 259 (legislation is best method, if not only method, to
remove confusion which surrounds reasonable doubt standard).
109. Id.; see infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (legislative act adopting particular
reasonable doubt definition is most effective means of clarifying reasonable doubt standard).
110. See W. MuRIPHY & C. PRcmTT, COURTS, JUDnGES AND PoLrIcs 489 (1979). The role
of a court is to decide the immediate case before the tribunal. Id. A judicial opinion has
precedential value only when it is based on the facts of the controversy before the court. Id.
Thus, while an appellate court could criticize erroneous definitions of reasonable doubt that
were not used in the particular case before it, such criticism would not serve as precedent for
future cases. See id. Furthermore, an appellate court is 'a passive lawmaker and can pass on the
propriety of a particular definition only when a defendant has brought the issue before the
court. See B. FISHER, INTRODUCTION TO T=E LEGAL SYsTEM 65 (1977) (courts can make law only
when lawsuit is brought before court).
11. See supra note 110 (courts are limited to deciding immediate cases before them).
112. See supra note 110 (courts are limited to deciding immediate case before them);
McBaine, supra note 3, at 259 (legislation is best method of removing confusion which surrounds
reasonable doubt standard).
113. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954); supra note 5 and accompanying
text (discussion of reasonable doubt definition Supreme Court recommended in Holland).
114. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). Ten federal circuit courts of
appeals have approved the hesitate to act definition of reasonable doubt. See United States v.
Wilkerson, 691 F.2d 425, 427 n.3, 428 (8th Cir. 1982) (approving instruction which defined
reasonable doubt as "doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act"); United
States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 1982) (hesitate to act definition is proper explanation
of reasonable doubt); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1982) (courts prefer
hesitate to act definition of reasonable doubt); United States v. Clayton, 643 F.2d 1071, 1075
(5th Cir. 1981) (courts should use "hesitate to act" definition to define reasonable doubt);
United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 436 (2d Cir. 1976) (courts should use hesitate to act
definition because definition is superior to other explanations of reasonable doubt), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1091 (1977); United States v. Leaphart, 513 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir. 1975) (trial courts
should substitute hesitate to act definition of reasonable doubt for definitions courts presently
use); United States v. Restaino, 369 F.2d 544, 546 (3d Cir. 1966) (courts should phrase reasonable
doubt instructions in terms of hesitate to act instead of willing to act); United States v. Releford,
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legislature should use the "hesitate to act" definition as a guide to assure the
legal accuracy of a statutory reasonable doubt definition. Psychological
studies concerning the effect of jury instructions on juror comprehension
can provide additional guidance to legislators on properly defining reasonable
doubt. Psychological research has demonstrated that jury instructions utiliz-
ing sound psycholinguistic principles improve juror comprehension of the
instructions.' 5 The vocabulary, grammar and organization of a jury instruc-
tion on reasonable doubt can affect a juror's ability to comprehend and
apply the reasonable doubt standard." 6 A legislature, therefore, should
combine the judicially accepted "hesitate to act" definition with sound
psycholinguistic principles to draft a legally accurate and comprehensible
reasonable doubt instruction.
1 7
In Smith v. Bordenkircher, the Fourth Circuit disapproved of two
reasonable doubt definitions the trial court included in the jury charge, but
denied the defendant habeas relief because the challenged instructions did
352 F.2d 36, 41, 41 n.2 (6th Cir. 1965) (trial court's use of willing to act definition of reasonable
doubt was not reversible error, but court should have used hesitate to act definition of reasonable
doubt), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 984 (1966); Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470, 470 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (trial court should have defined burden of proof in terms of hesitate to act
and not as kind of proof one is willing to act upon in his own affairs), cert. denied 389 U.S.
883 (1967); United States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1965) (preferable to define
reasonable doubt as doubt that would make one hesitate to act); see also supra note 16
(discussion of appellate court disapproval of reasonable doubt definitions).
115. See Severance & Loftus, supra note 101, at 194 (psycholinguistic changes in jury
instructions improve jurors' ability to comprehend and apply instructions). Jurors are more
confident in applying the law when the trial court's jury instructions are based on sound
psycholinguistic principles. Id. Psycholinguistic improvements in jury instructions include using
active voice, eliminating multiple negatives, reducing item lists, and replacing uncommon words
with those more common to jurors. Id. at 159-60, 185-87.
116. See id. at 194 (psycholinguistic changes in jury instructions improve jurors' ability to
comprehend and apply instructions).
117. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (discussion of judiciary's general
acceptance of hesitate to act definition of reasonable doubt and benefits of utilizing sound
psycholinguistic principles in jury instructions). An article in a recent law journal proposed a
definition of reasonable doubt combining the hesitate to act definition and sound psycholinguistic
principles. See Bain, A Proposed Definition of Reasonable Doubt and the Demise of the
Circumstantial Evidence Charge Following Hawkins v. State, 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 353, 377-78
(1984). The proposed reasonable doubt definition provides:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It is the kind of
doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the conduct of his or
her serious and important business or personal matters. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is proof that will remove from your mind any reasonable doubt, which is the
kind of doubt that would make you hesitate to act in the conduct of your serious
and important business or personal matters. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that all elements of the crime have been proved, then you must find the
defendant guilty. However, if you are left with a reasonable doubt about the proof
of any element, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
See id. at 377-78. Bain's proposed definition of reasonable doubt applies findings of the
Severance & Loftus study to the Holland hesitate to act definition. See id.; see also supra note
101 (explanation of Severance and Loftus study).
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not so affect the trial as to deny the defendant due process of law."18 The
Fourth Circuit found that several proper instructions on the reasonable doubt
standard mitigated any prejudicial effects attributable to the two erroneous
definitions.Y9 The great weight of authority supports the Smith court's denial
of habeas relief on constitutional grounds.2 0 Although the Fourth Circuit
could not overturn the trial court's conviction in Smith because the court
was reviewing a state conviction, appellate courts should nonetheless utilize
their supervisory powers to overturn convictions when a trial court unneces-
sarily increases juror confusion by including universally condemned reason-
able doubt definitions in the jury charge.' 2' Since the state trial court's
erroneous reasonable doubt instructions in Smith did not deny the defendant
due process, however, the Fourth Circuit was limited to merely criticizing
the erroneous instructions.122 The decision in Smith therefore does little to
alleviate the uncertainty that jurors experience when applying the reasonable
doubt standard.'21
J~mms R. LANCE
C. "Bright Lines" Enter the Gray Zone: Application of Automobile
Search Incident to Arrest Standards to Non-Automobile Cases
A search conducted incident to a lawful custodial arrest is a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to the United
118. See supra text accompanying notes 44-58 (Smith court found that both "good and
substantial doubt" instruction and "good and substantial reason" instruction were erroneous,
but concluded that instructions did not deny defendant cfue process of law).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 46-56 (Smith court found that proper jury
instructions mitigated prejudice attributable to trial court's erroneous definitions of reasonable
doubt).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 64-89 (discussion of precedent supporting Fourth
Circuit's holding in Smith).
121. See supra notes 90-107 and accompanying text (discussing need for appellate courts
to use supervisory power to compel trial courts to discontinue use of erroneous definitions of
reasonable doubt); see also supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (appellate courts could
reduce uncertainty surrounding reasonable doubt standard by using supervisory power of
reversal, but legislative act adopting particular reasonable doubt definition is most effective
means of clarifying reasonable doubt standard).
122. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (federal court review of state jury instruction
is limited to determining whether instruction violates federal Constitution).
123. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (merely criticizing trial court's use of
erroneous definition of reasonable doubt does not deter future use of such definitions and
therefore is not effective in alleviating jury confusion which surrounds reasonable doubt).
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States Constitution.' The United States Supreme Court in Chimel v. California2
held that, contemporaneous with and incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
law enforcement personnel may search the arrestee's person and the area
within the arrestee's immediate control.' The Chimel Court defined the area
1. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1969); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 30 (1925); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment protects people from unreasonable searches,
and a search conducted without first obtaining a valid search warrant based on probable cause
is unreasonable per se. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (mandate of fourth
amendment requires adherence to judicial process). Because society's interest in crime prevention
sometimes may outweigh an individual's privacy expectations, however, the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement is not without exception. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982);
see Note, Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause in Automobile Searches: A Validity
Checklist for Police, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 361, 362
n.10 (1983) (discussion of thirteen recognized exceptions to fourth amendment's warrant
requirement). A search incident to arrest is the oldest exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES AND CONCEPTS § 6.01, at 133 (1980). The Supreme Court has had trouble defining the
scope of the search incident to arrest exception. See 1 W. RrNoEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 12.2, at 12-1 to 12-2 (2d ed. 1979) (discussion of contradictory
history of search incident to arrest cases decided by Supreme Court). The Supreme Court first
recognized the search incident to arrest exception in dicta in Weeks v. United States, noting
that both English and American law always have recognized the government's right to search
the person of an arrestee to seize fruits or evidence of the crime. See 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)
(warrantless search of defendant's house and seizure of letters and papers found there held
violative of fourth amendment). The Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States further permitted
officers to search incident to arrest the area within the control of the arrestee. See 267 U.S.
132, 158 (1925) (warrantless search of defendant's automobile for illegal liquor upheld pursuant
to prohibition statute). The Supreme Court then embarked on a series of shifting and conflicting
cases interpreting the search incident to arrest exception. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 58-66 (1950) (search of arrestee's place of business, including desk, files and safe,
valid as incident to arrest), overruled, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699, 705-06 (1948) (search incident to arrest exception will not justify search when officers
could have obtained warrant), overruled, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950); Harris v. United states, 331
U.S. 145, 152 (1947) (warrantless search of arrestee's four-room apartment held reasonable),
overruled, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1932)
(warrantless search of arrestee's office held unreasonable); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931) (warrantless search of arrestee's office held unreasonable);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (warrantless search of all parts of premises
used for unlawful purposes held reasonable).
2. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the police waited at Chimel's house for Chimel's
arrival with a warrant for Chimel's arrest. Id. at 753. When Chimel arrived home, the police
arrested him and conducted a warrantless search of the entire house without Chimel's consent.
Id. at 753-54.
3. Id. at 763. In holding that the arrestee's person and the area within the arrestee's
immediate control are searchable incident to a lawful custodial arrest, the Chimel Court stressed
that concern for the arresting officer's safety and preservation of evidence justified the rule.
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within the arrestee's immediate control as the area from within which the
arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
4
The federal circuit courts were unable to reach a consensus interpretation
of Chimel.s Depending on the relative significance a court placed on certain
facts surrounding an arrest, the area within the immediate control of the
arrestee could be either very large or nonexistent.6 At least one commentator
recognized that one way to end the confusion in the area of search incident
Id. at 762-64. The Chimel opinion expressly overruled the Supreme Court's Harris and
Rabinowitz decisions. Id. at 768; see Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1950); Harris, 331 U.S.
145, 151-52 (1947); supra note I (description of Harris and Rabinowitz decisions). The Chimel
Court stressed that the fourth amendment considerations of protecting the arresting officer and
preserving evidence no longer exist if the rule permits the search to exceed the arrestee's person
and the area within the arrestee's reach. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 766. The Chimel Court reasoned
that permitting a search beyond the reach of the arrestee would create an essentially limitless
scope of search. Id.
4. 395 U.S. at 763.
5. Compare United States v. Matlock, 558 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.) (seizure of arrestee's
briefcase from wife's possession upheld even though arrestee was in police car), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 872 (1977) and United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1973) (seizure
of money from garment bag in closet while arrestee detained on bed upheld because arrestee
made "furtive movements" toward closet), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 930 (1974) and United States
v. Ciotti, 469 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1972) (seizure of stolen credit cards from briefcase
permitted while arrestee handcuffed), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 1151 (1974) with
United States v. Cooks, 493 F.2d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1974) (warrantless search of entire house
pursuant to arrest of two armed men in one room held unreasonable), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
996 (1975) and United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061, 1066 (6th Cir. 1973) (warrantless search
of sack found four feet from arrestee behind water heater held unreasonable).
One federal circuit court held the relevant time for determining whether an item was within
the arrestee's immediate control to be the time of the arrest rather than the time of the search,
thereby allowing searches of items beyond the arrestee's reach at the time of the search. See
Watkins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 1977) (search under mattress upheld
although arrestee was restrained in handcuffs at time of search), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976
(1978). Other circuit courts simply endowed the arrestee with superhuman skills capable of
bringing vast areas within the arrestee's control, thereby permitting warrantless searches incident
to arrest although the arrestee was restrained at the time of the search. See United States v.
Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1973) (search of attache case on back seat of automobile
upheld although arrestee standing outside car, handcuffed, and guarded by four officers);
United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1971) (search of kitchen cabinet
upheld although arrestee guarded by five officers in next room), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1064
(1972).
6. See supra note 5 (discussion of cases interpreting Chimel differently). One commen-
tator has suggested four factors which the courts usually consider in determining the area within
the arrestee's reach. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 6.3, at 415-16 (1978). First, the courts consider whether the law enforcement
officers have restrained the arrestee in some way. Id.; see United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d
206, 210 (2d Cir. 1977) (seizure and search of billfold on bedroom bureau illegal while arrestee
shackled to bed); see also United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 727-28 (5th Cir.) (dictum)
(court states suitcase would have been within arrestee's reach if arrestee's hands cuffed in front
of arrestee, but not if cuffed in back), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973). Second, the courts
usually consider the relative positions of the arresting officer and the arrestee in relation to the
area searched. LAFAVE, supra, at 415-16; see United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51, 55 (6th Cir.
1973) (court mentions that no officer stood between arrestee and desk as one factor in upholding
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to arrest was to establish a rule and apply it to a certain type of case
regardless of the particular factual variations.
7
The Supreme Court in New York v. Belton' developed such a "bright
line" test for the troublesome area of warrantless searches of automobiles
incident to arrest of the occupants. 9 Concerned with the ability of police to
apply the standard for determining areas within the reach of the arrestee,
the Belton Court generalized that articles in the passenger compartment of
warrantless search of desk), cert. denied 416 U.S. 992 (1974); United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d
67, 80 (2d Cir. 1973) (bedroom closet not within arrestee's reach while armed officer stood
between closet and arrestee). Third, courts usually consider the accessibility of the area searched.
LAFAvE, supra, at 416. Compare United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir.)
(warrantless search of box in open closet within six feet of arrestee upheld), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 859 (1972) with Mapp, 476 F.2d at 80 (court mentions that closet was closed as one factor
putting closet beyond reach of arrestee). The final consideration is the relative number of
officers and arrestees. LAFAVE, supra, at 415-16; see Mapp, 476 F.2d at 80 (officers outnum-
bering arrestee six to one as one factor in holding that searched closet was beyond arrestee's
reach).
7. See LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures". The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 142-43 (1974) (advocating set rules applicable to
all cases of certain type, in lieu of less precise ad hoc decisions).
8. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Belton, a lone officer stopped a car with four occupants for
speeding. Id. at 455. Upon approaching the automobile and smelling burnt marijuana, the
officer ordered the occupants out of the car and arrested them for possession of marijuana. Id.
at 455-56. With the four occupants standing away from each other and the car, the officer
searched the interior of the automobile, finding cocaine in a jacket on the back seat. Id. at
456. The Supreme Court upheld the officer's search of the jacket as incident to the arrest of
the automobile's occupants. Id. at 462-63.
9. Id. at 460. The Supreme Court first recognized the problems inherent in obtaining
warrants for automobile searches in Carroll v. United States. 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). In
Carroll, federal prohibition agents stopped Carroll as he was driving between Detroit and Grand
Rapids, Michigan and searched Carroll's car, finding 68 bottles of liquor. Id. at 134-36. The
Carroll Court recognized that the mobile nature of automobiles requires the arresting officer to
take quick action before the arrestee or his accomplices have a chance to remove evidence from
the jurisdiction, preventing the officer from obtaining a warrant. Id. at 153. Consequently, the
Carroll Court permitted the warrantless search of Carroll's automobile upon a showing of
probable cause to believe that illegal alcohol was in the automobile. Id. at 149. After Chimel,
the circuit courts came to different conclusions about the permissible scope of a search incident
to arrest of the occupants of an automobile. Compare United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309,
1313 (8th Cir. 1980) (warrantless search of container in car upheld as incident to arrest although
occupants stood outside car during search), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) and United States
v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1977) (warrantless search of bag in car while occupant
handcuffed outside upheld as incident to arrest), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) and United
States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1973) (warrantless search of attache case found
inside car while occupant stood outside car upheld as incident to arrest) with United States v.
Benson, 631 F.2d 1336, 1339-40 (8th Cir. 1980) (warrantless search of tote bag in car while
occupant outside held unreasonable), vacated, 453 U.S. 918 (1981) and United States v. Rigales,
630 F.2d 364, 366-68 (5th Cir. 1980) (warrantless search of zippered case found on car's
floorboard while occupant under guard outside held unreasonable). At least one state court
held that Chimel did not apply to automobile searches because of the added exigency of the
automobile's mobility. See Paxton v. State, 255 Ind. 264, -, 263 N.E. 2d 636, 640 (1970)
(court extended permissible scope of search incident to arrest beyond Chimel because of added
exigency of automobile's mobility).
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an automobile are almost inevitably within the area into which the automo-
bile's occupants might reach to grab a weapon or destructible evidence.' 0
The Belton Court held, therefore, that law enforcement officers may search
the passenger compartment of an automobile as a contemporaneous incident
to the lawful custodial arrest of the automobile's occupants." The Belton
Court noted that it based its decision solely on the theory of search incident
to arrest and not on the automobile exception.' 2 Furthermore, the Belton
Court explicitly rejected the theory that a lav enforcement officer reduces
an article to his exclusive control as soon as the officer seizes the article
because such a theory would effectively destroy the search incident to arrest
exception to the fourth amendment. 3 In two recent cases, United States v.
Litman, 4 and United States v. Porter,5 the Fourth Circuit applied the
reasoning in Belton to uphold warrantless searches incident to arrest in
situations not involving automobiles.' 6
In Litman, the defendant arrived at a hotel room to sell cocaine pursuant
to a prior arrangement with an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA).' 7 Litman entered the room carrying a black leather
shoulderbag and a plastic shopping bag from which protruded a triple-beam
balance.' Three DEA agents were waiting in the room and immediately
arrested Litman.19 The agents ordered Litman to drop the bags, and one of
10. 453 U.S. at 460.
11. Id. The Supreme Court's holding in Belton was the result of the Court's search for a
workable rule to deal with the permissible scope of a search incident to the arrest of the
occupants of an automobile. See id. at 459-60 (discussion of need for straightforward, easily
applied rule for cases involving automobiles and search incident to arrest). Automobile searches
have proven particularly troublesome for the courts because of the inherent exigency of the
automobile's mobility and the diminished expectation of privacy that an automobile provides
its occupants. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (discussion of reasons for
justifying warrantless searches of automobiles). In stating its "bright line" rule, the Belton
Court decided that the lawful arrest alone, and not any variable set of exigent circumstances,
justifies the warrantless search of the automobile passenger compartment incident to the arrest
of the automobile's occupants. 453 U.S. at 461. The Belton Court relied heavily on language
in United States v. Robinson in holding that the probable cause required to make an arrest is
sufficient to justify a search incident to that arrest. Id.; see Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)
(validity of search of arrestee's person depends solely on lawfulness of arrest and not on
subsequent judicial determination of whether arresting officer was actually likely to discover
weapons or evidence).
12. 453 U.S. at 462-63 n.6.
13. Id. at 461-62 n.5.
14. 739 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1984).
15. 738 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 389 (1984).
16. Litman, 739 F.2d at 138-39; Porter, 738 F.2d at 627.
17. 739 F.2d at 138. In Litman, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent made
arrangements to buy cocaine from Litman through an intermediary, who was arrested prior to
the arrest of Litman. Appellant's Brief at 3, United States v. Litman, 739 F.2d 137 (4th Cir.
1984) (hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief).
18. Appellant's Brief at 4, supra note 17. The Litman court described the triple-beam
balance as a type of scale used in narcotics transactions. 739 F.2d at 138.
19. 739 F.2d at 138. In Litman, the intermediary had delivered the hotel room key to the
DEA agent before the DEA agent arrested the intermediary. Appellant's Brief at 3, supra note
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the agents frisjked Litman while the other two agents kept their weapons
aimed at the defendant. 20 After the frisk, one of the agents searched both
bags and found cocaine in clear plastic bags in the shoulderbag and the
balance in the shopping bag. 2' The agents did not have a warrant to search
the bags .
2
Before trial, Litman moved to suppress the cocaine and balance as fruits
of an illegal search. 23 The prosecution argued that the shoulderbag was within
Litman's reach at the time of the search and therefore that the agents
reasonably searched the bag incident to Litman's lawful arrest.24 The district
court agreed that the bags were within Litman's reach at the time of the
search.2 - The district court nonetheless suppressed the evidence, holding that
the bags were in the exclusive control of the agent conducting the search,
which destroyed any exigency that would have justified the agent's warrant-
less search. 26
17. The hotel management consented to have the three DEA agents wait in the hotel room for
Litman. Id.
20. 739 F.2d at 138.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see FED. R. CRim. P. 12(b)(3) (defendant must make motion to suppress evidence
prior to trial). Litman did not dispute the lawfulness of his arrest. 739 F.2d at 138.
24. Litman, 739 F.2d at 139 n.4. The prosecution in Litman argued that the black leather
bag was only ten to twelve inches from Litman's left foot at the time of the search. Id. At
trial, however, Litman testified that the bag was several feet away from him. Id. The district
court decided that the bag was within Litman's reach under either version of the facts. Id.
25. 739 F.2d at 138.
26. Id. All exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant clause are based on exigent
circumstances. 1 W. RINGEL, supra note 1, § 10.1. The relevant exigencies justifying a warrantless
search incident to arrest are protection of the arresting officer and prevention of destruction of
evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). When the police reduce property
to their exclusive control so that the arrestee can no longer reach the property to obtain a
weapon or destroy evidence, the exigencies justifying a search of that property as incident to
the arrest no longer exist. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1977) (warrantless
search of footlocker in exclusive control of police for more than one hour after arrest held
unreasonable).
The triple-beam balance in Litman, which was protruding from the plastic bag and visible
when Litman entered the hotel room, was admissible as evidence under the "plain view"
exception to the warrant requirement. 739 F.2d at 138 n.2. The Supreme Court in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, first recognized the "plain view" exception to the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement although the Court held that the exception was inapplicable in that case because
the search was not contemporaneous with the arrest. See 403 U.S. 443, 464-65 (1971) (warrantless
search of automobile two days after seizure held unreasonable). The Coolidge Court recognized
that any evidence seized is necessarily in plain view at the time of seizure. Id. at 465. The
Coolidge Court, therefore, held that the "plain view" exception applies only when the police
have prior justification for the initial intrusion and discover the evidence inadvertently. Id. at
466-70; see United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 1976) (discovery and seizure
of stolen mail scattered on floor of room upheld when defendant consented to initial police
entry); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1972) (inadvertent discovery and




On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the shoulderbag in
Litman was within the area from which Litman could grab a weapon or
destroy evidence and therefore was subject to a search incident to Litman's
arrest.27 The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the defendant's theory that an
item seized by and in the exclusive control of law enforcement personnel
necessarily is not subject to search without a warrant. 28 The Litman court
explained that such a theory would place an article in the "exclusive control"
of the officer as soon as the officer made the seizure, essentially destroying
the search incident to arrest exception to the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement.
29
The Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Porter the same day it
decided Litman, using reasoning similar to that in Litman.3 0 In Porter,
detective John Dawley accosted the defendant, Penny Porter, in the general
passenger area of the Washington National Airport after Dawley received an
anonymous tip that Porter was transporting cocaine.3" In addition to match-
27. 739 F.2d at 139.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Porter, 738 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1984); Litman, 739 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1984).
31. 738 F.2d at 623-24. In Porter, John Dawley, a Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police
Department detective on special assignment to the DEA Task Force at Washington National
Airport, received a telephone call from an anonymous informant on February. 20, 1982. Id. at
623. The informant claimed that Penny Porter would be leaving Washington from National
Airport that evening bound for Miami and would return carrying a quantity of cocaine. Id.
The informant described Porter as a black female between 5'3" and 5'7", weighing between
115 and 125 pounds, with long brown hair, and wearing a red miniskirt and brown leather coat
and carrying a large gold-colored purse. Id. The informant also gave Dawley information
concerning someone other than Porter, which Dawley investigated and found to be correct. Id.
Although the Porter court acknowledged that details of the information concerning the other
individuals were lacking in the record, the Porter court later stressed the accuracy of this other
information as corroborative of the information concerning Porter in providing probable cause
to arrest Porter as soon as Porter identified herself. Id. at 623, 625, 626; see infra note 49
(Porter court stressed anonymous informant's proven reliability in justifying Terry stop of
Porter). Dawley also discovered that a "T. Porter" had taken a flight to Miami that night,
providing Dawley with apparent verification of the anonymous informant's information about
Penny Porter. 738 F.2d at 623. On February 22, the informant again called Dawley, claiming
that Porter would arrive at Washington National Airport that afternoon. Id. That afternoon,
Dawley observed a woman matching Porter's physical description deplane from a flight arriving
from Miami. Id. Instead of the red miniskirt and gold purse described by the informant's first
phone call, the woman who caught Dawley's attention as matching Porter's physical description
was wearing jeans and carrying a piece of carry-on luggage. Id. at 623-24. The woman further
roused Dawley's suspicion by being one of the last passengers to leave the plane, looking directly
at Dawley, continuously looking over her shoulder while walking rapidly down the concourse,
and generally seeming nervous. Id. at 624.
The Porter court recognized Dawley's description of Porter's actions as containing elements
of the DEA's drug courier profile. Id. at 626 n.3. The drug courier profile is an informally
compiled list of characteristics typical of people transporting drugs. See United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 (1980) (Court upheld consent search conducted after federal
agents stopped and questioned arrestee on basis of her display of drug courier profile charac-
teristics); see also Constantino, Cannavo and Goldstein, Drug Courier Profiles and Airport
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ing Porter's physical description given by the anonymous informant, Porter
attracted Dawley's attention by displaying several characteristics of the
DEA's drug courier profile. 2 Dawley positively identified Porter as the
woman he was looking for by checking Porter's boarding pass. 3 On Dawley's
request, Porter accompanied Dawley to the DEA office at the airport.
3 4
Although Dawley later testified that Porter was free to refuse his request
and go her own way, Dawley did not inform Porter that she was free to
leave. 35 The DEA office was part of the Federal Aviation Administration
Stops: Is the Sky the Limit?, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 175, 181-82 (1980) (discussion of various
characteristics usually included in drug courier profiles). Some of the more common character-
istics included in drug courier profiles are the use of small denomination of currency in
purchasing tickets, travel to or from cities considered major sources of drugs, nervousness,
bulky clothing, and traveling with little or no luggage. See Constantino, supra, at 181-82; see
also Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on
Less Than Probable Cause, 19 AM. Clit,. L. REv. 49, 77-78 (1981) (discussion of drug courier
profile and determining reasonable suspicion). Although the mere fact that a person fits a drug
courier profile does not justify even a Terry stop, profile characteristics supplemented by other
information may provide the officer with a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
necessary for a limited seizure of the person. See Royer v. State, 389 So.2d 1007, 1019 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (mere similarity with drug courier profile characteristics is inadequate even
to satisfy articuiable suspicion requirement to justify Terry stop), aff'd, 460 U.S. 491, 502
(1983); infra note 49 (discussion of Terry v. Ohio as requiring law enforcement officers to have
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity by person to justify a limited seizure of
that person); see also United States v. Harrison, 667 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1982) (seizure
of defendant upheld because defendant made peculiar movement, ran up stairs, and had long
bulge on his back beneath jacket as well as matching drug courier profile), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1151 (1982); Greenberg, supra at 77 (contending that drug courier profile is neither specific
enough nor reliable enough to evidence reasonable suspicion). See generally 3 LAFAvE, supra
note 6, § 9.3, at 39-43 (Supp. 1984) (discussion of DEA drug courier profiles and establishing
grounds for Terry stop).
Upon approaching Porter, Dawley identified himself as a special agent for the DEA, and
Porter consented to speak with him. Porter, 738 F.2d at 624. Upon Dawley's request, Porter
handed Dawley her boarding pass, which bore the name "T. Porter," and she said her name
was Teresa Porter. Id.
32. Porter, 738 F.2d at 626; see supra note 31 (discussion of DEA drug courier profiles).
33. 738 F.2d at 624.
34. Id. In Porter, at the time Dawley asked Porter to accompany him to the DEA office,
Dawley was not accompanied by any other agents, nor had Dawley touched Porter or made
any show of authority. Id.
35. Id. Enroute to the DEA office, Porter said that she urgently needed to go to the
bathroom, but Dawley told Porter that a policewoman would accompany Porter to the restroom
once they arrived at the DEA office. Id. The Porter court noted that what had begun as a
Terry stop probably turned into an arrest when Dawley told Porter that Porter could go to the
restroom only in the company of a policewoman. 738 F.2d at 625 n.2; see infra note 49
(discussion of Dawley's encounter with Porter in terms of Terry v. Ohio). An initially consensual
encounter between police and a citizen becomes a seizure if a reasonable person, viewing the
totality of circumstances surrounding the incident, would believe that he was not free to leave.
See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1761 (1984) (no seizure
of workers during factory search for illegal aliens although armed federal agents stationed at
all exits because workers free to walk around); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503 (1983) (as
practical matter, defendant was under arrest when police seized defendant's plane ticket,
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(FAA) office at Washington National Airport, and when Dawley and Porter
arrived at the FAA office, Dawley asked Porter for further identification.3 6
Porter started going through her carry-on bag before Dawley asked Porter
if he could look in the bag. 37 Porter permitted Dawley to frisk the sides of
the bag and look inside, but Dawley did not place his hands inside the bag.3"
After Dawley and Porter walked back to the DEA office, Dawley asked
Porter if she had brought anything with her from Miami. 39 Porter replied
that she had some marijuana and pulled from her left rear pocket an
envelope containing marijuana cigarettes. 4° Dawley promptly placed Porter
under arrest, fifteen minutes after Porter stepped off the plane.4' After
advising Porter of her Miranda rights, 42 Dawley conducted a warrantless
search of Porter's carry-on bag, which was between Dawley and Porter and
within Porter's reach at the time of the arrest.43 Dawley discovered approx-
imately 60,000 dollars worth of cocaine hidden in Porter's bag. 44
identification, and luggage and never informed defendant that he was free to leave room in
which police detained him).
Dawley was unable to find a policewoman at the DEA office to accompany Porter to the
restroom, so Dawley asked the FAA desk sergeant to summon a policewoman to the office.
Porter, 738 F.2d at 624.
36. 738 F.2d at 624.
37. Id.
38. Id. At least one circuit court has held that once the police seize and search an item,
subsequent searches of that item do not require a warrant if the item remains in the legitimate,
uninterrupted possession of the police. See United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1049 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 936 (1983). In Burnette, police officers searched the defendant's
purse at the scene of the arrest, then searched the purse more thoroughly at the police station.
Id. The Burnette court reasoned that the initial search significantly reduced the arrestee's
expectation of privacy in the purse, thereby making the subsequent search reasonable. The
Porter record is silent as to who carried Porter's bag from the front desk of the FAA police
office, where the initial pat-down and visual search of the bag occurred, to the DEA office. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Supreme Court will not validate searches incident to arrest unless the police
conduct the search contemporaneously in time and place with the arrest. See Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (once defendant is under arrest and in custody, search made
at another place, without warrant, is not incident to arrest because no danger to officer or
evidence); see also C. WHITBREAD, supra note 1, § 6.04, at 138-39 (discussion of contempor-
aneousness requirements for search incident to arrest).
42. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (to safeguard fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, law enforcement officers must immediately inform person
in custody that he has right to remain silent and right to have attorney present during
questioning). In Porter, after advising Porter of her rights as required by Miranda, Dawley
asked Porter if she understood the Miranda rights, and Porter said that she did but Porter did
not express any desire to see a lawyer at that time. Porter, 738 F.2d at 624.
43. 738 F.2d at 624.
44. Id. In Porter, the cocaine that Dawley discovered in Porter's carry-on bag was in a
clear plastic bag, wrapped in a red miniskirt, which was itself stuffed inside a gold-colored
purse. Id. After the warrantless search of Porter's carry-on bag, resulting in discovery of the
cocaine, Dawley again advised Porter of her Miranda rights. Id. Porter made several inculpatory
statements, not elaborated upon in the record, before indicating that she wished to see a lawyer.
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Porter made a pretrial motion to suppress the seized cocaine as fruit of
an illegal search.4 5 The district court denied the motion, holding that Dawley's
warrantless search of Porter's carry-on bag was a legitimate search incident
to arrest.46 The district court subsequently found Porter guilty of possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute. 47 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the district court was not clearly erroneous in characterizing the
initial encounter between Dawley and Porter as a limited seizure justifiable
under Terry v. Ohio48 because Dawley had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal activity sufficient to justify detention and questioning of Porter.4 9
45. Id.; see FED. R. ChuM. P. 12(b)(3) (defendant must make motion to suppress evidence
prior to trial).
46. 738 F.2d at 624-25. The district court in Porter held that Dawley's initial encounter
with Porter was justifiable as a Terry stop and that Porter voluntarily consented to accompany
Dawley to the DEA office. Id. at 625; see infra note 49 (discussion of Terry v. Ohio as requiring
law enforcement officers to have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity by person
to justify limited seizure of that person).
47. 738 F.2d at 623.
48. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
49. 738 F.2d at 624-25; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). A law enforcement
officer is justified in making a limited seizure if he can point to specific and articulable facts
concerning criminal activity that, with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
a belief by the officer that the seized person is, was, or is about to be involved in criminal
activity. 392 U.S. at 21. The reasonable, articulable suspicion needed to justify a limited seizure
of a person under Terry is necessarily less than probable cause to arrest but must be more
substantial than an inarticulable hunch on the part of the officer. Id. at 22. If a district court
determines that an encounter between police and a citizen never reached the point where the
citizen reasonably believed he could not leave, then the police officer has not violated the
citizen's constitutional rights. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-99 (1983) (plurality
opinion) (even momentary detention without reasonable, objective grounds violates fourth
amendment); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980) (Stewart, J.) (law enforce-
ment officers may address questions to anyone on the street without violation of fourth
amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (not all personal interactions between
police and citizens involve seizure of citizen). A police officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal activity will justify a limited seizure of the person under Terry. See Terry, 392 U.S.
at 30; see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per curiam) (police must show
reasonable, articulable suspicion that person is engaged in criminal activity to support any
restriction of that person's liberty). If the court characterizes the encounter as a full arrest, only
probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime will justify
the detention. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) (police power to make
warrantless arrest limited to situations in which reasonable grounds exist to believe that arrestee
has committed or is committing crime). The Porter court, citing United States v. Gooding,
stated that the nature of an encounter between police and citizen is a question of fact for the
district court to decide. 738 F.2d at 625; Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982) (court refused
to find clearly erroneous district court's factual determination that police had seized defendant).
An appellate court will not reverse a district court's finding of fact unless that finding is clearly
erroneous. Gooding, 695 F.2d at 82; see Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493 (1963)
(appellate court may not disturb district court's factual determination unless clearly erroneous).
The Porter court held that the anonymous informant's tip gave Dawley sufficient justifi-
cation to subject Porter to a Terry stop, especially in light of the informant's proven reliability.
Id. The Porter court did not consider whether Porter acted voluntarily in accompanying Dawley
to the DEA office. Id. The Porter court noted, rather, that other courts have found that a
detainee consented to accompany a police officer even when the officer later testifies that the
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The Fourth Circuit proceeded on the premise that Porter was under arrest
following her identification during the Terry stop because, at that time,
Dawley had probable cause to arrest Porter based on the anonymous
informant's corroborated information." The Fourth Circuit in Porter noted
the Belton Court's rejection of the "exclusive control" theory in holding
that Dawley was not in exclusive control of Porter's bag at the time of the
search.5' The Porter court also relied on Belton as establishing a "bright
line" rule that a lawful custodial arrest justifies a contemporaneous, war-
rantless search of the arrestee and the immediately surrounding area.5 2 The
Porter court noted that Porter did not dispute that her carry-on bag was
within her reach at the time of the search. 3 The Porter court also stated that
the prosecution does not have to show that an officer's safety or the existence
of evidence is actually threatened.5 4 According to the Porter court, for the
search incident to arrest exception to apply, all the prosecution need show is
that the arrest was lawful and that the searched article was within the
arrestee's reach. 5 The Fourth Circuit alternatively held that Dawley did not
detainee was not free to leave the officer's presence. Id. at 625 n.2; see United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 574-75 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court found that
defendant consented to accompany officers because defendant was asked rather than ordered
to accompany officers and officers neither threatened defendant nor made show of force,
although officer later testified that defendant was, in fact, not free to leave); United States v.
Corbin, 662 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1981) (court held that defendant consented to accompany
officers although officer later testified that defendant was not free to leave). In light of Dawley's
testimony that Porter was free to leave, the Porter court held that Porter consented to answer
Dawley's questions. 738 F.2d at 625.
50. 738 F.2d at 625-26. While the Porter court admitted that the DEA drug courier
characteristics alone could not supply the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion for even a
Terry stop, the Porter court was quick to point out that the drug courier characteristics displayed
by Porter supplemented the informant's tip. Id. at 626 n.3; see Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,
439-41 (1980) (officer could not reasonably have suspected criminal activity afoot merely on
strength of defendant displaying drug courier profile characteristics). The Porter court also
noted the similarity of factual situations in Porter and Draper v. United States, reasoning that,
if the agent in Draper had probable cause to arrest Draper, then Dawley was equally justified
in arresting Porter. 738 F.2d at 626; see Draper, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1959) (federal narcotics
agent had probable cause to arrest man matching description, provided by proven reliable
source, of man who informant claimed was drug dealer); see also Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2327-28 (1983) (veracity of informant is one element in determining whether police have
probable cause to arrest individual in light of totality of circumstances).
51. 738 F.2d at 626-27; see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.5 (1981) (Supreme
Court labeled broad exclusive control doctrine espoused by New York Court of Appeals a
"fallacious theory" because theory would wipe out search incident to arrest exception to fourth
amendment by not allowing officers to search what they seize); supra note 8 (discussion of
Belton facts).
52. 738 F.2d at 627; see Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (citing Chimel v. California for proposition
that lawful arrest creates situation justifying warrantless, contemporaneous search of arrestee
and area within arrestee's control); Chimel, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
53. 738 F.2d at 627.
54. Id.
55. Id. The permissibility of a search of the arrestee's person and the area within the
arrestee's immediate control does not depend on whether a threat to the arresting officer or
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have exclusive control of Porter's carry-on bag and that, therefore, the
exigency of danger to evidence was present if the prosecution needed to show
an exigency to justify the search incident to arrest 5 6 The Porter court held
that Dawley was not in exclusive control of Porter's carry-on bag because
the bag was within Porter's reach during the arrest and therefore within the
area from which Porter could attempt to conceal or destroy evidence. 7
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's admission of
the cocaine as the product of a valid search incident to the lawful arrest of
Porter."
The dissent in Porter disapproved of the majority's extension of Belton
to deal with a factual setting not involving an automobile. 9 The Porter
dissent stressed that Belton did no more than resolve the meaning of Chimel
in the narrow context of searches incident to arrest of an automobile's
occupants.6 0 The dissent maintained that no authority existed which validated
all searches of the arrestee and the surrounding area regardless of the presence
of exigent circumstances . 6 The dissent emphasized the total lack of exigencies
destructible evidence exists. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (authority
to search arrestee's person incident to arrest not dependent on subsequent judicial finding that
search was likely to uncover weapons or destructible evidence); Belton, 453 U.S. at 459
(application of Robinson to area within arrestee's reach); see also Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763
(concern for arresting officer's safety and preservation of evidence justifies search of area within
reach of arrestee as well as person of arrestee). The prosecution in Porter did not have to prove
that any exigency existed to justify the search incident to arrest because the Porter court
determined that Porter's arrest was lawful and that the carry-on bag was within Porter's reach
at the time of the arrest. 738 F.2d at 627.
56. 738 F.2d at 627.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 626-27. The Porter court dismissed any problem of contemporaneousness in
the fifteen minute interval between the arrest and the search incident to arrest in Porter. Id. at
627 n.4. The Porter court noted that the Fourth Circuit had held searches permissible as incident
to arrest where as much as half an hour separated the arrest from the search. Id.; see United
States v. McEachern, 675 F.2d 618, 622 (4th Cir. 1982) (warrantless search held incident to
arrest even though police arrested defendant and drove to FBI office thirty minutes away before
conducting search of arrestee's wallet).
59. 738 F.2d at 627-28 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see Belton, 453 U.S. 459-60 (Belton
Court explicitly states issue of case as determining proper scope of search of automobile incident
to arrest of automobile's occupants); see also supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (discussion
of Belton facts and holding).
60. 738 F.2d at 628 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.2. The
Porter dissent maintained that the Belton Court upheld the officer's search of the automobile's
passenger compartment because of the exigent circumstances inherently present in the automo-
bile. 738 F.2d at 628; see Belton, 453 U.S. at 457. Exigent circumstances noted by the Belton
Court were that a lone police officer was faced with four men in a speeding car owned by none
of them and the car apparently contained an uncertain quantity of a controlled substance.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 457. Further supporting its view that the outcome in Belton depended on
the search being of an automobile, the Porter dissent claimed that the inherent exigency of
mobility exists in any case involving an automobile. 738 F.2d at 628; see Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964) (common sense dictates distinction between search of automobile
and search of immovable structure).
61. 738 F.2d at 629 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Porter dissent noted the distinctions
between a search of the arrestee's person and a search of the area within the arrestee's immediate
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to justify the warrantless search of Porter's carry-on bag, noting that Dawley
conducted the search at the FAA police station, which was staffed by at
least two other officers, and that Dawley already had frisked the bag for
weapons. 62 The Porter dissent suggested that Dawley was in exclusive control
of Porter's carry-on bag for several minutes prior to the search.63 The dissent
further implied that Dawley created whatever exigencies existed by placing
the bag within Porter's reach when Dawley searched the bag. 64 Claiming that
the majority's holding set a precedent for erosion of the public's right to
privacy, the dissent maintained that the warrantless search of Porter's carry-
on bag violated the fourth amendment and that the district court should
have suppressed the seized cocaine.65
The Fourth Circuit properly upheld the warrantless searches in both
Litman and Porter.66 The rule established by Chimel and its progeny, that
law enforcement officers may search, contemporaneous to a lawful custodial
arrest, the arrestee's person and the area within the arrestee's immediate
control, is easily applicable in Litman.67 Litman did not dispute the lawfulness
of his arrest, and the district court made a finding of fact that the shoulderbag
was within Litman's reach at the time of the search.6" The police officer
control in claiming that the Porter majority misapplied United States v. Robinson. Id.; see
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); supra note 55 (discussion of Porter majority's application
of Robinson). The Porter dissent reasoned that an article on the person of the arrestee remains
accessible to the arrestee, and therefore, represents a danger to the arresting officer and
destructible evidence, until the police seize the article and remove it from the arrestee's reach.
738 F.2d at 629 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Porter dissent then noted the lack of absolutes
governing searches of the area within the reach of the arrestee, concluding that the courts in
such cases must look to the exigencies presented by the situations involved in each case in
deciding the legality of the search. Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (exigencies
which justify initiation of search also limit permissible scope of that search).
62. 738 F.2d at 629.
63. Id. at 630. The Porter dissent considered Dawley's possession of Porter's bag during
Dawley's frisk of the bag and the level of detail of Dawley's testimony compared with Dawley's
silence on whether he ever returned the bag to Porter in concluding that Dawley had uninter-
rupted control over the bag from the time of his initial frisk of the bag until the time of the
search. Id.
64. Id. Police may not justify a warrantless search of an article as incident to arrest when
the possibility of the arrestee reaching the article is due to the acts of the police. See United
States v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1978) (search of checked luggage held unreasonable
because police brought luggage within reach of arrestee); United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d
900, 903 (7th Cir. 1976) (search of bathroom and luggage, brought within reach of arrestee by
police ordering arrestee to get dressed, held unreasonable); United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d
1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1973) (search of checked luggage held unreasonable when luggage in
custody of airline at time of arrest and police responsible for bringing luggage within reach of
arrestee).
65. 738 F.2d at 630.
66. Litman, 739 F.2d at 139; Porter, 738 F.2d at 627.
67. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (incident to arrest, police may search arrestee and area
within arrestee's immediate control).
68. 739 F.2d at 138; see supra note 24 (Litman trial court decided that Litman's
shoulderbag was within his reach during search as result of either Litman's testimony or
testimony of arresting officers).
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searched the shoulderbag immediately following Litman's arrest, thus satis-
fying the requirement that the search be contemporaneous with the arrest.6 9
The Litman court properly affirmed Litman's conviction by applying the
Chimel tests to the facts of Litman.
In Porter, the Fourth Circuit again applied the Chimel tests to uphold a
search incident to arrest.1 0 Porter never disputed that her carry-on bag was
within her reach at the time of the search, thereby satisfying the requirement
that the searched article must be within the immediate control of the
arrestee. 7' Although Porter disputed the legality of her arrest, the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Porter is consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions
in Draper v. United Statese2 and Illinois v. Gates1 in holding that the tip
given Dawley by the anonymous informant provided Dawley with probable
cause to arrest Porter.74 The Draper and Gates decisions established that
corroborated information from an anonymous informant can provide an
officer with probable cause to arrest.75 In Litman, Dawley had sufficient
probable cause to arrest Porter because Dawley had verified personally every
aspect of the anonymous informant's detailed tip.76
Despite the strenuous objection of the dissent, the Porter majority
properly determined that the prosecution is not required to prove that any
69. 739 F.2d at 138; see United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 1979) (search
conducted within fifteen seconds of arrest is contemporaneous with that arrest), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 984 (1980) see generally 1 W. RnGoEL, supra note 1, at 12-13 to 12-22 (general
discussion of contemporaneousness of search incident to arrest in various situations).
70. 738 F.2d at 627.
71. Id.; see Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (Court defines area within arrestee's immediate
control as that area from within which arrestee could gain possession of weapon or destructible
evidence).
72. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). The facts of Draper closely paralleled those Porter. See Draper,
358 U.S. at 309-10 (facts of Draper); Porter, 738 F.2d at 623-24 (facts of Porter). In Draper,
a narcotics agent relied on information from a reliable informant to provide probable cause to
arrest a man who matched exactly the description given by the informant. Draper, 358 U.S. at
309-10. The Draper Court held that the informant's tip, personally verified in every detail by
the narcotics agent, provided reasonable grounds for the agent to arrest a man exactly matching
the detailed description given by the informant. Id. at 312-13.
73. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). In Gates, the police received an anonymous letter detailing
the drug-related activities of Gates and his wife. Id. at 2319. The police corroborated much of
the information in the letter through investigation and then, on the strength of the anonymous
letter and corroborating investigation, obtained a search warrant for the Gates home and
automobile. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the warrant's validity, holding that the warrant was
based on sufficient probable cause to justify the search. Id. at 2334-35.
74. 738 F.2d at 626.
75. Draper, 358 U.S. at 312-13; Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2334-35. Corroboration of part of
an informant's information indicates that the rest of the information is probably true. Gates,
103 S. Ct. at 2335. In Porter, Dawley's verification of the anonymous informant's tip concerning
someone other than Porter increased the probability that the tip concerning Porter was also
true. 738 F.2d at 626; see supra note 31 (discussion of information anonymous informant gave
Dawley). Dawley's corroboration of the informant's information concerning Porter's physical
appearance and travel plans lent further credence to the informant's assertion that Porter was
transporting cocaine. See id.




danger to police or evidence actually existed to justify the warrantless search
of items within the immediate control of the arrestee. 77 Exigent circumstances,
which are emergency situations that make securing a warrant impractical,
are the basis for nearly all exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement. 7 The exigencies justifying a warrantless search incident to arrest
are the potentially immediate dangers of assault on the arresting officer and
the destruction of evidence. 79 Those potential dangers exist any time weapons
or evidence are within the reach of an arrestee.8 0 Containers within the
arrestee's reach may hold weapons or destructible evidence accessible to the
arrestee, and therefore such containers are subject to search for the protection
of officers and preservation of evidence.8" Noting that the decision to search
in any arrest situation is necessarily a quick, ad hoc decision by the arresting
officer, the Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson 2 held that the right
to conduct a search incident to arrest flows automatically from the fact of
the lawful arrest and does not depend on a case-by-case adjudication of
whether danger to the officer or evidence actually existed. 3 The circumstances
that the Porter dissent noted, such as the relative number of law enforcement
officers and arrestees, the surroundings in which the officers conducted the
search, and who was holding the article at the time of the search, may be
relevant in determining the area within Porter's immediate control. 4 As long
as the arrest is lawful and the searched article is within the arrestee's reach,
77. 738 F.2d at 627.
78. W. RiNGEL, supra note 1, at 10-1 to 10-2.
79. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63; see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977)
(potential dangers present in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within
arrestee's immediate control reasonable).
80. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
81. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61 (police may search contents of any container within
reach of arrestee whether container is opened or closed because fact of lawful custodial arrest
justifies police infringement of any privacy interest arrestee may have in container); Chadwick,
433 U.S. at 15 (when police have exclusive control of article and that article is no longer
accessible to arrestee, search of that article is no longer incident to arrest).
82. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
83. Id. at 235. The Robinson decision dealt only with a search of the arrestee's person
incident to arrest. Id. The Chimel Court, however, recognized that the area within the arrestee's
reach is as subject to search as the arrestee's person. See 395 U.S. at 763 (area within arrestee's
reach is as subject to search as arrestee's person). Considering the Robinson Court's disapproval
of sophisticated judicial scrutiny of necessarily quick, ad hoc police decisions, the rule in
Robinson, that the fact of the lawful arrest establishes the authority to search, should apply to
a search of the area within the arrestee's reach as well as to a search of the arrestee's person.
See 414 U.S. at 235 (Robinson Court states that fourth amendment does not require rigorous
analysis of officer's quick, ad hoc decision) see also 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 7, § 6.3 at 417
(Robinson likely is applicable to search of area within arrestee's immediate control); Moylan,
Further Thoughts on the Belton and Robbins Decisions, 3 THE SuPREMiE CoURT: TRENDS AND
DEVLOPMENTs 113, 114-116 (1980-1981) (explanation of impact of Robinson and Belton on
relieving police and prosecution from proving that danger to arresting officer or destructible
evidence actually exists).
84. See 738 F.2d at 629-30 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (examination of circumstances
dissent deems relevant in determining reasonableness of search of Porter's carry-on bag); supra
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however, the prosecution need not show any further exigent circumstances
to justify the search incident to arrest.
8 5
For a warrantless search to be valid as a search incident to arrest, not
only must the arrest be legal and the searched item be within the arrestee's
immediate control, but the search must be contemporaneous with the arrest.8 6
The Porter court properly allowed the search of Porter's carry-on bag as a
contemporaneous incident to Porter's arrest, despite the fifteen minute lapse
between Porter's deplaning and the search. 7 Contemporaneousness is tied
closely to concepts of exclusive control and proximity of the searched article
to the arrestee 8 Circuit courts generally have permitted law enforcement
officers to conduct a search of an item as contemporaneous to arrest if the
searched item is within reach of the arrestee at the time of arrest or search.8 9
Rather than fix a certain number of minutes beyond which a search is not
contemporaneous with the arrest, courts consider the facts of each case in
determining whether the search is reasonably and substantially contempora-
neous with the arrest.9 For example, in United States v. Fleming,9' the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that a constitutional test of contemporaneousness
should not be entirely at odds with safe and sensible police procedures and
upheld a warrantless search of a paper bag separated from the arrest by a
five minute delay occasioned by handcuffing the arrestee and moving him to
the street.92 In Porter, Dawley's search of Porter's carry-on bag was reason-
notes 5 & 6 (discussion of cases noting circumstances courts considered in holding that article
searched was within reach of arrestee).
85. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (lawful arrest justifies contemporaneous, incidental search
of arrestee and area within immediate control of arrestee); supra note 84 (justification for
search incident to arrest flows directly from fact of arrest and prosecution need not show
further exigency).
86. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (justification for search incident
to arrest, danger to officer or evidence, no longer present if search is remote in time or place
from arrest). The Preston Court held the search of the defendant's automobile unreasonable
because the police had the defendant in custody at the police station and had towed the
automobile to a garage where the search occurred. Id.
87. 738 F.2d at 626.
88. See id. (search not contemporaneous with arrest if conducted at time or place where
searched article no longer on arrestee's person or within arrestee's immediate control). See
generally I W. RINGEL, supra note 1, at §§ 12.4(b)-12.4(b)(3) (discussion of courts' general
flexibility in defining period after arrest during which police may search arrestee and area within
immediate control of arrestee).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 1979) (search of
arrestee's luggage upheld as contemporaneous to arrest when search conducted within fifteen
seconds of arrest and in presence of arrestee), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980); United States
v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603, 610 (1st Cir.) (search of briefcase carried by arrestee at time of
arrest upheld although police handcuffed arrestee and placed him in patrol car before conducting
search), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); see also supra notes 5 & 6 (discussion of cases finding
searched article within arrestee's reach).
90. See supra note 89 (description of cases considering contemporaneousness requirement
of search incident to arrest exception to fourth amendment).
91. 677 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1982).
92. Id. at 607. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Fleming rejected the contention
that a search incident to arrest must be absolutely contemporaneous with the arrest regardless
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ably contemporaneous with Porter's arrest because the bag was within
Porter's reach at the time of the search.
93
Both Litman and Porter properly applied the Belton Court's rejection
of an exclusive control doctrine that would prohibit officers from searching
an article without a warrant the instant the arresting officer seizes the
article.9 4 Prior to Belton, the Supreme Court in United States v. Chadwick
95
established the rule that, once a law enforcement officer reduces an article
to his exclusive control and any danger that the arrestee might reach the
article to grab a weapon or destroy evidence no longer exists, a search of
that article is no longer incident to the arrest.9 6 At least one circuit court
held that the Chadwick Court, in promulgating the exclusive control doctrine,
had limited the doctrine to situations in which the article was not only in
the possession of the arresting officer, but also outside the reach of the
arrestee.9 7 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Garcia,9 reasoned that
the justification for a search incident to arrest existed as long as the searched
article was within reach of the arrestee, regardless of who had physical
possession of the article at the time of the search. 99 Other circuits, however,
have held that an article came within the exclusive control of the police at
the instant the arresting officer seized the article, thereby rendering the article
no longer subject to a search incident to arrest.100 The Belton Court subse-
of the immediate peril to the officer or to bystanders. Id. But see United States v. Monclavo-
Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1981) (court held that potential security risk at time of
arrest did not justify delaying warrantless search until one hour later at police station).
93. See 738 F.2d at 627 (Porter did not dispute that her carry-on bag was within her
reach at time of search); supra notes 86-90 (courts generally find search contemporaneous to
arrest if article searched is still within arrestee's reach).
94. Litman, 739 F.2d at 139; Porter, 738 F.2d at 627.
95. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
96. Id. at 15. In United States v. Chadwick, federal narcotics agents arrested the
defendants and seized a 200 pound, double-locked footlocker that the agents had probable
cause to believe contained illegal drugs. Id. at 4. An hour and a half after the arrests and more
than an hour after the police had placed the defendants in jail cells, the police conducted a
warrantless search of the footlocker, finding a large amount of marijuana. Id. The Chadwick
Court held that the search was not a valid search incident to arrest because the search was not
contemporaneous in time or place with the arrest and there was no longer any danger of the
arrestees gaining access to the footlocker at the time of the search. Id. at 15.
97. See United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 355-56 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 984 (1980).
98. 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
99. See id. at 354-55.
100. See United States v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1979) (court held that
article ordinarily comes into exclusive control of arresting officer at time of initial seizure);
United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1172 (8th Cir. 1978) (same). The Schleis court reasoned
that an interpretation of Chadwick that did not place an article in the exclusive control of the
police upon the initial seizure would encourage police to circumvent Chadwick by conducting a
search of luggage incident to arrest. Id.; see supra note 96 (discussion of Chadwick requirement
that police obtain warrant before searching article within exclusive control of police); see also
Note, Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-Persons Lawfully Arrested for Alleged Posses-
sion of Narcotics Have a Privacy Interest in a Footlocker in Their Possession at the Time of
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quently held that such a broad theory of exclusive control essentially would
eviscerate altogether the search incident to arrest exception to the fourth
amendment because the police could not search an article after seizing it.101
Although the Belton holding contemplated facts involving search of an
automobile, other circuit courts have applied the Belton Court's rejection of
a broad exclusive control theory to cases not involving automobiles. 0 2 The
reasoning employed in Belton to reject the exclusive control argument does
not depend on any characteristics inherent in automobiles, and should be
applicable in non-automobile cases such as Litman and Porter.03
Although the Fourth Circuit's use of Belton to settle the issue of exclusive
control was reasonable, both the Litman and Porter courts inappropriately
cited Belton to support other propositions.' 4 The Belton decision, designed
to provide a workable rule for warrantless searches of automobiles incident
to arrest, should not be applicable to cases not involving automobiles. 05 The
Belton Court's generalization that any article within the relatively small
confines of an automobile's passenger compartment almost inevitably will
be within the reach of the automobile's occupants produces a bright line
presumption of exigent circumstances justifying, incident to arrest, a war-
rantless search of the automobile's interior for the protection of the arresting
officer and for the preservation of evidence.'06 The presumption in Belton,
Their Arrest Which is Protected by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, 6 AM. J.
Cum. L. 81, 94 (1978) (initial police seizure of article must be sufficient to establish exclusive
control by officers to give Chadwick any substantial impact on search and seizure law).
101. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461-62 n.5.
102. See United States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (seizure and
immediate search of zippered leather pouch from between arrestee's knees held valid as incident
to street arrest of defendant); United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588, 592-93 (8th Cir. 1981)
(search held valid as incident to defendant's arrest when police allowed defendant to retrieve
paper bag from bus after his arrest and police then seized and searched the bag), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1003 (1982).
103. See supra text accompanying note 101 (discussion of policy behind Belton Court's
rejection of exclusive control theory); supra text accompanying note 12 (Belton decision based
on search incident to arrest and not automobile exception).
104. See Litman, 739 F.2d at 139 n.4 (Litman court claimed that Litman's bag was at least
as accessible to Litman as Belton's jacket was to Belton in Belton); Porter, 738 F.2d at 627
(citing Belton as establishing "bright line" rule that lawful arrest justifies contemporaneous
search of arrestee and area within arrestee's reach).
105. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (Supreme Court intended Belton to settle question of
what was within reach of arrestee in cases involving arrest of automobile's recent occupants);
see United States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1983) (any extension of Belton
beyond exact limits of objects within vehicle's passenger compartment would create temporal
and spatial uncertainties and increase likelihood of unjustified invasion of individual's privacy).
In Vaughan, the defendant was a passenger in an automobile driven by a man for whom the
police had an arrest warrant. 718 F.2d at 333. Vaughan twice tried to walk away from the scene
of the driver's arrest, but the police brought Vaughan back to the car each time and searched
the briefcase Vaughan was carrying after Vaughan's second attempt to leave. Id. The Vaughan
court ruled that the police never had probable cause to arrest Vaughan and that Belton did not
apply because the briefcase was not in the car at the time of the seizure. Id. at 333-34.
106. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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that an article within a certain space is within the reach of a recent occupant
of that space, is defensible precisely because the space that Belton contem-
plated is relatively small and easily defined.0 7 The Belton Court explicitly
limited its decision to the search of an automobile incident to the arrest of
the automobile's recent occupants."" Applying the "bright line" rule of
Belton to searches involving less easily defined areas such as a hotel room,
an FFA police office, or the middle of a street is less easily rationalized.' 9
Justice Brennan, in his Belton dissent, and several commentators have warned
of the consequences of applying Belton's "bright line" rule in non-automo-
bile cases." 0 Justice Brennan hypothesized that the Belton reasoning could
justify the warrantless search of a house as incident to the arrest of a suspect
who had recently exited the house."' One commentator indicated that
application of the Belton rule to arrests in homes, offices, and other locations
could easily permit the search of the entire room in which the officers made
the arrest." 2 Potentially, the courts might permit searches of items clearly
beyond the reach of the arrestee as incident to arrest." 3 As the Supreme
Court noted in Chimel, once the courts permit a search to go beyond the
area from which the arrestee might obtain a weapon or evidence, no
consideration relevant to the fourth amendment suggests any point of rational
limitation of the scope of the search." 4 Both Litman and Porter, nonetheless,
applied the Belton "bright line" rule to justify the warrantless searches in
each case."- The Fourth Circuit's use of the Belton "bright line" reasoning
107. See id.
108. See id. at 455, 460 & 462 (Belton Court consistently mentions that Belton decision
deals with limited situation of search of automobile incident to arrest of automobile's occupants).
109. See infra notes 110-12 (discussion of problems in applying Belton bright line rule to
non-automobile situations).
110. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 463-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing Belton as
expanding permissible scope of search incident to arrest beyond reach of arrestee). See generally
2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 7.1 at 176-85 (Supp. 1984) (criticizing Belton as difficult to
apply, unnecessary, and subject to abuse and manipulation); Katz, Automobile Searches and
Diminished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 Am. Cui s. L. REv. 557, 583-97 (1982)
(criticizing Belton generally for raising more issues than it answers); Note, Expanding the Scope
of a Search Incident to an Arrest: Efficiency at the Expense of Fourth Amendment Rights-
New York v. Belton, 31 DEPAuSL L. REv. 581 (1982) (criticizing Belton for disregarding arrestee's
privacy interests in containers and for undermining Chimel requirements of danger to police or
evidence).
111. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. See Katz, supra note 108, at 593. Katz reasons that application of the Belton rule to
non-automobile situations could invite reconsideration of Chimel's reversal of Rabinowitz and
Harris by allowing a warrantless search of an entire room incident to an arrest made in that
room, even though some areas of the room are not actually within reach of the arrestee. Id.;
see supra note I (discussion of Harris and Rabinowitz decisions).
113. See supra notes 108-110 (discussion of dangers of applying Belton to non-automobile
situations).
114. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 766.
115. See Litman, 739 F.2d at 139 n.4 (Fourth Circuit used result of Belton bright line rule,
which was that Belton's jacket was presumptively within Belton's reach because jacket was in
automobile's passenger compartment, to justify holding that Litman had access to his should-
erbag at time of search); Porter, 738 F.2d at 627 (Fourth Circuit cites to Belton for bright line
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does not expand the scope of the searches in Litman and Porter because
both cases are justifiable under Chimel."16 Application of the Belton rule in
non-automobile cases, however, sets a precedent for applying the Belton
"bright line" reasoning in other non-automobile cases in which the search
would be unreasonable under Chimel."
7
The Fourth Circuit correctly upheld the warrantless searches in Litman
and Porter as incident to arrest because the facts in each case satisfied the
Chimel requirements of a lawful arrest and restriction of the scope of the
search to the area within the arrestee's immediate control."18 In reaching the
holdings in Litman and Porter, the Fourth Circuit reasonably employed the
Belton Court's rejection of a broad exclusive control theory in determining
that the searched items were not in the exclusive control of the arresting
officers at the time of the search."9 The Fourth Circuit's application of the
Belton "bright line" rule to situations not within the contemplation of the
Belton Court, however, was inappropriate and expansionary.' 20 As a result
of the Litman and Porter decisions, the trend in the Fourth Circuit appears
to be toward an expansion of the area which law enforcement officers may
properly search incident to arrest through the use of "bright line" reasoning
in cases outside the automobile context.1
2 '
D. Federal Misapplication Statute: The Worthless
Funds Doctrine and Determining What Constitutes Bank Funds
under 18 U.S.C. Section 656
Section 656 of title 18 of the United States Code makes criminal the
embezzlement, abstraction, theft or willful misapplication of the funds of a
federally-connected bank by its officers or employees.' Section 656 is designed
rule that lawful custodial arrest justifies contemporaneous search of arrestee and area within
arrestee's reach).
116. See supra notes 66-76 (analysis of Litman and Porter in context of meeting Chimel
tests).
117. See supra notes 110-12 (discussion of implications of applying Belton to non-auto-
mobile situations).
118. See supra notes 66-76 (analysis of Litman and Porter in context of meeting Chimel
tests).
119. See supra notes 94-103 (analysis of exclusive control theory and Fourth Circuit's
rejection of that theory in Litman and Porter).
120. See supra notes 104-17 (analysis of Fourth Circuit's use of Belton "bright line" rule
in Litman and Porter).
121. See id.
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982). § 656 of Title 18 provides:
Whoever being an officer, director, agent or employee of, or connected in any
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to protect the assets of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and all
banks having a federal relationship 2 by protecting such banks from wrong-
doing by their own servants.3 The misapplication provision of section 656 is
one of the federal government's primary weapons in attacking bank fraud. 4
capacity with any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, national bank or insured
bank, or a receiver of a national bank, or any agent or employee of the receiver, or
a Federal Reserve Agent, or an agent or employee of a Federal Reserve Agent or of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, embezzles, abstracts, purloins
or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds or credits of such bank or any
moneys, funds, assets or securities intrusted to the custody or care of such bank, or
to the custody or care of any such agent, officer, director, employee or receiver, shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; but
if the amount embezzled, abstracted, purloined or misapplied does not exceed $100,
he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both.
Id.
2. See United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 1976) (18 U.S.C. § 656
protects assets of F.D.I.C. and banks having a federal relationship). Banks that have a "federal
relationship" under § 656 are national banks, Federal Reserve Banks, any bank or trust
company that is a member of the Federal Reserve System, or any banking institution insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982).
3. See Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 664, 669 (1896) (primary object of federal
misapplication statute is to protect banks from their own servants). Congress enacted the original
federal statute addressing misappropriation of funds by bank employees in 1864. See National
Bank Act, § 5209, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 116 § 55 (1864). The National Bank Act of 1864 provides
that:
every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of any association, who shall
embezzle,abstract or willfully misapply any of the moneys, funds, or credits of the
association . . . with intent . . . to injure or defraud the association of any other
company ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by imprisonment not less than five years nor more than ten years.
National Bank Act, § 5209, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 116 § 55 (1864). Although the National Bank Act,
for the most part, codified the common law, the crime of misapplication has no common law
ancestry and was included in the statute to enlarge the common-law definition of embezzlment.
See United States v. Krepps, 605 F.2d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 1979) (incorporation of misapplication
in 1864 statute was intended to enlarge definition of embezzlement). In 1940, Congress revised
the National Bank Act in § 592 of title 12 of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 656
(1976), Reviser's Note; see also O'Malley, The Federal Criminal Liability of Bank Personnel
Under the Misapplication Statute, 99 BANKING L.J. 100, 103 n.15 (1982) (§ 592 revised National
Bank Act). In 1948, Congress recodified the substance of the earlier federal misapplication
statutes in § 656 of title 18 as part of a revision of the entire federal criminal code. See
O'Malley, supra, at 103; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 656 (1976), Reviser's Note. Section 656,
however, did not change the meaning or substance of the existing law. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 656
(1976), Reviser's Note (Congress enacted revised § 656 to clarify existing law, not to modify it).
Therefore, the cases decided under the earlier federal misapplication statute remain relevant.
Id.; see also United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 956 n.5, 957 (5th Cir.) (since § 656 was
not intended to change existing law, old case law remains pertinent), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
116 (1983).
4. See O'Malley, supra note 3, at 102 (§ 656 is one of most commonly used means to
control misappropriation of bank funds by bank employees).
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The Third Circuit, in United States v. Moraites,5 defined misapplication as
the "unauthorized or unjustifiable or wrongful use of a bank's funds." ' 6 In
United States v. Kellerman,7 the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of what
constitutes bank funds under the misapplication provision of section 656.8
In Kellerman, the defendant, Fred M. Kellerman (Kellerman), former
president of the Southwest Virginia National Bank (Bank), 9 authorized
payment on several overdrafts on the checking account of Cowan Associated
Mining Company, Inc. (Cowan). 10 By February of 1980, Cowan had accu-
mulated overdrafts in excess of 90,000 dollars.' On February 20, 1980,
Kellerman submitted a request to the Bank's Board of Directors for approval
of a 170,000 dollar loan to Cowan to cover the overdrafts and other
expenses.' 2 As security for the proposed loan to Cowan, Kellerman presented
to the Board of Directors a 165,000 dollar check drawn on N-S Corporation
(N-S), a mining venture. 3 Kellerman told the Board of Directors that N-S
had agreed to purchase Cowan's assets if a substantial reduction in Cowan's
indebtedness was not made in ninety days. 14 Kellerman further stated that
he would place the N-S check in an escrow account for the Bank. 5 However,
5. 456 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
6. Id. at 441. The offense of misapplication of funds under § 656 has four essential
elements. See United States v. Broome, 628 F.2d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 1980) (indictment alleging
violation of § 656 must contain four essential elements of offense). The prosecution must show
that the defendant is an officer, director, agent or employee of the bank, that the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation insures the bank or the bank is a member of the Federal Reserve
System, that the defendant willfully misapplied funds, money or credits belonging to or intrusted
to the bank, and that the defendant committed the act with the intent to injure or defraud the
bank. See id.; United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 858 (4th Cir.) (government must prove
four essential elements under § 656 to obtain conviction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979);
United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1024 (3d Cir.) (government must prove four essential
elements under § 656 to obtain conviction), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978).
7. 729 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1984).
8. Id. at 284-85. In Kellerman, the Fourth Circuit noted that the defendant clearly
deceived the Bank's Board of Directors. See id. at 284 n.4. The court therefore stated that the
only question for review was whether the check the defendant allegedly misapplied constituted
"funds" of the Bank under § 656. Id.
9. Southwest Virginia National Bank has merged with the Dominion Bankshares Cor-
poration and is presently Dominion Bank N.A., Bluefield. See Dominion Bankshares Corpo-
ration, 1981 Annual Report.
10. See 729 F.2d at 282.
11. Id.
12. Id. In Kellerman, Cowan applied to the Bank for a $170,000 loan to cover $90,000
of overdrafts on the Cowan checking account at the Bank and to provide capital for Cowan
mining operations. Id. To secure this loan, Cowan was to assign its stock and coal reserves to
the Bank. Id.
13. Id. The Board of Directors in Kellerman initially approved a proposed loan to Cowan,
but the next day the Chairman of the Board requested that Kellerman call a special meeting to
reevaluate the loan transaction. Id. After the Chairman of the Board requested the special
meeting, Kellerman, with the assistance of the Bank's attorney, obtained a check from N-S
Corporation. Id. Kellerman presented the N-S check at the special meeting as security for the
Cowan loan. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. In Kellerman, despite having told the Board of Directors he would place the N-S
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an escrow letter from N-S to Cowan produced at trial stated that the N-S
check was consideration for a coal lease Cowan owned in West Virginia and
that the check was payable to "Southwest Virginia National Bank for
Cowan."' 6 The escrow letter further stated that the Bank should hold the
check pending final negotiations and closing of the lease transaction between
Cowan and N-S.'
7
The Bank's Board of Directors approved a ninety-day loan of 165,000
dollars to Cowan. 8 About the time that Cowan's ninety-day note matured,
an N-S corporate officer telephoned Kellerman stating that N-S needed the
check returned to begin a mining operation in Wise County, Virginia. 19
Kellerman then returned the check to N-S without the knowledge or consent
of the Bank's Board of Directors.
20
Kellerman subsequently was indicted on thirty-two counts of bank fraud
arising out of a series of loans made while he was president of the Bank. 2'
Count twenty-eight of the indictment charged that Kellerman's return of the
N-S check constituted a violation of the misapplication provision of section
656. 22 In count twenty-eight, Kellerman was charged with misapplying the
funds of the Bank and not with misapplying funds intrusted to the custody
or care of the Bank.23 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia found Kellerman guilty on count twenty-eight. 24 Keller-
check in an escrow account for the Bank, Kellerman never placed the check in an escrow
account. Id.
16. Id. In Kellerman, the evidence revealed that Cowan never owned a leasehold interest
in the particular tract of West Virginia property described in the escrow letter. Id.; see infra
note 17 (escrow letter from N-S to Cowan).
17. Id. The escrow letter from N-S to Cowan provided:
This check [was] to be held by [Southwest Virginia National Bank] pending final
negotiations and closing of transaction for prospective coal lease and related equip-
ment which [Cowan] control[s] or will control in the near future.
By copy of this letter, said bank is directed to deliver said check back to [Cowan]
upon [Cowan's] assignment to [N-S Corporation] of a valid marketable leasehold
estate of [Cowan's] property near Brewster-Dale [sic], McDowell County, West
Virginia, free from any valid objections. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Brief for Appellant at 8, United States v. Kellerman, 729 F.2d 281 (4th
Cir. 1984).
20. See 729 F.2d at 282. In Kellerman, the N-S check was never negotiated, nor was the
check or a copy thereof ever located. Id.
21. Id. at 283. In Kellerman, the government indicted the defendant on thirty-two counts
of bank fraud. Id. Four courts were dismissed before trial, twenty-five were dismissed following
the close of the government's case-in-chief, and Kellerman was acquitted of two counts after
trial. Id. at 283 n.2. The Fourth Circuit reviewed only count twenty-eight of the indictment,
which charged that Kellerman's return of the N-S check was a misapplication of bank funds.
See id. at 283.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 284.
24. See id. at 283.
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man moved for acquittal on the ground that the government had failed to
prove that Kellerman had misapplied the Bank's funds. 21 The district court
vacated its prior ruling and acquitted Kellerman.
26
Although the district court found that Kellerman intentionally misrep-
resented to the Bank's Board of Directors that he had a "good check" as
security for the Cowan loan,27 the court concluded that Kellerman's actions
did not violate section 656 because the N-S check was worthless. 28 The district
court found that the N-S check was valueless because N-S never had sufficient
funds to cover the check. 29 In addition, the district court reasoned that the
N-S check was worthless because if the Bank had attempted to sue N-S to
collect on the check, the Bank would have been subject to N-S's valid defense
of lack of consideration. The district court held that since valueless paper
cannot be considered funds of a bank, Kellerman was not guilty of misap-
plying Bank funds when he returned the check to N-S.31 The government
appealed the district court's judgment of acquittal.
3 2
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's acquittal of
Kellerman. 33 The Fourth Circuit noted that Kellerman was indicted for
misapplying funds of the Bank and not for misapplying funds intrusted to
the custody or care of the Bank.3 4 Therefore, the crucial issue in Kellerman
25. Id.
26. United States v. Kellerman, 555 F. Supp. 843, 847 (W.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d
281 (4th Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 844.
28. Id. at 847.
29. Id.
30. Id. The district court in Kellerman found that the Bank was not a holder in due
course, and therefore concluded that the Bank was subject to N-S Corporation's defense of
lack of consideration. Id.; see infra note 53 (defining holder in due course).
31. Id.
32. 729 F.2d at 283. In Kellerman, the government appealed the district court's judgment
of acquittal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Id.; Criminal Appeals Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §
3731 (1982) (United States may appeal district court judgment dismissing indictment unless
double jeopardy clause prohibits further prosecution). Kellerman claimed that both the double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution and § 3731 of title 18 prohibited the appeal
of the district court's judgment of acquittal. See Brief for Appellee at 10, United States v.
Kellerman, 729 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Criminal Appeals Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §
3731 (1982); U.S. CONST. amend. V (no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). Section 3731 provides that there shall be no appeal in
a criminal case when the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits an
appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982). The Fourth Circuit held that the government's appeal did
not violate the double jeopardy clause because the government's success on appeal would not
result in a new trial, but merely a reinstatement of the district court's prior ruling that Kellerman
violated § 656. 729 F.2d at 283 n.3; see United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1976)
(government may appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 because success on appeal would result
in reinstatement of prior finding of guilt and not further factfinding on issue of defendant's
guilt of innocence). Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction pursuant
to § 3731 to hear the government's appeal. 729 F.2d at 283.
33. 729 F.2d at 285.
34. Id. at 284. Section 656 makes criminal the misapplication of federal bank funds. See
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was whether the check drawn on N-S Corporation constituted funds of the
Bank within the meaning of section 656. 31 The Fourth Circuit held that the
government had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 36 that the check
constituted bank funds. 37 The court stated that for the N-S check to have
been of value to the Bank, 31 the Bank would have to have been a holder of
the check as defined by section 8.1-201 (20) of the Virginia Code. 39 Section
8.1-201 (20) defines a holder as "a person who is in possession of a document
of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed
to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank.'"'4 The Kellerman court
noted that the government produced no evidence and made no claim that
the check was payable to bearer or that the payee line was left blank. 41 The
escrow letter N-S Corporation sent to Cowan was the only evidence the
government offered concerning the identity of the payee.42 The court found
that the government's evidence merely established that the Bank possessed
the N-S check as an escrow agent, and was not sufficient to prove that the
18 U.S.C. § 656 (1984). A separate clause in § 656 protects funds intrusted to the care of a
federal bank. Id.; see also United States v. Rickert, 459 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1972) (it is not
necessary for misapplied funds to be bank property to obtain conviction under § 656 because
statute also protects funds intrusted to care of bank).
35. See 729 F.2d at 284, 284 n.4.
36. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process clause requires government
to prove every element of criminal offense beyond reasonable doubt to sustain conviction).
Since § 656 is a criminal statute, the government has the burden of proving every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.; see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
703-04 (1975) (criminal statute which shifted burden to defendant to show that he acted in heat
of passion did not satisfy due process requirement that prosecution prove beyond reasonable
doubt every fact necessary to constitute crime charged); Powers v. Commonwealth, 211 Va.
386, 388, 177 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1970) (Commonwealth has burden to prove every element of
offense beyond reasonable doubt).
37. 729 F.2d at 284, 285.
38. Id. at 284, 284 n.6. The Fourth Circuit in Kellerman implied that if the N-S check
had value to the Bank, the check would constitute Bank funds. Id.
39. Id. at 284; See VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20) (1950) (defining holder as "a person who is
in possession of a document of title or an instrument or investment security drawn, issued or
endorsed to him or to his order or to bearer in blank").
40. VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20) (1950). The Uniform Commercial Code defines a holder as
"a person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument or a certificated
investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank."
U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1950). The definition of holder in the Virginia Commercial Code is identical
to that of the U.C.C. except that the term "certificated" is not included to describe investment
security in the Virginia definition. See VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20) (1950); supra note 39 (definition
of "holder" under § 8.1-201(20) of the Virginia Code). However, § 8.1-201(20) of the Virginia
Commercial Code recently has been amended to substitute "certificated investment security"
for "investment security," making the Virginia definition of holder parallel the Uniform
Commercial Code definition. See VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20) (1950). The amendment to § 8.1-
201(20) of the Virginia Code is effective January 1, 1985. Id.
41. 729 F.2d at 284, 284 n.5, 6.
42. Id. at 285; see FED. R. EviD. 1004 (extrinsic evidence of content of writing is
admissible if original is lost, destroyed, or not obtainable by judicial process or procedure).
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Bank was the payee of the check. 43 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that since the government had not established beyond a reasonable doubt
that the check was Bank funds, the government had failed to prove an
element necessary to establish a violation of section 656."
Addressing the dissent's claim that all feasible constructions of the
endorsement 45 would have made the Bank a holder of the N-S check, 46 the
Kellerman court stated that each endorsement the dissent proposed merely
made the Bank an escrow agent with no rights in the check. 47 In addition,
the Fourth Circuit held that even if the government had proven that the
Bank was a holder, a misapplication of the check could not support a section
656 conviction because the check was a worthless instrument.48 In support
of its holding, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Batchelor
v. United States49 held that no criminal misapplication of funds can occur if
the funds allegedly misapplied are worthless.50 The Fourth Circuit found that
the N-S check was worthless because if the Bank had attempted to collect
on the check, the Bank would have been subject to N-S's defense of lack of
consideration and not entitled to payment. 5' The Fourth Circuit explained
that since N-S never received an interest in Cowan's West Virginia property
in return for its check, N-S had a valid defense of lack of consideration.
2
43. 729 F.2d at 285. In concluding that the government in Kellerman had failed to meet
its evidentiary burden, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the government had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the bank was the payee to show that the bank was a holder, which in
turn would establish that the N-S check constituted Bank funds. See id. at 284, 284 n.6, 285;
see also supra note 36 (discussing government's burden of proof in criminal case). The N-S
check or a copy thereof was never located. See 729 F.2d at 282. At trial, the government did
not inquire of any witness, including Kellerman, whether he or she knew the identity of the
payee of the N-S check. See id. at 284 n.6. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the government
had not satisfied its burden of proving that the Bank was a holder. Id. at 284 n.6, 285.
44. 729 F.2d at 285.
45. For purposes of this article, the term endorsement refers to the way N-S issued the
check in Kellerman.
46. See 729 F.2d at 287 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). Based on the escrow letter, the
dissent in Kellerman stated that there are four plausible ways the N-S check could have been
issued. Id. The four possibilities are (1) to "Southwest Virginia National Bank Escrow for
Cowan Mining," (2) to "Southwest Virginia National Bank, Escrow Agent for Cowan Mining,"
(3) to "Southwest Virginia National Bank" with the notation, "for Cowan Mining Escrow
Account," (4) to "Southwest Virginia National Bank and Cowan Mining." Id. These four
possibilities account for all of the plausible ways the N-S check could have been issued. Id.
47. 729 F.2d at 285. In Kellerman, the majority and dissent disagreed over what is required
to be a holder of a negotiable instrument under § 8.1-201(20) of the Virginia Code. Id. at 284
n.6, 287 n.5; see VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20) (1950) (defining holder as "a person who is in
possession of a document of title or an instrument or investment security drawn, issued or
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank").
48. See 729 F.2d at 284 n.6, 285; infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (explaining
Fourth Circuit's finding in Kellerman that N-S check was worthless).
49. 156 U.S. 426 (1895); see infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (discussion of
Batchelor v. United States).
50. 156 U.S. at 431.




The defense of lack of consideration is a valid defense against anyone
attempting to collect on a check except as against a holder in due course. 3
The court found, however, that the Bank was not a holder in due course.
54
Since N-S therefore possessed a valid defense to the check, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the N-S check was worthless to the Bank.5 Furthermore, the
court determined that the N-S check had no value to the Bank because N-S
did not have sufficient funds in its account to cover the 165,000 dollar check
form the time that the check was presented to the Board of Directors up
until the time Kellerman returned the check. 6 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that both the lack of sufficient funds to cover the check and N-S Corpora-
tion's defense of lack of consideration rendered the check worthless.5 7 Citing
Batchelor as support, the Fourth circuit in Kellerman concluded that even if
the N-S check constituted Bank funds, the defendant could not be held guilty
of criminal misapplication under section 656.58
The dissent in Kellerman disagreed with the majority's holding that either
N-S Corporation's defenses or the fact that N-S Corporation did not have
sufficient funds to cover the check rendered the check worthless. 9 The
dissent stated that N-S Corporation's defense of lack of consideration was
only a potential defense because N-S had not yet asserted the defense ° The
dissent emphasized that a check subject only to potential defenses has value
to a holder until a court renders a final judgment in favor of the drawer. 6
The dissent also noted that N-S might have failed to assert the lack of
consideration defense or that a court might have rejected the defense and
found in favor of the Bank. 62 The dissent stated that an instrument has value
53. See VA. CODE § 8.3-408 (1950) (want of consideration is defense against all persons
not holding instrument in due course). Section 8.3-302(1) of the Virginia Code defines a holder
in due course as ". . . a holder who takes the instrument for value; and in good faith; and
without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to
it on the part of any person." See id. § 8.3-302(1) (1950).
54. See 729 F.2d at 284, 285. One must be a holder of a negotiable instrument to be a
holder in due course. VA. CODE § 8.3-302(l) (1950). The Kellerman court determined that the
Bank could not be a holder in due course because the Bank was an escrow agent and therefore
not a holder. See 729 F.2d at 284, 285; see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (Fourth
Circuit found that escrow letter established that Bank possessed N-S check as escrow agent).
55. See 729 F.2d at 285.
56. Id. at 284 n.6. The Kellerman court stated that even if the Bank was a holder of the
N-S check and had attempted to cash the check, the drawee bank would have refused payment
for insufficient funds. Id. The court therefore concluded that the N-S check was worthless. Id.
57. See id. at 284 n.6, 285; see supra notes 50-55 (Kellerman court found that N-S check
was worthless instrument).
58. See id. at 284, 284 n.6, 285; see also infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text
(discussion of Batchelor).
59. See 729 F.2d at 288, 288 n.10 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
60. See id at 288 n.10 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
61. Id.; see VA. CODE § 8.3-307 (1950) (presentment of negotiable instrument entitles
holder to payment unless maker establishes defense); see infra notes 120-21 and accompanying
text (explaining rights of holder of negotiable instrument).
62. 729 F.2d at 288 n.10 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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to its holder when such uncertainty exists as to the validity of a defense.63
In addition, the dissent disagreed with the majority's claim that the check
was worthless to the Bank because N-S Corporation did not have sufficient
funds to cover the checkA4 The dissent stated that the Bank could have
demanded satisfaction of the underlying obligation if payment was refused
for insufficient funds, utilizing judicial process if necessary.65 The dissent
concluded that since the N-S check was not worthless to the Bank, the
Fourth Circuit should have reinstated the district court's initial decision that
Kellerman was guilty of misapplication of Bank funds.
66
In determining whether the defendant in Kellerman violated section 656,
the crucial factor is the government's wording of the indictment.6 7 The
government's indictment charged Kellerman with misapplying Bank funds
and not with misapplying funds intrusted to the custody or care of the
Bank. 68 The Bank in Kellerman was holding the N-S check in escrow.
69
Therefore, the N-S check constituted funds intrusted to the custody and care
of the Bank and was protected from misapplication by section 656.70 If the
indictment in Kellerman had included the language of section 656 which
protects funds intrusted to a federal bank, the question whether the N-S
check constituted bank funds or intrusted funds would not have been at
issue.
71
Since the government failed to include the proper language in the
indictment, the critical issue in Kellerman was whether the N-S check
constituted Bank funds under section 656.72 The Fourth Circuit's theory in
Kellerman was that in order for a check to constitute bank funds under
63. Id.; see infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (explaining rights of holder of
negotiable instrument).
64. 729 F.2d at 288 n.10 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 288. When a check is given to satisfy an obligation, the obligation is suspended
until the check is presented for payment. See VA. CODE § 8.3-802(1)(b) (1950). If the check is
dishonored upon presentation, the obligee may sue either on the check or on the underlying
obligation. Id.
66. 729 F.2d at 288-89 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
67. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing importance of government's
failure to include in indictment language of § 656 that protects funds intrusted to care of federal
bank).
68. 729 F.2d at 284; see 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982); supra note 34 (describing funds that §
656 protects from misappropriation).
69. See 729 F.2d at 285 (government proved Bank was escrow agent). In Kellerman, the
Bank was an escrow agent under each of the four alternative endorsements the dissent proposed.
See id. at 284 n.6.
70. See supra note 34 (explaining that § 656 protects funds intrusted to care of federal
banks from misappropriation); see also 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1984).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70 (N-S check was entrusted to care of Bank
in Kellerman); supra note 34 (explaining that § 656 protects funds intrusted to care of federal
bank from misappropriation).
72. See 729 F.2d at 284, 284 n.4; supra text accompanying notes 68-71 (N-S check was
intrusted to care of Bank in Kellerman, but government's indictment did not include language
of § 656 which protects intrusted funds).
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section 656, the bank must be a holder of the instrument allegedly misap-
plied. 73 Since section 656 is a criminal statute, the government had the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense.74 Thus,
the government in Kellerman had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Bank was a holder of the N-S check, which in turn would
establish the necessary element that the check constituted Bank funds.7 5 The
court stated that the only evidence adduced at trial established that the Bank
merely was an escrow agent and not a holder of the check.7 6 The Fourth
Circuit implicitly assumed that an escrow agent could not also be a holder.
77
Therefore, the Kellerman court reasoned that the government had not carried




Although the Fourth Circuit's finding that the Bank was an escrow agent
was correct, the court's assumption that an escrow agent cannot be a holder
was not correct.7 9 Section 8.1-201 (20) of the Virginia Commercial Code
defines a holder as a person in possession of a check to whom it is drawn,
issued or indorsed.80 Any of the four possible endorsements of the N-S check
proposed by the dissent would have made the Bank a holder of the check. s1
Under the first suggested endorsement, to "Southwest Virginia National
Bank and Cowan Mining," 82 the Bank clearly was a holder because a check
73. See 729 F.2d at 284, 284 n.6, 285.
74. See supra note 36 (discussion of Supreme Court's Winship and Mullaney decisions
prescribing constitutional requirements for government's burden of proof in criminal cases).
75. See 729 F.2d at 284 n.6.
76. See id. at 285 (escrow letter establishes that Bank in Kellerman only was escrow
agent).
77. See id. at 284, 284 n.6, 285.
78. Id.
79. See Liebowitz v. Wright Properties, Inc., 427 So. 2d 783, 784-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(real estate brokerage company was holder of instrument which brokerage company held as
escrow agent), pet. for rev. den., 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983). In Liebowitz, the Florida District
Court of Appeals held that under § 671.201(20) of the Florida Commercial Code, a real estate
company was a holder of a deposit check which the company held in escrow, and that the
company had a holder's right of recourse when the purchaser stopped payment on the check.
427 So. 2d at 784-85. The definition of holder in § 671.201(20) of the Florida Commercial Code
is identical to the definition of holder contained in § 8.1-201(20) of the Virginia Commercial
Code. Compare FLA. STAT. § 671.201(20) (1966) (defining holder as "a person who is in
possession of a document of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or
endorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank") with VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20), supra
note 39 (same). The Kellerman court incorrectly assumed that an escrow agent cannot be a
holder under § 8.1-201(20) of the Virginia Code. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text
(demonstrating that Bank in Kellerman was holder of N-S check as well as escrow agent).
80. See VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20) (1950) (definition of "holder"); supra note 39 (text of §
8.1-201(20)).
81. See supra note 46 (stating Kellerman dissent's four proposed ways in which N-S check
could have been issued); see also infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (Bank in Kellerman
was holder of N-S check as well as escrow agent).
82. 729 F.2d at 287 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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issued in this manner would make the Bank and Cowan joint payees." Either
one or both of the payees in possession of an instrument issued in this
manner would satisfy the definition of holder under section 8.1-201 (20) of
the Virginia Code. 4 Since the Bank was in possession of the N-S check and
the check was issued to the Bank, the Bank was a section 8.1-201 (20) holder
under the first suggested endorsement."5
The three other possible endorsements the dissent proposed were to
"Southwest Virginia National Bank Escrow for Cowan Mining," to "South-
west Virginia National Bank, Escrow Agent for Cowan Mining," and to
"Southwest Virginia National Bank" with the notation, "for Cowan Mining
Escrow Account. ' s6 In all three of these possibilities, the N-S check would
have been issued to the Bank with additional words describing the Bank as
an escrow agent.8 7 Section 8.3-117 (b) of the Virginia Code provides that
"an instrument made payable to a named person"8 with the addition of
words describing him as . . . [a] fiduciary for a specified person or purpose
is payable to the payee and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced by
him."8 9 Since an escrow agent is a fiduciary, 90 the remaining three ways in
which the N-S check could have been issued come within the provisions of
section 8.3-117 (b). 91 The Bank thus had the status, rights, powers and duties
83. See VA. CODE § 8.3-116(b) (1950) (instrument payable to more than one person and
not in alternative is payable to all such persons as joint payees); see also L.B. Smith, Inc. v.
Bankers Trust Co. of Western N.Y., 80 A.D.2d 496, 496, 439 N.Y.S.2d 543, 543-44 (1981)
(check payable to "A and B" creates joint payees and requires endorsement of both parties
before bank properly may honor check under U.C.C. § 3-116).
84. See VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20) (1950) (definition of "holder"); supra note 39 (definition
of "holder" under § 8.1-201(20) of the Virginia Code). In Kellerman, the bank was a holder
of the N-S check if the check was made payable to "Southwest Virginia National Bank and
Cowan Mining," because the Bank was in possession of an instrument issued to it as the
definition of holder requires. 729 F.2d at 287.
85. See VA. CODE § 8.1-201(20) (1950) (definition of "holder"); supra note 39 (definition
of "holder").
86. See 729 F.2d at 287 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 46 (stating
Kellerman dissent's four proposed ways in which N-S check could have been issued).
87. See 729 F.2d at 287 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 46 (stating
Kellerman dissent's four proposed ways in which N-S check could have been issued).
88. See VA. CODE § 8.1-201(30) (1950). In the Virginia Commercial Code, the word
"person" includes "an individual or an organization." Id. The term "organization" includes
"a corporation, government, or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate,
trust, partnership, or any other legal or commercial entity." Id. § 8.2-201(28). The Bank in
Kellerman, as a corporation, was a person under the Virginia Commercial Code. See id. § 8.1-
201(28), (30).
89. See VA. CODE § 8.3-117(b) (1950).
90. See Buffington v. Title Ins. Co. of Mn., 26 Ariz. App. 97, -, 546 P.2d 366, 368
(1976) (escrow agent is fiduciary and may act only within terms of escrow agreement); see also
Delson Lumber Co. v. Washington Escrow Co., 16 Wash. App. 546, 550, 558 P.2d 832, 834
(1976) (escrow agent owes same duty of fidelity that agent or trustee owes to its principal).
91. See VA. CODE § 8.3-117(b) (1950). Section 8.3-117(b) details the legal consequences
that result when a maker issues a check to a named person and includes additional words
describing the payee as a fiduciary for a specific person or purpose. See id. If the N-S check
was issued to "Southwest Virginia National Bank Escrow for Cowan Mining," "Southwest
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of a fiduciary under section 8.3-117 (b). 92 Since a section 8.3-117 (b) fiduciary
is a holder,9 the Bank would have been a holder under the remaining three
plausible ways the N-S check could have been issued. Therefore, while the
Kellerman majority correctly found that the Bank was an escrow agent, the
court's assumption that an escrow agent cannot be a holder was incorrect
because in Kellerman the Bank was both an escrow agent and a holder.
94
Although the Bank in Kellerman was a holder of the N-S check, the
instrument did not constitute Bank funds because the Bank had no proprie-
tary interest in the check. 95 The "holder test" that the Kellerman court
applied to determine if the N-S check was Bank funds was an inadequate
means of resolving the issue.96 The shortcomings of the holder test are
demonstrated in Kellerman. As an escrow agent, the Bank in Kellerman was
merely a conduit and had only those powers that the escrow agreement
explicitly granted. 97 Thus, while the Bank was a holder of the N-S check,
the Bank could not legally negotiate, transfer, or release the instrument
unless the escrow agreement granted such authority. 98 Most importantly, the
Virginia National Bank, Escrow Agent for Cowan Mining," or "Southwest Virginia National
Bank" with the notation, "for Cowan Mining Escrow Account," then the check comes within
the terms of § 8.3-117(b) of the Virginia Code. Id. In each of the three endorsements the N-S
check is issued to the Bank. The Bank is a "person" under the Virginia Code. See supra note
88 (definition of "person" in § 8.1-201(30) of Virginia Code). Each endorsement describes the
Bank as an escrow agent for Cowan Mining. An escrow agent is a fiduciary. See supra note
90. Cowan Mining is a "person" under the Virginia Code. See supra note 88 (definition of
"person" in § 8.1-201(30) of Virginia Code. Therefore, in all three of these possible endorse-
ments the N-S check is issued to a named person with additional words describing "him" as a
fiduciary for a specified person and thus the three endorsements come within the terms of §
8.3-117(b) of the Virginia Code. See VA. CODE § 8.3-117(b) (1950).
92. See VA. CODE § 8.3-117(b) (1950).
93. See Maplewood Bank & Trust Co. v. F.I.B., Inc., 142 N.J. Super. 480, 483-84, 19
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1164, 1165-66 (1976) (court held that Biscamp was payee and
holder of check made out to "Robert Biscamp Atty. for F.I.B."). The Maplewood Bank court
held that a check issued to "Robert Biscamp Atty. for F.I.B." came within the terms of §
12A:3-117(b) of the New Jersey Code. Id. at 484; N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A:3-117(b) (1962).
Therefore, the court concluded that Robert Biscamp was the payee and holder of the instrument.
142 N.J. Super. at 484. Section 12A:3-117(b) of the New Jersey Code is identical to § 8.3-
117(b) of the Virginia Code. Compare N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A:3-117(b) (1962) ("an instrument
made payable to a named person with the addition of words describing him ... as [a] fiduciary
for a specified person or purpose is payable to the payee and may be negotiated, discharged or
enforced by him") with VA. CODE § 8.3-117(b) (1950) (same).
94. See 729 F.2d at 285; supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text (Bank in Kellerman
was holder of N-S check as well as escrow agent).
95. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (holding N-S check in escrow gave
Bank in Kellerman no ownership rights in check and therefore N-S check was not Bank funds).
96. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (use of holder test in Kellerman was
inadequate test to determine whether N-S check was Bank funds).
97. See Marathon U.S. Realties, Inc. v. Kalb, 244 Ga. 390, 392, 260 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1979)
(escrow agent's powers are limited to those set out in escrow agreement); see also Tamburine
v. Center Savings Assn., 583 S.W.2d 942, 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (powers of escrow agent
are strictly limited to those powers granted in escrow agreement).
98. see Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 67, 375 P.2d 33, 35 (1962)
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Bank could not legally cash the N-S check for its own benefit. 99 If the Bank
had cashed the check for its own benefit, the Bank would have been liable
for criminal embezzlement and breach of fiduciary duty.10 In short, the N-
S check had no value to the Bank in Kellerman because the Bank possessed
no ownership rights in the instrument.10 1 The fact that a check the Bank held
in escrow could constitute bank funds under the holder test, when the bank
had no proprietary interest in the check, demonstrates the inadequacy of the
holder test. 02
To determine if the N-S check constituted bank funds, the Fourth Circuit
in Kellerman should have concentrated on the Bank's ownership rights in
the check, rather than the Bank's status as a holder of the instrument. Under
such an ownership analysis, the majority's conclusion that the N-S check did
not constitute funds of the Bank would be correct, because as an escrow
agent the Bank's rights in the N-S check were not proprietary. 03 Thus, the
Kellerman court's conclusion that the N-S check did not constitute bank
funds, unlike its analysis in reaching the conclusion, was soundY°
4
As an alternative ground for affirming the district court's acquittal of
the defendant in Kellerman, the Fourth Circuit stated that even if the
government had proved that the N-S check constituted funds of the Bank,
Kellermhan would not be guilty of criminal misapplication because the check
was worthless paper. 05 Batchelor v. United States is the seminal case ad-
(escrow agent must strictly comply with escrow agreement); see also Malta v. Phoenix Title &
Trust Co., 76 Ariz. 116, __, 259 P.2d 554, 557 (1953) (escrow agent must act in strict
accordance with terms of escrow agreement).
99. See Casolaro v. Blau, 158 N.Y.S.2d 589, 593, 4 Misc. 2d 206, 210 (1956) (escrow
agent has no personal interest other than to make payments pursuant to terms of escrow
agreement). An escrow agent's application of escrow funds for personal use constitutes a breach
of fiduciary duty and criminal embezzlement. Hildebrand v. Beck, 196 Cal. 141, -, 236 P.
301, 303 (1925).
100. See Hildebrand v. Beck, 196 Cal. 141, -, 236 P. 301, 303 (1925) (application of
escrow funds for own purposes constitutes breach of fiduciary duty and criminal embezzlement).
101. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (Bank in Kellerman had no ownership
rights in N-S check).
102. Id. Although the Bank in Kellerman had no ownership rights in the N-S check, the
Bank was a holder of the check. Id.; see supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (Bank in
Kellerman was holder of N-S check as well as escrow agent). Since the Bank was a holder, the
N-S check constituted funds of the Bank under the holder test. See supra note 43 (Kellerman
court stated that government had to prove Bank was holder of N-S check to establish that
check was Bank funds).
103. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (escrow agent's rights in escrow funds
are not proprietary).
104. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (N-S check did not constitute Bank
funds in Kellerman).
105. 729 F.2d at 284 n.6, 285. The Fourth Circuit in Kellerman utilized the worthless funds
doctrine as an alternative ground for holding that Kellerman was not guilty of misapplication
of Bank funds. Id. Although the Kellerman court held that the N-S check did not constitute
Bank funds, the majority assumed arguendo in its worthless funds analysis that the government
had demonstrated that the N-S check was security for the Cowan loan. Id. Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit's worthless funds analysis proceeded under the assumption that the N-S check
was Bank funds. Id.
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dressing the issue of whether the misappropriation of worthless funds can
constitute criminal misapplication.c 6 The Fourth Circuit read too broadly
the Supreme Court's holding in Batchelor.1' 7 The reasoning in Batchelor for
exempting the misapplication of worthless notes from the purview of section
656 does not support the majority's holding in Kellerman.'" In Batchelor, a
bank president allowed John Batchelor to substitute an unsecured note in
satisfaction of an earlier note. 109 The Supreme Court held that since Batchelor
was insolvent, the first note was worthless to the bank." 0 The action of the
bank president in Batchelor therefore amounted to a substitution of a
worthless note for one equally worthless."' Since the transaction did not
deplete the Bank's funds, the Court held that the transaction did not violate
the federal misapplication statute."2
The Fourth Circuit applied the worthless funds doctrine in Cooper v.
United States."3 In Cooper, a bank official was indicted under the misappli-
cation statute for trading an unsecured note for an equally unsecured debt." 4
The Fourth Circuit followed the reasoning of Batchelor and stated that
before criminal misapplication can occur, the bank must suffer some financial
loss." The Cooper court concluded that the substitution of worthless funds
for equally worthless funds did not constitute a financial loss and therefore
106. See Batchelor v. United States, 156 U.S. 426, 431 (1895).
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit incorrectly applied
worthless funds doctrine in Kellerman).
109. 156 U.S. at 431. In Batchelor, the defendant, Harry F. Batchelor, was the president
and a director of a national banking association. Id. at 427. The indictment in Batchelor alleged
that the defendant substituted unsecured notes to cancel the indebtedness of John Batchelor,
whom the defendant knew to be insolvent. Id. at 431.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. The United States Supreme court refined the worthless funds doctrine in
Coffin v. United States. See 162 U.S. 664 (1896). In Coffin, the defendant was charged with
aiding and abetting the misapplication of bank funds. Id. at 665. Although the Supreme Court
found that the worthless funds doctrine did not apply in Coffin, the Court stated that the mere
renewal of a worthless note, when the renewal does not in any way deplete bank funds, is not
a criminal misapplication of funds. Id. at 676-77.
113. 13 F.2d 16 (4th Cir. 1926).
114. See id. at 19. In Cooper v. United States, the president of a national bank was
indicted for misapplying bank funds. Id. at 17. The trial court instructed the jury that
substituting a worthless note to discount equally unsecured debt constituted criminal misappli-
cation of funds. Id. at 18. The jury found the defendant guilty of misapplication of bank
funds. Id. at 17. Finding the jury instructions erroneous, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 19. The Fourth circuit
stated that no criminal misapplication of bank funds can occur unless the bank suffers a
financial loss. Id. at 18, 19. The Cooper court further stated that substituting a worthless note
for a note equally worthless does not constitute a financial loss. Id.
115. Compare id. at 18 with Batchelor v. United States, 156 U.S. at 431. The Cooper
court stated that if the bank was not in a less desirable position after the alleged misapplication
of funds than it was before the transaction took place, then the misapplication statute had not
been violated. Id. at 19.
1985]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
found that Cooper's action was not a misapplication of bank funds.",6
In light of the Batchelor worthless funds doctrine, criminal misapplica-
tion under section 656 requires more than a renewal of worthless paper or
the substitution of a worthless note for a note equally worthless." 7 A bank
official is not guilty of criminal misapplication unless the bank loses control,
possession, or the benefit of bank funds or funds intrusted to the bank.,"
In Batchelor, the bank official's actions did not, even temporarily, place the
bank in a less desirable financial position." 9 In contrast, the action of
Kellerman in returning the N-S check did put the Bank in a less desirable
financial position because the check was not worthless paper. As the dissent
observed, the mere fact that N-S had a potential defense to the check did
not make the check valueless.1
2 0
A potential defense to payment relieves a drawer of his obligation to
pay only when the drawer asserts his defense and a judicial body of competent
jurisdiction accepts the defense as terminating the obligation. 12' Until a
drawer establishes a defense to an instrument, the instrument represents an
obligation to pay a sum to the holder on demand. 22 At the time Kellerman
returned the N-S check, it was not known whether N-S would assert its
defense if the Bank cashed the check, or whether a court would accept the
defense if asserted. 23 Therefore, N-S Corporation's potential defense to the
N-S check did not render the check worthless to the Bank. 2 4
116. Id. at 18, 19; see also Batchelor v. United States, 156 U.S. 426, 431 (1895) (substitution
of worthless notes for notes equally worthless is not misapplication of funds because bank
incurs no loss).
117. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text (discussing worthless funds doctrine);
see also United States v. Michael, 456 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D.N.J. 1978) (summarizing worthless
funds doctrine).
118. See 456 F. Supp. at 340 (misapplication conviction cannot stand unless bank loses
control or possession of its moneys, funds or credits).
119. See Batchelor v. United States, 156 U.S. 426, 431 (1895). The bank in Batchelor was
in an equally secured, or unsecured, position both before and after the alleged misapplication
of funds. Id.
120. See 729 F.2d at 288 n.10 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
121. See VA. CODE § 8.3-307 (1950) (maker of instrument has burden of establishing
defense to negotiate instrument). Presentment of a negotiable instrument entitles a holder to
payment unless the maker establishes a defense. Id. The maker has the burden of clearly proving
his defense. Catron v. Bostic, 123 Va. 355, 372, 96 S.E. 845, 850 (1918).
122. See VA. CODE § 8.3-307 (1950) (presentment entitles holder to payment unless maker
establishes defense); see also VA. CODE § 8.3-108 (1950) (instruments are payable on demand
when no time for payment is stated).
123. See 729 F.2d at 288 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
124. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (holder is entitled to payment if maker
does not establish defense by preponderance of evidence). In Kellerman, at the time the
defendant returned the N-S check, N-S Corporation had no asserted a defense to payment of
the instrument. See 729 F.2d at 282, 288 n.10. Assuming that the N-S check was collateral for
the Cowan loan, the Bank had the legal right to cash the check upon Cowarl's default. See 6
MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING Ch. 11, § 7 (rev. perm. ed. 1975) (bank can satisfy obligation
from collateral if borrower defaults on loan). Therefore, at the time Kellerman returned the N-
S check, the check had value to the Bank until N-S established a defense to the instrument. See
VA. CODE § 8.3-307 (1950). The fact that N-S had a potential defense to the check did not
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To further support its assertion that the N-S check was worthless paper,
the Kellerman court stated that because N-S never had sufficient funds in its
account to cover the $165,000 check, the N-S check had no value to the
Bank. 25 The Fourth Circuit, however, incorrectly assumed that a check
drawn on insufficient funds has no value to its holder. When a drawer issues
a check to satisfy an obligation, the obligation is suspended until the payee
presents the check for payment.1 26 If the check is dishonored upon present-
ment, the obligee may sue either on the check or on the underlying obliga-
tion.127 Assuming arguendo, as the Kellerman court does in its worthless
funds analysis, that the N-S check was security for the Cowan loan, N-S
had an obligation to the Bank. 2 When Cowan failed to pay its note, the
Bank had the legal right to cash the N-S check.1 29 If payment on the N-S
check was refused due to insufficient funds, the Bank could have maintained
an action on the check. 30 Therefore, the N-S check was not worthless to the
Bank even if N-S did not have sufficient funds to cover the check.131
Given that the N-S check was not worthless paper, the Fourth Circuit in
Kellerman should not have applied the worthless funds doctrine. Assuming
that the N-S check was collateral for the Cowan loan, the Bank had valuable
security for the loan before Kellerman returned the check.132 After Kellerman
returned the N-S check, the Bank was left holding an unsecured note. Thus,
the Bank in Kellerman suffered a financial loss. Since the worthless funds
doctrine is only applicable when a bank has suffered no financial loss, the
Fourth Circuit incorrectly applied the doctrine in Kellerman.3
In United States v. Kellerman, the Fourth circuit found that the Bank
render the check worthless to the Bank. Id.; see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text
(Kellerman dissent's argument that N-S defense to check did not render check worthless).
125. 729 F.2d at 284 n.6.
126. See VA. CODE § 8.3-802(1)(b) (1950) (instrument given for underlying obligation
suspends obligation until instrument is due or until presented if payable on demand).
127. See id. (obligee may maintain action on instrument or obligation when check given to
satisfy underlying obligation is dishonored).
128. See supra note 105 (Fourth Circuit's worthless funds analysis in Kellerman proceeds
under assumption that N-S check was security for Cowan loan and therefore constituted Bank
funds).
129. See 6 MicHua ON BANKS AND BANKING Ch. 11, § 7 (rev. perm. ed. 1975) (bank can
satisfy obligation from collateral if borrower defaults on loan).
130. See VA. CODE § 8.3-802(1)(b) (1950) (obligee may maintain action either on instrument
or underlying obligation when check given to satisfy obligation is dishonored).
131. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (N-S check was not worthless to Bank
in Kellerman merely because N-S did not have sufficient funds in its account to cover check).
132. See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text (N-S check was not worthless to Bank
in Kellerman).
133. See Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 664, 677-78 (1896) (transactions that do not
deplete funds of bank are not criminal misapplications); Batchelor v. United States, 156 U.S.
426, 431 (1895) (substitution of worthless notes for notes equally worthless is not misapplication
of funds because bank incurred no loss); Cooper v. United States, 13 F.2d 16, 18 (4th Cir.
1926) (no criminal misapplication occurs unless some financial loss to bank results); United
States v. Michael, 456 F. Supp. 335, 342 (1978) (bank official's action does not constitute
misapplication of bank funds unless some detriment to bank occurs).
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was not a holder of the check that the defendant allegedly misapplied, and
therefore held that the check did not constitute Bank funds under section
656.114 Although the Fourth Circuit incorrectly used a holder test to determine
whether the N-S check constituted Bank funds, the court properly held that
the check was not funds of the Bank.'35 The Kellerman court, therefore,
correctly affirmed the district court's judgment of acquittal.
36 However,
since the check was not worthless to the Bank, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly
applied the worthless funds doctrine as an alternative basis for holding that
Kellerman had not violated section 656.11 In its-worthless fund analysis, the
Kellerman court expands the worthless funds doctrine beyond its intended
scope.1 38 Since the government worded the indictment in Kellerman too
narrowly,3 9 however, the Fourth Circuit's analysis and decision on the issue
of whether the check in question constituted Bank funds will have little
precedential value in future actions brought under the federal misapplication
statute. Unless the government neglects to include in its indictment language
concerning funds intrusted to the bank, the issue of whether the funds in
question are bank funds or intrusted funds will be of no importance in future
section 656 actions.1
4
JA Es R. LANCE
E. Untimely Government Motion to Rehear Criminal Appeal:
Is the Delay Allowable Under the Speedy Trial Act?
Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act' (the Act) to impose a statute of
limitations on delay between accusation 2 and trial of federal criminal defend-
134. See 729 F.2d at 284, 284 n.6, 285; supra note 43 (N-S check did not constitute Bank
funds because Bank in Kellerman was not holder of check).
135. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (holder test is inadequate but Kellerman
court correctly concluded that N-S check did not constitute Bank funds).
136. See 729 F.2d at 284, 284 n.4 (government could not obtain conviction of defendant
in Kellerman unless government established that N-S check constituted bank funds).
137. See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text (worthless funds doctrine was not
applicable in Kellerman because N-S check was not worthless to Bank).
138. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (reasoning of worthless funds doctrine
does not support application of doctrine in Kellerman).
139. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (issue whether N-S check constituted
Bank funds in Kellerman was important only because government failed to include in indictment
language charging defendant with misapplication of funds intrusted to Bank).
140. Id.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982).
2. "Accusation" refers to the formal charge against a person to the effect that he is
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ants.3 Congress limited the permissible period for pretrial delay to protect
the public interest in swift conviction of offenders4 and to codify the right
of a defendant to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment.5 The Act
guilty of a punishable offense. See BLACK'S LAW DICToNARY 11 (5th ed. 1979). The Supreme
Court has determined that a suspect becomes "accused" for purpose of the sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial at the time of indictment or arrest. See Dillingham v. United States, 423
U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (per curiam) (arrest); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 325 (1971)
(indictment). The sixth amendment specifically states that the "accused" in a criminal prose-
cution shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The Supreme Court
developed a balancing test to measure post-accusation delay in Barker v. Wingo. See 407 U.S.
514, 530 (1972); infra note 5 (discussing application of balancing test in Barker); see also Note,
Misapplication of the Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial, 38 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 563,
578-98 (1981) (discussion of Fourth Circuit decision applying the sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a)-(h) (1982) (establishing time limits for delay). Congress asked
district courts to implement the Speedy Trial Act over a four-year period beginning in 1974 and
to develop docket management systems to meet the time standards of the Act. See A. PARTRIDGE,
LEGiSLATIW-E HISTORY OF TrrLE I OF Tit SPEEDY TRuL ACT OF 1974 11-23 (1980). In enacting
the Speedy Trial Act, Congress intended to alleviate public concern over crime, especially crime
attributed to criminal defendants who were released awaiting trial. See H.R. REP. No. 1508,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7401, 7402
[hereinafter cited as 1974 House Report]. The Speedy Trial Act also responded to the Supreme
Court's holding in Barker v. Wingo that determination of a uniform time period for a speedy
trial under the Sixth Amendment is a legislative function. See 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972). In
1979, Congress enacted revisions to the Act to require a minimum thirty-day preparation period
between accusation and trial, to modify the Act's statutes of limitation, and to provide for
additional delay periods in which the court and prosecution could toll the running of the Act's
time limits. See Speedy Trial Act Amendments of 1979, H.R. REP. No. 390, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 805, 806; see also Misner, The 1979
Amendments to the Speedy Trial Act: Death of the Planning Process, 32 HAsiNaGs L.J. 635,
635-41 (1981) (comparing intent of 1974 Act's sponsors with effect of 1979 amendments).
4. See 1974 House Report, supra note 3, at 15-16, 7408-09 (taxpayer bears costs of
pretrial detention for defendant, and released defendant may pose danger to the community);
PARTRmE, supra note 3, at I1 (purpose of Act is to reduce high recidivism among defendants
released awaiting trial). The Act legislated the concept that the public enjoys a right to a
defendant's speedy trial independent of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right. 1974 House
Report at 15-16, 7408-09; cf. Project, The Speedy-Trial Act: An Empirical Study, 47 FORDHAIA
L. REv. 713, 716-17 (1979) (tracing historical sources of public's right to speedy trial of
defendants). Proponents of the Act argued that speedy trials were necessary for adequate
operation of the criminal justice system. 1974 House Report at 15-16, 7408-09; see Bridges, The
Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal Criminal Litigation, 73 J. Cams. L. &
CMUNsnoiooy, 50, 51 (1982) (discussing address to Congress emphasizing anti-crime purposes of
the Act); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 n.8 (1972) (citing research showing 70.1%
of persons arrested in Washington, D.C. in 1968 for robbery who were released on bail were
rearrested before trial). The Act places the burden of efficient prosecution on courts and
prosecutors. See Bridges, supra, at 58-60 (discussing duties imposed on courts and prosecution,
and measuring prosecutorial performance in certain courts); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (1982)
(court congestion, lack of preparation by prosecution, and prosecutorial failure to obtain
available witness shall not be grounds for delay beyond Act's limitation period).
5. 1974 House Report, supra note 3, at 1, 7401; see supra note 2 (defendant's speedy
trial rights attach upon arrest or indictment); see also Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43
U. Cm. L. REv. 667, 706-07 (1976) (discussing sixth amendment speedy trial dimensions of
Act). In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court implemented a four-part balancing test to
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determine whether a prosecutor has violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial. See 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The Barker court stated that, in evaluating whether a sixth
amendment violation has occurred, a court should consider the length of pretrial delay, the
validity of the government's reasons for delay, the timeliness of the defendant's assertion of
speedy trial right, and the prejudice accruing to the defendant as a result of delay. See id. at
530-32. In Barker, the court determined that the purposes of the sixth amendment speedy trial
clause are to protect the defendant from enforced idleness, scorn and suspicion resulting from
pretrial incarceration, to prevent needless anxiety on the part of defendant, his or her family
and friends, and to insure that delay will not hamper the defendant's ability to mount a defense.
Id. at 532-33. See 1974 House Report, supra note 3, at 15, 7408 (due process dictates that
courts try defendant without undue haste or delay). The Supreme Court noted in United States
v. MacDonald that Congress enacted the Act to protect defendant's sixth amendment speedy
trial rights. See 456 U.S. 1, 7 n.7 (1982).
The Act specifically provides that the government's compliance with the provisions of the
Act will not bar a defendant's claim for denial of sixth amendment speedy trial rights. 18
U.S.C. § 3173 (1982); see United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d 1139, 1144 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)
(compliance with the Act's time limits does not preclude claim by defendant for denial of sixth
amendment rights). In contrast to the jurisprudential balancing test of Barker, the Act measures
prejudice to defendants' speedy trial rights solely in terms of delay. See United States v.
Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1980); see id. at 769-770 (Congress enacted Act
out of dissatisfaction with sixth amendment jurisprudence and to revive defendants' speedy trial
rights); cf. 1974 House Report, supra note 3, at 12, 7405 (Barker test is neutral in effect,
provides no guidance regarding sixth amendment rights of defendants, and reinforces the
practice of delay by courts and prosecutors). But see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530 (length
of delay alone may be grounds for dismissal of charges).
In contrast to the rigid limits on delay under the Act, courts have adopted a wide range of
time limits in determining whether pretrial delay violates a defendant's constitutional speedy
trial right. See, e.g., United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 360-61 (9th Cir.) (five-month delay
did not violate defendant's sixth amendment right), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982); United
States v. Rich, 589 F.2d 1025, 1033 (10th Cir. 1978) (nine-month delay did not trigger Barker
analysis of whether delay prejudiced defendant's sixth amendment rights); United States v.
Rankin, 572 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.) (seven-month delay did not trigger Barker analysis), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 979 (1978); United States v. Garcia, 553 F.2d 432, 432 (5th Cir. 1977) (one-
year delay did not violate defendant's sixth amendment rights under Barker analysis); Brady v.
Superintendent, Anne Arundel County Detention Center, 443 F.2d 1307, 1310 (4th Cir. 1971)
(eight-year delay in bringing trial for sentencing of incarcerated defendant did not violate
defendant's sixth amendment rights).
Since the Act sets an absolute limit on the maximum number of days the government can
delay, while the Barker test permits the government to justify delay in many cases, a delay that
is permissible under the Act arguably will never give rise to a sixth amendment claim under
Barker. See United States v. Saintil, 705 F.2d 415, 417-18 (11th Cir. 1983) (five-month delay
did not exceed Act's time limits and was insufficient to trigger Barker analysis of sixth
amendment violation), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 171 (1983); United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d
353, 360 (9th Cir.) (since Congress enacted Act to compel speedier trials than courts had
required under sixth amendment, delay that is permissible under Act rarely will violate
defendant's sixth amendment right), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982).
In addition, the Act narrowly prescribes the circumstances under which delay may toll the
Act's time limits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(l)(A)-(I) (1982) (allowing exclusion from computation
of delay for specific procedures necessary to prepare defendant for trial). In contrast to the
specific reasons for delay that the Act permits, the Barker sixth amendment speedy trial right
analysis balances the reason for delay against the prejudice to the defendant and the timeliness
of the defendant's assertion of the speedy trial right. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531
(valid reason for government delay will justify commensurate delay for purposes of determining
whether defendant's speedy trial right was violated); cf. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
324 (1971) (court will weigh heavily in favor of defendant any deliberate governmental delay in
determining whether government violated defendant's speedy trial right). Since the Act exclu-
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prescribes a seventy day limit on pretrial delay. 6 Prosecutorial delay beyond
seventy days will result in dismissal of charges.
7
The Act provides that delays not attributable to the prosecution will not
be included in computation of the seventy day period." The Act also permits
sively specifies when a delay will be justified, a delay that is permissible under the Act rarely
will violate the defendant's right to speedy trial under Barker. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(l)(A)-(I)
(1982) (specifying procedures requiring delay that will toll Act's time limits); 18 U.S.C.
§3161(h)(8)(A) (1982) (Act permits indefinite delay where court determines, in writing, that the
ends of justice require delay); cf. United States v. Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir.
1980) (Act eliminates requirement that courts measure factors other than delay as computed
under terms of Act).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1982) (trial must commence within 70 days of filing date
of information or indictment, or within 70 days of date defendant last appeared before judicial
officer of court in which charge is pending, whichever occurs last); see also 18 U.S.C. §
3161(d)(1) (1982) (when government files more than one indictment or information for same
offense, seventy day period begins with filing date of latest information or indictment); 18
U.S.C. § 3161(d)(2) (1982) (when trial court dismisses indictment or information that is
subsequently reinstated on appeal, retrial shall begin within 180 days if unavailability of witnesses
or other factors resulting from passage of time make trial within 70 days impractical); 18
U.S.C. § 3161(e) (1982) (when trial follows mistrial or order for new trial, seventy day period
begins on date that action occasioning retrial became final).
7. 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(1)-(2) (1982); see United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 982
(2d Cir. 1983) (charges dismissed under § 3162 for failure to file indictment within Act's time
limit); United States v. Perez-Reveles, 715 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing trial
court for failure to dismiss in circumstances requiring dismissal under § 3162); United States v.
Antonio, 705 F.2d 1483, 1486 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing trial court that failed to dismiss where
§ 3162 required dismissal). A defendant must move to dismiss charges before trial or before
entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or the defendant will have waived his right to
speedy trial under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982). The court may dismiss charges
without prejudice in exceptional circumstances. See id. at (a)(1) (court shall consider all relevant
factors, including the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances that led to dismissal,
and the impact of reprosecution on speedy trial policies and administration of justice); United
States v. Perez-Reveles, 715 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir. 1983) (remand to trial court to dismiss
charges and determine whether dismissal shall be with or without prejudice); United States v.
Antonio, 705 F.2d 1483, 1486 (9th Cir. 1983) (remand to trial court to dismiss charges and
determine whether dismissal shall be with or without prejudice); United States v. Thomas, 705
F.2d 709, 710 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that district court properly dismissed charges without
prejudice), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 232 (1983); United States v. Hawthorne, 705 F.2d 258, 260-
61 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. van Brandy, 563 F. Supp. 438, 441 (S.D. Cal. 1983)
(dismissing charges with prejudice); United States v. Quillen, 468 F. Supp. 480, 482 (E.D.
Tenn.) (dismissing charges with prejudice), aff'd without opinion, 588 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1978);
cf. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973) (when government violates defendant's
sixth amendment right to speedy trial, dismissal of charges is only possible remedy); accord,
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
8. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(l)(A)-(I) (1982) (excluding delay resulting from physical
and mental examinations, trials on other charges, interlocutory appeals, hearings on pretrial
motions, and transfers under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); id. § 3161(h)(1)(J) (auto-
matically excluding delay up to thirty days for consideration of proceeding concerning the
defendant); id. § 3161(h)(2)-(7) (excluding delay attributable to factors beyond control of trial
court); id. § 3161(h)(8) (excluding delay by trial court for good cause shown where ends of
justice require delay); cf. Bridges, supra note 4, at 60-63 (survey showing that courts used
exclusions under § 3161(h) to accommodate delays caused by court congestion and that median
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exclusion of time from the seventy day limit during which parties perform
certain pretrial procedures. 9 Section 3161(h)(l)(J) of the Act further permits
the exclusion of a period up to thirty days during which a court takes under
advisement a proceeding concerning the defendant.10 In United States v.
Black," the Fourth Circuit determined whether the prosecution's untimely
motion for rehearing en banc was excludable as a "proceeding taken under
advisement" under section 3161(h)(1)(J).l2
The litigation in Black arose from the trial and conviction of a federal
prison inmate for armed assault on a prison guard.1 3 The Fourth Circuit
reversed the conviction after finding error in an instruction to the jury
concerning the law of self-defense. 4 The government initially sought rehear-
pretrial delay remained unchanged from 1977-1981, despite time limits of Act).
9. See supra note 8 (listing trial procedures that toll running of Act's time limits).
Congress intended the exclusions allowed by the Act to add flexibility to enforcement of the
Act's strict time standards. See 1974 House Report at 12, 7414 (Act time limits should be tolled
by hearings, proceedings, and necessary delay occurring prior to trial); United States v. Saintil,
705 F.2d 415, 418 (11th Cir.) (exclusions in Act are intended to add flexibility and should be
liberally construed), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 171, 172 (1983); cf. Bridges, supra note 4, at 60-
63 (exclusions in Act may have undermined Act's goal of reducing number of calendar days of
pretrial delay).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J) (1982). § 3161(h)(l)(J) provides in part:
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within
which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defend-
ant, including but not limited to-
(J) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during
which any proceedings concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the
court.
18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(l)(J) (1982).
11. 733 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1984).
12. Id. at 350.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see United States v. Black, 692 F.2d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 1982) (errors as to law of
self defense in instruction to jury constitute reversible error). At trial, Black alleged that a
guard had ordered him to return to his cell and had swung at him with a putty knife when
Black refused to return to his cell. Id. at 315. Black admitted that he then threatened the guard
with a homemade knife, backed the guard away, and returned to his cell. Id. At trial, Black
offered a jury instruction on self-defense under which the jury would have been required to
acquit if the jury found that the guard had used excessive force and that Black had responded
with an amount of force he reasonably deemed necessary to protect himself from bodily harm.
Id. at 317. The court rejected Black's proffered instruction, however, and instead charged the
jury to the effect that Black was entitled to use "deadly force" only to protect himself from
serious bodily harm or death. Id.
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court's instruction was erroneous because the
instruction implied that the lesser force used by Black could not be justified unless a threat of
death or serious injury existed. Id. at 318. The court held the rule applicable to the Black trial
to be that the quantum of force one may use in self-defense is proportional to the threat one
reasonably apprehends. Id.
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ing by the panels to introduce new arguments that traditional principles of
self-defense should not apply to a confrontation between a prison guard and
a disobedient inmate.' 6 The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing, and subse-
quently remanded the case for trial with a mandate of reversal on December
15, 1982.17
On January 12, 1983, the government moved for leave to file an untimely
motion for rehearing en banc. 1 ' The government made the motion fourteen
days after the time limit for requesting rehearing under the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure had expired. 19 After taking the motion under advisement
15. 733 F.2d at 350. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, appellant ordinarily
must move for rehearing within 14 days of judgment, regardless whether or not appellant
suggests rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 40(a). The timely filing of a petition for
rehearing ordinarily will stay the court's mandate until disposition of the petition. FED. R. APP.
P. 41(a). A party seeking an extension to file a petition for rehearing may request an extension
within the initial fourteen day period. FED. R. APP. P. 40(a).
The Black dissent questioned whether both a petition for rehearing and a subsequent
motion for rehearing en banc were justified. 733 F.2d at 350, 352 n.1 (Winter, J., dissenting).
According to the government, the government had asked the panel to rehear the case before
the government requested an en banc rehearing, because the government did not make the
arguments offered on rehearing in the original appeal, and the panel had not been able to
address those arguments in the Black opinion. Id. at 352. The government contended that the
Solicitor General would not authorize a petition for rehearing en bane until the panel had an
opportunity to hear the arguments offered to justify rehearing. Id.; and see id. (under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure and Fourth Circuit internal rehearing procedures, it is not necessary
to frame a petition for rehearing as "en bane," since panel will rehear all petitions, whether en
bane or not, in which there is any possibility of rehearing by panel); FED. R. APP. P. 35
advisory committee note (court may treat petition for rehearing en banc simply as petition for
rehearing).
16. See 733 F.2d at 350; supra note 14 (discussing grounds for error in self-defense
instruction). In Black, the government argued that the public's interest in orderly management
of prisons requires courts to abrogate a disobedient inmate's right to resist the reasonable and
necessary use of force by a prison guard. See Brief for Appellant at 29, United States v. Black,
733 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1984). According to the government, application of self-defense rules to
confrontations between inmates and guards would deter exercise of authority by guards over
disobedient inmates. Id. at 29-30.
17. See 733 F.2d at 350. An appellate court's mandate comprises a certified copy of the
judgment, a copy of the opinion, if any, and a statement as to costs, if any. FED. R. APP. P.
41(a).
18. See 733 F.2d at 350. A majority of circuit judges in regular active service may elect
to order rehearing en bane, which refers to a rehearing by the full court. FED. R. APp. P.
35(a). Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellate court will not grant
rehearing en bane except to decide questions of exceptional importance, or to consider a decision
that fails to maintain conformity with legal doctrine of prior decisions in the circuit. Id.; see
733 F.2d at 352 n.l (Winter, J., dissenting) (discussing Fourth Circuit rehearing practice). An
appellate court has the power to entertain successive petitions for rehearing, as well as to
entertain petitions filed out of time. See infra note 53 (listing cases granting untimely motions
for rehearing). Parties filing an untimely petition for rehearing should preface the petition with
a motion for leave to file out of time. 16 C. WVsuGm, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GREss AN,
FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE, § 3986 at 471 (1977 and Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
WRIarr & MILLER].
19. See 733 F.2d at 350. In Black the government contended that the Solicitor General
authorized both the timely filing of the rehearing petition and the late filing of the petition for
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for twenty-seven days, the Fourth Circuit denied the motion on February 8,
1983. 20 The government took no further action on the appeal. 2' On March
3, 1983, seventy-seven days after the Fourth Circuit issued the mandate,
Black filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia to dismiss the indictment 22 for failure by the government
to bring a new trial within the Speedy Trial Act statute of limitations.
23
The district court granted Black's motion to dismiss the indictment.
24
The court reasoned that the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the conviction had
become final upon issuance of the mandate.25 The district court found that
the limitation period under the Act had expired because the government's
untimely motion for rehearing en banc did not toll the Act's time limit.
26
The district court rejected the government's argument that section 3161(h)(1)(J)
applied to exclude the twenty-seven day period when the untimely motion
was under advisement.2 7 The court explained that the untimely motion could
not be considered a "proceeding concerning the defendant" as required by
section 3161(h)(1)(J) of the Act.28 According to the district court, the Fourth
Circuit lost jurisdiction over the defendant when the Black panel issued the
mandate of reversal to the district court. 29 The district court therefore
concluded that all seventy-seven days following the issuance of the mandate
rehearing en bane. See id.; supra note 15 (government wished to give panel opportunity to
consider new arguments before raising arguments to en bane court); see also supra note 15
(discussing time limits for filing rehearing); WsRiGH & MLER, supra note 18, § 3986 at 470-71
(describing procedure for filing untimely motion).
20. 733 F.2d at 350.
21. See 733 F.2d at 350. The Black dissent noted that the government did not respond to
defendant's request for a new trial date for 15 days between denial of rehearing en bane and
expiration of Act's seventy day time limit. Id. at 352 (Winter, J. dissenting).
22. 733 F.2d at 350. The Act requires a defendant to move for dismissal before trial or
before entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or defendant will waive speedy trial rights.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). In Black, since the parties had not set a trial date, the defendant
apparently moved prematurely for dismissal under section 3162. See id. (defendant need not
move for dismissal until trial).
23. See 733 F.2d at 350; 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (1982) (sanction for violation of Act's
statute of limitations is dismissal of indictment); see also supra note 22 (defendant in Black
moved prematurely for dismissal).
24. 733 F.2d at 350.
25. See 733 F.2d at 350-51; 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (1982). Section 3161(e) of the Act provides
that retrial following reversal must "commence within seventy days from the date the action
occasioning the retrial becomes final." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (1982). The district court held that
issuance of the mandate was the "action occasioning retrial" for purposes of § 3161(e). 733
F.2d at 350-351; cf. United States v. Dunn, 706 F.2d 153, 154 (5th Cir. 1983) (issuance of
mandate will begin running of Act's time limit unless government petition for certiorari is
pending), vacated on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984).
26. 733 F.2d at 351.
27. Id.; supra note 9 (discussing purpose of Act exclusion provisions); supra note 10 (text
of § 3161(h)(l)(J)).
28. 733 F.2d at 351; supra note 10 (§ 3161(h)(l)(J) provides that Act's statute of limitation
may be tolled during a proceeding concerning defendant).
29. 733 F.2d at 351; see infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing effect of
issuance of mandate on court's jurisdiction over defendant).
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were includable for purposes of computing pretrial delay under the Act.3 0
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit initially considered whether the district
court's denial of an exclusion for the twenty-seven day deliberation period
was proper in light of the purposes of the Act's exclusion provisions.3' The
Black court stated that Congress had provided exclusions to the Act's time
limits to accommodate courts' needs for flexibility in administering trials.32
In addition, the court stated that 1979 amendments to the Act had conferred
on courts the authority to define more broadly the Act's exclusion provisions,
thereby adding greater flexibility to courts' docket management. 3
After explaining the purposes of the Act's exclusion provisions, the Black
court considered the appellee's argument that the Fourth Circuit lacked
jurisdiction to entertain a motion that tolled the running of the Act's
limitation period. 34 The court stated that jurisdiction over the appellant was
not necessary to entertain a motion for rehearing subsequent to issuance of
the mandate.3 5 The Black court reasoned that the Fourth Circuit's inherent
authority to recall or stay a mandate after issuance guaranteed the court's
continuing authority to hear motions to alter the judgment, even after
issuance of the mandate. 6 Citing decisions from other circuits, the Black
30. 733 F.2d at 351.
31. Id. at 351; see supra note 9 (discussing purposes of Act's exclusion provisions).
32. 733 F.2d at 351.
33. Id.; supra note 9 (discussing purposes of Act's exclusion provisions).
34. 733 F.2d at 351; infra notes 51-59 and accompanying test (discussing appellate court's
authority to entertain motions on case after issuing mandate).
35. 733 F.2d at 351. The Black court cited dicta from United States v. DiLapi stating
that a court may take a motion under consideration in order to deny the motion even though
the mandate had issued. Id.; see United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). In DiLapi, the Second Circuit denied the appellant's request to
rehear an appeal after the issuance of a mandate. 651 F.2d at 144. The Second Circuit
acknowledged that appellant's filing of a petition for rehearing did not revest jurisdiction in
the appellate court, but noted that a court was not required to reacquire appellate jurisdiction
to deny a petition for rehearing after issuing the mandate. Id. at 144, n.2. As an analogous
proposition, the DiLapi opinion cited Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
Rule 33 enables a district court to deny a motion for new trial after appellant has filed a notice
of appeal in the court of appeals, despite the fact that a district court lacks jurisdiction over
the defendant until the court of appeals issues the mandate. Id.; cf. FED. R. CaMs. P. 33
(wording of rule offers negative implication that appellate court must issue mandate for district
court to grant motion for new trial, but not to deny such motion).
36. See 733 F.2d at 351. The Black court cited United States v. DiLapi and Sparks v.
DuVal County Ranch Company to support the proposition that courts of appeal have inherent
power to take under advisement a proceeding notwithstanding issuance of the mandate. See 733
F.2d at 351; supra note 35 (discussion of DiLapi); Sparks v. DuVal County Ranch Co., 604
F.2d 976, 979 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980). In Sparks, the Fifth Circuit
considered whether an appellate court automatically lost jurisdiction over an appeal once the
twenty-one day limit for issuance of mandate passed. See 604 F.2d at 979; FED. R. App. P.
41(a) (court must issue mandate within 21 days). The Fifth Circuit stated that since it had not
issued the mandate, jurisdiction remained in the Fifth Circuit. See 604 F.2d at 979. In dicta,
the Sparks court added that even if the mandate issued, appellate courts possess well-established
authority to recall and reform a mandate. Id.
The Black court also relied on United States v. Dunn, in which the Fifth Circuit held that
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court noted that jurisdiction over the appellant ordinarily is not a prerequisite
to obtaining recall of the mandate and modification of the judgment.
3 7
The court next considered whether the section 3161(h)(1)(J) exclusion
allowed government delay resulting from a motion for rehearing that was
untimely under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. If not, the court
explained, appellate courts could be compelled to recall a mandate merely to
prevent the expiration of the Act's statute of limitations, and the subsequent
release of a criminal defendant. 39 The Black court concluded that a literal
construction of section 3161(h)(1)(J) permitted exclusion of the twenty-seven
days.
4o
In contrast to the holding of the majority that the government's untimely
motion constituted an excludable proceeding under section 3161(h)(l)(J), the
dissent argued that the section allowed exclusion of only those proceedings
that were initiated according to appellate court rules. 4' The dissent noted
that the government failed to meet the time limit for filing a motion for
rehearing imposed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a).4 2 Further,
the dissent maintained that the government had failed to demonstrate good
cause for permission to file an untimely motion for rehearing. 43 The dissent
a pending petition for certiorari tolls the Act, regardless whether the appellate court stayed the
mandate or issued the mandate. See 733 F.2d at 351; United States v. Dunn, 706 F.2d 153, 155
(5th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984). The Dunn court held that
to recall a mandate while a petition for certiorari pended would be redundant, because the
Speedy Trial Act required that a court reach a final result in a prior case before the Act's time
clock could begin to run. See 706 F.2d at 155, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (1982) (trial following order
granting new trial must commence within seventy days of when action occasioning new trial
becomes final).
37. 733 F.2d at 351; see supra note 35 (discussing DiLapi holding that jurisdiction is not
necessary to deny petition for rehearing); supra note 36 (discussing Sparks and Dunn holdings
that jurisdiction obtains after issuance of mandate); but cf. infra note 45 (arguing that DiLapi
holding means jurisdiction over appeal ends when court issues mandate).
38. 733 F.2d at 351; see supra note 35 (discussing DiLapi dicta that court may consider
motion without recalling mandate).
39. See 733 F.2d at 351. The Black court argued that if a § 3161(h)(l)(J) exclusion did
not encompass untimely motions, a court that had taken a motion for rehearing under
advisement near the end of the seventy day limit could be forced to grant rehearing not on the
merits of the rehearing petition, but to prevent release of defendant due to expiration of the
Act's time limit. Id. at 351-52.
40. See 733 F.2d at 351-352; infra notes 63 & 70 and accompanying text (discussing when
motion will constitute "proceeding" to implicate Act policies).
41. See 733 F.2d at 353 (Winter, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 352 n.1 (Winter, J., dissenting). See supra note 15 (discussing Rule 40(a)). But
see Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Internal Operating Procedure 40.2, "Applications
From The United States For An Extension Of Time Within Which To File A Petition For
Rehearing To Enable The Solicitor General's Office To Review The Merits Of A Case"
[hereinafter LO.P. 40.2]. I.O.P. 40.2, which was developed after the Black decision, provides
that effective October 3, 1984, government attorneys may request additional time in which to
file a petition for rehearing, in view of the Solicitor General's rule that the Solicitor General's
Office must thoroughly review all appeals and court decisions before United States attorneys
may petition for rehearing. Id.
43. See 733 F.2d at 353 (Winter, J., dissenting). The dissent in Black noted that the
[Vol. 42:447
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
contended that an untimely motion for rehearing was not a legitimate
proceeding within a proper construction of section 3161(h)(1)(J), and thus
was not a proceeding that tolled the Act's time limit. 4
In addition, the dissent noted that other circuits have held that once an
appellate court issues a mandate, that court loses jurisdiction over the
defendant. 45 To reacquire jurisdiction, the dissent argued, an appellate court
must recall the mandate. 46 The dissent argued that, absent a recall, the Fourth
Circuit could not take under advisement any proceeding concerning the
defendant.
47
Examining the district court record, the dissent noted the government's
delays in response to attempts by the district court and the defendant to set
a trial date within the Act's limitation period. 4 The dissent argued that the
government's fault led to the government's untimely filing for rehearing and
failure to bring the defendant to trial within seventy days. 49 The dissent
concluded, therefore, that the Act mandated dismissal of the charges against
the defendant.
50
The correctness of the Black decision depends on whether section
3161(h)(1)(J) requires that an appellate court have jurisdiction over a case
before a proceeding in the appellate court will toll the running of the Act's
government filed both a petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing en bane. Id. The
dissent contended that under rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the second
petition was unnecessary and provoked unwarranted delay. Id. at 352 n.l; FED. R. App. P. 35
(court will consider all petitions for rehearing as having potential for en banc rehearing,
regardless of form).
44. 733 F.2d at 353 (Winter, J., dissenting); see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text
(discussing Black dissent's contention that second motion for rehearing resulting in delay is not
excludable under Act).
45. 733 F.2d at 353 (Winter, J., dissenting). The dissent in Black cited United States v.
DiLapi for the proposition that jurisdiction does not obtain in an appellate court after the court
issues its mandate. Id.; see United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing
cases holding that issuance of mandate terminates jurisdiction), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938
(1982).
46. See 733 F.2d at 351. The Black dissent construed § 3161(h)(l)(J) of the Act to
encompass only proceedings concerning the defendant in which the court has jurisdiction to
order the relief sought. Id. The dissent argued that although the court had authority to recall
the mandate and thereby reacquire jurisdiction over the defendant, the court could not assume
jurisdiction unless the court recalled the mandate. Id. The dissent argued that without actually
recalling the mandate, the court did not have jurisdiction. Id. The dissent stated jurisdiction
was a prerequisite to a "proceeding" under the language of § 3161(h)(1)(J). Id.
47. 733 F.2d at 353 (Winter, J., dissenting). See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text
(discussion of dissent's reasoning in Black).
48. See 733 F.2d at 352, 353 & n.l, 354 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing examples of
unexplained government delay). But see supra note 42 (Fourth Circuit internal procedures
recognize that, under Solicitor General's review policy, United States attorneys must submit
petitions for rehearing to thorough review of merits by Solicitor General before filing petition).
49. 733 F.2d at 354 (Winter, J., dissenting).
50. Id. The Black dissent separately considered whether the district court correctly had
ordered the dismissal with prejudice of charges against Black. Id.; see supra note 7 (discussing
Act provision for dismissal of charges with or without prejudice). The dissent stated that the
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limitation period.5 ' The majority correctly noted that jurisdiction does not
affect the court's power to rehear or recall a mandate after it has issued .
2
The majority's view is consistent with decisions in other circuits that recall
of a mandate may be obtained regardless of whether the motion to recall is
timely.5 For example, in American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA,5 4 the
District of Columbia Circuit recalled a mandate issued two years earlier
because a Supreme Court decision in the intervening period undermined the
basis for the original American Iron decision.5 5 In deciding to recall the
mandate, the American Iron court examined the source of an appellate
court's authority to recall a mandate, and held that the authority is rooted
dismissal with prejudice was entirely within the district court's discretion. 733 F.2d at 354
(Winter, J., dissenting).
51. See 733 F.2d at 351 (court's power to take motion under advisement is grounded in
appellate court's inherent authority to recall and modify mandate); id. at 353 (Winter, J.,
dissenting) (untimely motion to rehear was not "proceeding" under § 3161(h)(1)(J) because
Fourth Circuit did not have jurisdiction once court issued mandate).
52. See 733 F.2d at 351; infra note 60-62 and accompanying text (analyzing Black court's
interpretation of "proceeding" as used in § 3161(h)(1)(J)).
53. See, e.g., Cruz v. Alexander, 708 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1983) (court granted untimely
motion for recall of mandate for modification); United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 144 n.2
(2d Cir. 1981) (dicta that no reacquisition of jurisdiction is needed to deny petition for rehearing
after mandate issued), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); A to Z Portion Meats, Inc. v. NLRB,
643 F.2d 390, 392 n.1 (6th Cir. 1980) (court possesses inherent power to recall mandate and
rehear appeal); Dilley v. Alexander, 627 F.2d 407, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court's power to recall
mandate emanates from inherent power to recall on good cause shown); Sparks v. DuVal
County Ranch Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 976, 979 (5th Cir. 1979) (dicta that power to recall mandate
is well-established), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. E.P.A.,
560 F.2d 589, 593 & n.15 (3rd Cir. 1977) (citing prior circuit court decisions adopting proposition
that appellate court may recall mandate in appropriate circumstances), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
914 (1978); Alphin v. Henson, 552 F.2d 1033, 1035 (4th Cir.) (dictum that court possesses
power to recall mandate in exceptional circumstances), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 424 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir.) (court has duty and power
to permit untimely petition for rehearing and to modify an erroneous decision after time for
rehearing has expired), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970). But see Powers v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir. 1973) (ruling of law that later was overruled in another case
was not so unconscionable in its effect as to justify reopening judgment not void when issued);
Hines v. Royal Indemnity Co., 253 F.2d 111, 113-14 (6th Cir. 1958) (although court has power
to recall mandate, court will not do so unless mandate is void, fraudulent, or manifestly
unconscionable). See generally WmiOnT & MILLER, supra note 18, at § 3938, 276 (discussing
sources of authority for recall); Note, Recall of Appellate Mandates in Federal Civil Litigation,
64 CORNELL L. Rav. 704, 706-07 (1979) (discussing balancing of court's authority to recall in
order to protect court processes against public's interest in finality of judgment).
54. 560 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
55. See 560 F.2d at 591. In American Iron, the District of Columbia Circuit had ordered
the EPA in 1975 to restructure the methodology used to arrive at water discharge standards
embodied in certain EPA regulations. Id. at 591-592. In February, 1977, the Supreme Court
implicitly approved the same regulations. Id. at 595; see E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138-39 (1977) (upholding EPA regulations setting water discharge standard-
setting methodology). The EPA then petitioned for recall and modification of the D.C. Circuit's
original mandate. 560 F.2d at 590. The EPA pointed out in its motion for recall that recall
would not injure either party's reliance because the EPA made little progress toward compliance
with its original judgment in the intervening two years. Id. at 592.
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in a court's inherent power to protect the integrity of its processes and the
uniformity of decisions within the circuit5 6 The American Iron court deter-
mined that the parties had not acted in reliance on the mandate and held
that recall of the mandate would not disturb the strong public interest in
finality of decisions.
57
Applying the American Iron holding to the Black case, the majority
properly noted that, where grounds for recall and modification of a mandate
exist, grounds must exist for an appellate court to accept untimely motions
for rehearing. 5 However, the issue of whether an appellate court can
reacquire jurisdiction over a defendant when it finds insufficient grounds to
recall and modify a mandate is one of first impression in the circuit courts.5 9
The Black court correctly analyzed the question in terms of a court's inherent
power to recall. 60 Under the Black analysis, the inherent power to recall a
mandate must include the power to take under advisement a motion that
will toll the Act's limitation period. 6' The Black analysis supports the policies
56. See 560 F.2d at 592-93. The American Iron court cited cases in which courts relied
on statutory foundations for the authority to recall. Id.; see Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 643 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which authorizes
appellate court to modify or vacate any judgment as that court deems just, to permit reassessment
of an appellate court's own decisions), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The American Iron
court noted several circuit decisions allowing recall under an "inherent authority" theory. 560
F.2d at 592-93 & n.15, n.17.
57. 560 F.2d at 594. The American Iron court held that situations dictating recall include,
first, where clarification of a mandate was critical, second, where misconduct had affected the
propriety of judicial processes, third, where there existed a danger of incongruent results in
cases pending at the same time, fourth, where an unintended mandate instruction had caused
an unjust result, and fifth, where a subsequent Supreme Court decision showed that the original
judgment was wrong. Id. at 594. In one Fourth Circuit decision, the court held that the facts
justified recall because the en banc court that issued the mandate improperly included a circuit
judge no longer in service, rendering the judgment defective. Uzzell v. Friday, 625 F.2d 111,
112 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980).
58. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing grounds for recall of
mandate).
59. See 733 F.2d at 351 (cases cited for support of majority involve factual and legal
issues different from issues in Black); U.S. v. Dunn, 706 F.2d 153, 154 (4th Cir. 1983) (stay of
mandate not necessary for purposes of tolling Act time clock, because pending petition for
certiorari will toll Act), vacated on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984); United States v.
DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 144 n.2 (2d. Cir. 1981) (dicta that court need not reacquire appellate
jurisdiction to deny motion for rehearing), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
60. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing court's inherent power to
recall); infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (courts should dispose of recall motion based
on validity of grounds for motion rather than on procedural untimeliness).
61. See 733 F.2d at 351 (if motion to rehear does not toll Act's limitation period, court
will endure possibly meritless rehearing merely in order to prevent release of criminal). The
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure vest power in appellate courts to enlarge sua sponte the
time limits for filing motions. See FED. R. App. P. 2 (court may suspend sua sponte filing
requirements of any rule); FED. R. App. P. 26(b) (court may enlarge filing period for good
cause shown); FED. R. App. P. 40(a) (local rule or court order may modify rule 40(a) time
limits); supra note 42 (Fourth Circuit rules now allow extension for government filing of petition
for rehearing where good cause shown); see also Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944)
(vacating court of appeals decision for failure to consider relevant new state court opinion,
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underlying appellate courts' recall authority, because the government will
not be forestalled from bringing a motion to rehear when the law provides
a legitimate ground for modifying a mandate. 62 The Fourth Circuit analysis
also comports with the policies of the Act, since the Act's exclusion provisions
treat proceedings necessary to establish a law under which a defendant will
be tried as proceedings that must toll the running of the Act.
63
Because the majority in Black relied on the discretionary authority of
appellate courts to take under advisement untimely motions to rehear, the
Black decision protects defendants from the risk that the government will
delay trial by filing meritless untimely motions. 4 The Fourth Circuit, like
other circuits, 65 follows the rule that an untimely motion to recall a judgment
must show that injustice would result if the parties relied on the judgment."
Since the Fourth Circuit can refuse to take under advisement an untimely
motion that asserts insufficient grounds, 67 the Black rule limits the prosecu-
tion's opportunity to delay retrial to the time needed by the appellate court
to evaluate the government's grounds for untimeliness of filing. 6 In view of
issued six months after court of appeals judgment; parties raised issue of new opinion on
untimely motion for rehearing).
62. See American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 594-95 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(balancing need to modify erroneous judgment against need for finality of judgment), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1977); supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing American
Iron case); see also supra note 53 (cases holding that recall of mandate is necessary in some
circumstances).
63. See S. REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 9-10 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate
Report] (§ 3161(b) exclusions are designed to alleviate harsh time limits of Act to ensure that
Act limitation period will not impair proper trial procedures).
64. See 733 F.2d at 351 (citing district court finding that government acted in good faith).
65. See supra note 53 (decisions recognizing duty to recall to protect court processes and
to prevent injustice).
66. See Uzzell v. Friday, 625 F.2d 1117, 1120 (4th Cir.) (recalling mandate one year after
issuance where decisions turned on vote of judge later shown not to be qualified for panel),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); Alphin v. Henson, 552 F.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Cir.) (modifying
mandate nine months after judgment to reflect intervening change in statute), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 823 (1977); see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing balancing of
public's interest in finality and prevention of unjust result due to erroneous mandate).
67. See, e.g., Trail v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 965 (6th
Cir. 1976) (defendant's untimely motion for rehearing dismissed for untimeliness); Burkette v.
Shell Oil Co., 487 F.2d 1308, 1317 (5th Cir. 1973) (court will ignore untimely attempt to obtain
rehearing); United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 762-63 (1st Cir.) (motion for rehearing dismissed
because motion was disguised attempt to reargue matters already adjudicated), vacated on other
grounds sub nom., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); cf. Cross Baking Co. v.
NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346, 1351 (Ist Cir. 1971) (court will hear argument of issue only once barring
substantial excuse).
68. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (courts will not review motions for
rehearing unless adequate grounds exist); see also FED. R. APP. P. 26(b) (appellate court may
allow untimely motion for good cause shown); Shumar v. United States, 423 U.S. 879 (1976)
(denial of certiorari) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (mere inadvertence does not excuse untimeliness
in filing of untimely motion for rehearing, notwithstanding substantive grounds for rehearing);
1979 Senate Report, supra note 63, at 34, (necessary time for deliberation on motion should be
considerably less than thirty days if motion is routine); 1974 House Report, supra note 3, at
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the district court's finding that the government acted in good faith in filing
its untimely motion,69 the Black court properly allowed exclusidn of the
deliberation period as a "proceeding" contemplated by section 3161(h)(1)(J).
70
In contrast to the majority's emphasis on the substance of the govern-
ment's untimely motion, the dissent in Black focused on the procedural
abuse resulting from the government's use of duplicative motions. 7' The
dissent, however, failed to address the district court's finding that the
government acted in good faith when it entered the duplicative filing that
resulted in the twenty-seven day delay.72 Further, by relying on a procedural
analysis, the dissent failed to consider whether the motion for rehearing was
necessary to determine the law of the case, in view of the Act's policy that
necessary pretrial procedures shall toll the Act's time limit.73 Finally, the
dissent erroneously concluded that a motion to recall a mandate is not a
proceeding with regard to the mandate unless the motion results in actual
recall of the mandate.7 4 The dissent thus obscured the Speedy Trial Act issue
of whether the petition under advisement was so necessary to the proper trial
of Black that a court should excuse the delay attributable to the proceeding.
7 5
The decision in Black indicates that the Fourth Circuit will adopt a
flexible construction of the Speedy Trial Act exclusion provisions in order
to prevent unwarranted dismissal of criminal charges. 76 Black is consistent
22, 7415 (for proceeding to be "actually under advisement" under § 3161(h)(1)(J), court actually
must be considering motion or conducting research on novel legal question).
69. See 733 F.2d at 351 (district court dismissed Black's indictment with prejudice despite
finding good faith in government delay).
70. See id. at 351, 352 n.7 (anguage of § 3161(h)(1)(J) does not restrict definition of
"proceeding" to motions timely filed).
71. See id. at 352 & n.1 (Winter, J., dissenting) (government use of duplicative motions
unnecessarily delayed retrial); supra notes 3-5 (purpose of sixth amendment speedy trial right is
to eliminate unwarranted governmental delay of trial).
72. See 733 F.2d at 352, 352 n.1 (Winter, J., dissenting) (government attorneys' procedural
errors unnecessarily delayed retrial). But see supra note 42 (Fourth Circuit internal operating
procedures recognize government's special circumstances, based on inherent delay required by
Solicitor General's review, may dictate extension of filing time).
73. See 733 F.2d at 353 (Winter, J., dissenting); supra notes 42-44 (discussing dissent's
view of reasons for delay); 1974 House Report, supra note 3, at 21, 7414 (hearings, proceedings,
and other necessary delays which normally occur prior to trial of criminal cases will toll Act's
time limits).
74. See 733 F.2d at 353 (Winter, J., dissenting) (Fourth Circuit lost jurisdiction of Black's
case when court issued mandate); supra note 45 (discussing decision determining that court loses
jurisdiction over case when court issues mandate); supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text
(grounds for rehearing, not issuance of mandate, should determine whether motion for rehearing
tolls Act time limit).
75. See 733 F.2d at 352 n.1 (Winter, J., dissenting) (discussing government's procedural
errors); supra notes 3-5 & 73 (discussing purposes of excludable delay provisions in Speedy
Trial Act).
76. See 733 F.2d at 351-352 (Black court's concern that Act's statute of limitations not
be allowed to run out during time Fourth Circuit holds petition for rehearing under advisement);
supra note 39 (petition for rehearing constitutes proceeding with regard to defendant's case,
notwithstanding untimely filing).
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